Using Asset Poverty Measures to Understand Poverty Dynamics, Poverty Traps and Farmer Behavior in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Focus on Rural Ethiopia by Liverpool, Lenis Saweda
  
 
USING ASSET POVERTY MEASURES TO UNDERSTAND POVERTY 
DYNAMICS, POVERTY TRAPS AND FARMER BEHAVIOR IN SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA:  A FOCUS ON RURAL ETHIOPIA 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
LENIS SAWEDA LIVERPOOL 
 
B.S., University of Jos, 2001 
M.S., University of Iowa, 2004 
M.A., University of Iowa, 2004 
 
 
 
DISSERTATION 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Agricultural and Consumer Economics 
in the Graduate College of the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2009 
 
 
 
 
Urbana, Illinois 
 
 
Doctoral Committee: 
 
Professor Alex Winter-Nelson, Chair 
Assistant Professor Kathy Baylis 
Associate Professor Craig Gundersen 
Associate Professor Madhubalan Viswanathan 
 
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
Effective poverty reduction programs require careful measurement of poverty 
status. Commonly used consumption or income-based classifications of poverty 
aggregate together households that are persistently poor with those who are only in 
poverty due to passing conditions.  They also classify as non-poor households that are at 
risk of falling into poverty as well as those that are not at risk. The tendency to group 
households that are likely to exit poverty independently with other poor households who 
lack this ability undermines the targeting of interventions to alleviate poverty and distorts 
evaluation of anti-poverty programs. Asset-based poverty measures enable more nuanced 
identification of poverty status, but these methods raise methodological problems when 
estimating the relationship between assets and livelihood. This dissertation uses panel 
data from Ethiopia to generate an asset-based poverty classification scheme. Regression 
results are used to derive an asset index and classify households into various categories of 
poverty. Asset index dynamics are also explored to test for the existence of multiple asset 
index equilibria; evidence of poverty traps. Results provide evidence of multiple 
equilibria in the study sample as a whole as well as convergence at different levels for 
different peasant associations, depending on commercialization opportunities and agro- 
ecological factors. The asset-based poverty classifications predict future poverty status 
more accurately than income-based measures implying that the asset-based measure 
could be used to more carefully target poverty interventions and to more accurately 
assess the impact of those interventions.  
Microfinance is often touted as a practical means of helping rural poor overcome 
capital constraints, and invest in new technology.  Using an asset-based approach to 
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poverty measurement and classification chapter three of this dissertation asks whether 
microfinance has a differential impact on use of improved technology and on 
consumption and asset growth depending on the family’s asset poverty status. The 
analysis finds no relationship between participation in microfinance programs and the use 
of modern technologies for the poorest households. Microfinance has a positive direct 
effect on both consumption and asset growth as well as on the use of modern technology 
among the relatively wealthier (less poor) households. I find that households who use 
fertilizer tend to enjoy more rapid consumption growth, and greater accumulation of 
productive assets, irrespective of their poverty status, but microfinance has no effect on 
the likelihood of fertilizer use among the poorest households. This implies that while 
modern technology could present a pathway out of persistent poverty, current formal 
credit programs are not serving the poorest households in this endeavor. The findings 
confirm the need to closely assess constraints faced by different classes of poor 
households and suggest the value of asset based poverty classifications in identifying 
target groups.  
The adoption and use of modern technologies is generally accepted as a potential 
vehicle out of poverty but  adoption rates in Ethiopia remain low with the nature of the 
adoption process largely unstudied (Spielman, 2007). Chapter 4 of this dissertation 
studies the impact of social networks and social leanring on technology adoption  in rural 
Ethiopia. Considering the potentially different marginal benefits of reducing information 
constraints by poverty status and technology type, the chapter explores the differential 
impacts of social networks by network type, technology and the asset poverty status of 
households. In addition to geographic networks, it considers the role played by networks 
iv 
 
with more purposeful interactions such as a household’s friends.  Results confirm the 
presence of social learning among farmers in rural Ethiopia, with significant difference 
across network type, farmer type and technologies. Social learning occurs in networks 
with purposeful interaction and depending on the technology this effect differs across 
households experiencing different degrees of poverty. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Effective poverty reduction programs require proper identification of the poor 
and a clear understanding of the nature of and mechanisms that underlie their 
predicament. Similarly successful evaluation of poverty reduction programs requires 
identification of the poor to isolate the effect(s) of the policy or strategy in question. 
Thus, to properly design and evaluate poverty reduction efforts, one needs a careful 
measurement of poverty status.   
Over the years, the concept of poverty has expanded to incorporate more than 
just monetary aspects of human wellbeing. Issues such as education, infrastructure and 
other public services, property rights, political freedom, and the presence of 
widespread corruption have been incorporated into its definition (UN, 2005). Be that 
as it may, poverty measurement and classification today is still largely based on 
income or expenditures and some poverty line based on these measures which 
constitutes a threshold below which one is considered to be in poverty. While useful, 
such measures inform us of the past (albeit recent in some cases) situation of an 
individual, household or community with little insight into the underlying potential of 
this individual, household or community to sustain or improve their situation. 
This dissertation compiles several efforts to explore the possibility to better 
define, measure and locate the poor as well as to evaluate the effect of poverty 
reduction strategies and programs on their behavior and livelihood. Most developing 
countries have a large informal sector precluding the recording of income earned. 
Furthermore in rural areas, accurate measurement of income and consumption 
expenditures is very difficult.  Consequently this research adopts a concept of poverty 
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based on capabilities and vulnerability. It develops a poverty measure that focuses on 
potential productive capacity based on human, physical and social capital and 
compares this measure to traditional poverty measures usually based on reported 
income or consumption expenditures. Upon comparison of the asset poverty measure 
to traditional measures, the asset measure is found to provide additional information 
on the structural nature of poverty. Then I explore the usefulness of the asset poverty 
measure in understanding farmer behavior and response to poverty reduction 
strategies.  First, I assess the differential impact of formal credit on farmer use of 
improved technology and on consumption and asset growth based on their asset 
poverty level in rural Ethiopia. Then I explore the differential impact of social 
networks in the technology adoption process among different kinds of asset poor 
farmers and for different kinds of technologies in the region of study. 
Ethiopia is a poor landlocked country situated in the horn of Africa. It ranks 
169 out of 179 in the Human Development index with life expectancy of 53 years 
vs.78 for the United States and 63 for the world (HDI) (Human Development Report, 
2008). Ethiopia’s GDP per capita (PPP) is $591 compared to $2,223 for Sub Saharan 
Africa and $41,676 for the United States.  Adult literacy is slated at 36% compared to 
99% for USA.  The majority of Ethiopians are engaged in agriculture with over 84% 
of the population being rural. More than three-quarters (77.8%) of the population lives 
on less than $2 a day and 45% of Ethiopians live below the national poverty line (IMF, 
2006; EEA, 2005). Faced with frequent droughts, land pressure and soil quality 
deterioration, agricultural productivity is very low, even declining in many regions of 
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Ethiopia. Between 1984 and 2002, annual per capita food production dropped from 
450 kilograms to 140 kilograms (Global Policy Forum, 2005). 
Ethiopia is also characterized by a complex political and economic history. 
Over the past half a century, the nation experienced a monarchic political regime 
between 1950 and 1974, a central planning regime (the Derge) during 1974-1991, and 
the current regime that has been in power since the collapse of the Derge in May 1991. 
Each of these political regimes is associated with distinct economic policies which 
have had different effects on the nation’s agricultural sector in terms of both accesses 
to factors of production as well as marketing of inputs and outputs (Rashid et al, 
2009).  
Ethiopia has been and continues to be a major recipient of aid receiving over 
1.9 billion dollars in 2006. This translates to about $25 ODA per capita, an amount 
that is largely superseded only by countries which are currently ravaged by war or just 
recovering from war (World Bank, 2007). Ethiopia also has a high presence of 
international agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGO’s) attempting to 
address the prevalence and depth of poverty in the country from multiple approaches.1
                                                 
1 Ethiopia's parliament has passed a controversial bill imposing tight restrictions on aid agencies.  
 
These key issues of poverty prevalence, low agricultural productivity, changing 
economic policy and national and international efforts to alleviate poverty highlight 
why Ethiopia is an appropriate site for a study on poverty; particularly one trying to 
explore the structural nature of poverty  and its implication on the use and effect of 
From January 6, 2009, foreign agencies have been prohibited from a number of areas including human 
rights, equality, conflict resolution and the rights of children (BBC, 2009). 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7814145.stm 
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various poverty reduction efforts. For example, with regard to formal credit, 
microfinance is often touted as a practical means of helping rural poor overcome 
capital constraints, and invest in new technology.  This dissertation (in chapter 3) asks 
whether microfinance has a differential impact on use of improved technology and on 
consumption and asset growth depending on the family’s asset poverty status. The 
analysis finds no relationship between participation in microfinance programs and the 
use of modern technologies for the poorest households. Among the relatively less poor 
households, microfinance has a positive direct effect on both consumption and asset 
growth as well as on the use of modern technology. While households using fertilizer 
tend to enjoy more rapid consumption growth and asset accumulation, microfinance 
has no effect on the likelihood of fertilizer use among the poorest households. This has 
direct policy implication as since modern technology use could be a pathway out of 
persistent poverty, findings reveal that current formal credit programs are not serving 
the poorest households in this endeavor.  The findings of chapter 3 confirm the 
variation in constraints faced by different classes of poor households and suggest the 
value of asset based poverty classifications in identifying target groups.   
Another key constraint to rural farmer technology adoption and productivity is 
inadequate information on the practice of various techniques. A common solution to 
this constraint has been the expansion of extension services, whose form and efficacy 
can depend on the nature of social learning as well as on formal instruction. Despite 
numerous years and programs for agricultural extension, appropriate technology 
disseminations systems are still being sought. Chapter 4 studies the impact of social 
networks in the technology adoption process in rural Ethiopia. Using the asset based 
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poverty measure developed in chapter 2, chapter 4 tests for potentially different 
marginal benefits of information based on household poverty status and by 
technology. In addition to geographic networks, generally considered in the literature, 
this chapter considers the role played by other networks with more purposeful 
interactions such as a household’s friends. The findings from this chapter show that 
social learning effects are available in rural Ethiopia and that they emerge through 
purposeful interaction rather than proximity. This is significant for extension planning 
as technology diffusion is likely to be enhanced if extension can reach more networks 
of interest.  This implies a need to target intentional groups of rural people rather than 
spatial clusters. Identifying such groups presents a challenge to extension services. 
 
Background and Justification 
Global poverty statistics list well over a billion people as living in absolute 
poverty (on less than $1.25 a day in 2005 purchasing power parity terms) (Ravallion 
and Chen, 2008). Despite current efforts by the world’s governments, multilateral 
agencies and many non-governmental organizations to halve the proportion of people 
living in poverty by 2015, it is estimated that with the current population growth 
trends, at least 900 million people will still live in chronic poverty2
                                                 
2 Chronic poverty here focuses on the duration of poverty status and refers to persistent poverty. 
 in the next 
generation (CPRC, 2009). While all other areas of the world have seen at least slow 
rates of absolute poverty reduction, in Sub Saharan Africa poverty rates have actually 
increased since 1990 and given present trends will only fall very slowly at best in the 
next 11 years (World Bank, 2008). 
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Defining and measuring poverty are crucial to any discussion of poverty 
reduction. While much progress has been made in measuring and analyzing income 
poverty, it is generally accepted that efforts are needed to measure and study the many 
other dimensions of poverty.  According to Sen, being poor does not mean living 
below an arbitrary poverty line, such as an income of two dollars a day or less. 
"…There are systematic disparities in the freedoms that people enjoy even within 
societies," says Sen, "and these disparities are often not reducible to differences in 
income…." Rather than measuring poverty by income level, Sen recommends 
calculating how much an individual can achieve with that income, taking into account 
that such achievements will vary from one individual to another and from one place to 
another… a focus on an individual’s potential to function rather than the results the 
individual obtains from functioning (Global Policy Forum, 2001). Similarly, Narayan 
(2003) describes the self reinforcing nature of poverty with descriptions of poverty by 
the poor themselves.  
“…in addition to being without financial resources, 
being poor often means suffering sickness…It means 
enduring difficult social relations, sometimes facing 
exclusion from the community or family. Poverty also 
translates into insecurity and powerlessness, a lack of 
access to information and institutions, and often a lack 
of self-confidence and voice…It is hard to plan ahead or 
to seize new opportunities when you are exhausted, 
stressed, or hungry… living in poverty often means 
facing a truncated view of the future... The poor are 
often averse to risk, having suffered from mistakes or 
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false expectations in the past and lacking assets to fall 
back on”. (Narayan, 2003) 
 
All these descriptions further reveal the complexity of poverty and the 
challenge faced by researchers and practitioners whose work depends on the proper 
identification of the poor; for the targeting of poverty reduction programs as well as 
for the analysis of the various strategies implemented. Currently in the field of 
international development, the multidimensionality of poverty is usually addressed via 
measures such as the human development index (Hulme and Shepherd, 2003). These 
efforts include assembling comparable and high-quality social indicators for 
education, health, access to services and infrastructure (World Bank, 2008). While 
very useful measures, further insight into the processes through which these non 
income measures affect poverty as well as various mechanisms which could prevent 
such services and provisions from positively affecting the livelihoods of  some 
individuals, households and  communities is needed to maximize their usefulness. 
Recent efforts have been geared towards developing new indicators to track 
other dimensions of poverty such as risk, vulnerability, social exclusion, and access to 
social capital while making sure that such measures permit comparison across and 
within countries. This research contributes to that effort by focusing on the 
combination of assets owned and/or controlled by households as indicators of the 
potential productive capacity and ability to use various inputs in production and wealth 
generation.  
Given the preeminence of physical and human assets the portfolios of rural 
households, issues of household economic growth and vulnerability are directly related 
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to the bundle of assets a household controls directly as well as its access to external 
resources through its stock of social capital. The bundle of assets a household controls 
is an indicator of its ability to take advantage of various growth promoting economic 
ventures (for example investing in new technologies or nonfarm activities) and to 
respond to various shocks. However, social capital plays a significant role in both 
these processes. In rural areas with weak and often nonexistent financial markets, 
informal networks and social ties often play a key role in asset accumulation, enabling 
various investments as well as preventing the depletion of assets in the event of 
various shocks, particularly those which are idiosyncratic (Zimmerman and Carter, 
2003; Adato et al, 2006; Mogues, 2006). 
Recent studies on asset-based poverty measures have clearly indicated the 
potential benefits from such measures (See Carter et al, 2006; Little et al, 2006; Carter 
and Barrett, 2006; Sahn and Stifel, 2000; Sahn and Stifel, 2003). Other researchers like 
Hulme and Shepherd (2003) have empirically shown how lack of assets or asset 
accumulation is a key factor in poverty persistence. However, while these studies 
conclude that assets are key to understanding poverty, they suggest assets as 
something to be considered rather than used in measuring poverty.  
This study thus not only explores the additional value of asset-based poverty 
measures over traditional poverty measurements based only on income or 
consumption expenditures, but also uses classifications based on these measures to 
explore the effects of poverty reduction programs on the welfare of rural households. 
It makes the case that asset based poverty measures should be poverty measures in 
their own right and not just indicators of poverty to be considered in poverty 
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measurement. Baseline data on assets can and should be used to more accurately 
identify households to target for specific programs, while ex post data on assets should 
be used to indicate the impacts of interventions more clearly than expenditures data in 
isolation. 
 This research also shows that the marginal benefit of reducing various 
constraints faced by rural farmers is different depending on their degree of poverty and 
should be considered more fully in the development and evaluation of poverty 
reduction programs. This is an issue not largely discussed in the development research. 
For example, while poverty itself is acknowledged as a constraint to technology 
adoption, its effect on the marginal value of poverty reduction strategies is not often 
discussed. This dissertation uses two examples to show how the marginal impact of 
typical poverty reduction strategies (reduced credit and information constraints) differs 
depending on the degree of household poverty. 
 
Research Problem and Questions 
This dissertation explores the possibility of using an asset-based poverty measure 
to increase our ability to define, measure and locate the poor as well as to evaluate the 
effect of poverty reduction programs on their behavior and livelihood. Consequently 
the study attempts to answer the following questions: 
 
1. Can asset based poverty measures improve our understanding of poverty over 
what is provided by traditional poverty measures?  If yes, in what ways is such 
added value captured? 
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This question is answered by empirically estimating a theoretically consistent 
asset based poverty measure, using it to test for poverty traps and/or the 
existence of multiple equilibria of asset bundles in rural Ethiopia. Then the 
asset measure is compared to traditional poverty measures based on income or 
consumption expenditures using various statistical measures of the predictive 
power of both measures as well as via transition matrices that  show how well 
the poverty status of a household is predicted by the income and asset poverty 
measures 
2. Can household classifications based on asset based poverty measures be useful 
as a tool for program evaluation as well as a useful benchmark in program 
development?  
This question is answered by empirically testing for a differential impact of 
formal credit on use of improved technology and on consumption and asset 
growth across subpopulations differentiated by their asset holdings and 
structural transitions or lack thereof. 
3. Do social networks play a role in technology adoption? If yes, what kinds of 
roles to they play and how, if at all do they differ across technologies and 
across different kinds of asset poor households. 
This question is answered by empirically testing for a differential impact of 
social networks on farmer technology adoption using a social learning model. 
Distinctions are made across three lines; first, between geographic and non 
geographic networks, second between new and old technologies and finally 
between persistently asset poor households and those who are not. 
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DATA: The Ethiopia Rural Household Survey (ERHS) 
The Ethiopia Rural Household Survey (ERHS) is a unique longitudinal 
household data set covering 1477 households in a number of peasant associations (a 
group of villages3
 
) in rural Ethiopia. Data collection started in 1989, when a team 
visited 7 farming peasant associations (PAs) in Central and Southern Ethiopia. In 
1994, the survey was expanded to cover 15 PAs across the country. An additional 
round was conducted in late 1994, with further rounds in 1995 1997, 1999 and 2004. 
Attrition in the sample is low with information available each year for about 88 
percent of households. In 1999 there is information for 94 percent of the households 
interviewed in 1994. These surveys have been supervised by the Economics 
Department, Addis Ababa University (Economics/AAU), the Centre for the Study of 
African Economies (CSAE), University of Oxford and the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington DC. 
Sampling 
Though the ERHS data collection exercise started in 1989, this dissertation 
only makes use of the household data collected between 1994 and 2004, with 
additional information from a subset of 186 households in 2007.  It also makes use of 
community level surveys conducted in 1994, 1999 and 2007. Though households 
within PAs were randomly sampled in 1989, the PAs selected were mainly areas that 
had suffered from the 1984-1985 famine and other droughts that followed between 
                                                 
3 While due recognition is given to the definitional difference of PA and village, villages and PA are 
used interchangeably to refer to PA in the course of this dissertation. 
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1987 and 1989. In 1994, CSAE and their collaborators at Addis Ababa University 
(AAU) started a panel survey incorporating six of the seven PAs earlier surveyed in 
1989. (One of the PAs which is in a semi-pastoralist area in Southern Ethiopia could 
not be revisited again because of violent conflict in the area). In these previously 
visited PAs, given the panel data focus, all households still present in the peasant 
association were revisited. A household was kept in the sample even if the head of the 
household had left or died. About 8 percent of the households had a different head, in 
most cases the spouse of the earlier head. In these six PAs, the attrition rate was less 
than 7 per cent (Dercon and Hoddinott, 2004). Low attrition is attributed to the fact 
that households cannot obtain land when moving to other areas. In these PAs, an 
attempt was made to re-randomize the sample by including an exact proportion of 
newly formed or arrived households in the sample, as well by replacing the lost 
households by households which were considered by PA elders and officials as 
broadly similar to in demographic and wealth terms as the households which could not 
be traced. Households formed out of households interviewed in 1989 were also 
interviewed, usually sons or daughters who after marriage formed their own 
household.  
The additional 9 peasant associations added in 1994 were selected to account 
for the diversity in the farming systems in the country, including the grain-plough 
areas of the Northern and Central highlands, the enset-growing areas and the sorghum-
hoe areas. While this amounts to a sample frame stratified by the main agro-ecological 
zones and sub-zones, and one to three PAs per strata was selected, it is generally 
acknowledged by researchers using this data that sampling only 15 of the thousands of 
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PAs in rural Ethiopia is not fully representative but can be considered broadly 
representative of households in non-pastoralist farming systems as of 1994. The sampling 
in the PAs newly included in 1994 was done by constructing a list of all households in 
a PA with the help of the local PA officials. All land in Ethiopia is owned by the 
government. To obtain land, households have to register with the PA and lists of the 
household’s allocated land are kept. Thus in virtually all PAs, there were good lists of 
households, for use as sampling frames.  Within each PA, random sampling was used, 
stratified by female headed and non-female headed households and by land ownership. 
Sampling size in each PA was governed by an attempt to obtain a self-weighting 
sample, when considered in terms of farming system: each person (approximately) 
represents the same number of persons from the main farming systems. The advantage 
is that pooling of the data is simplified, although alternative procedures could easily 
have been implemented.  
In conjunction with the implementation of the 1994 and 1995 survey rounds, 
PA profiles were constructed for all 15 PAs. These were based on qualitative 
fieldwork, secondary sources, interviews with key informants and community level 
questionnaires. These profiles locate each PA in time and space, include maps 
showing where these PAs are found, describe seasonal activities and events, outline 
the most important economic and reproductive activities, outline local institutions, 
organizations, values and beliefs, and relationships with other communities and 
Ethiopian society. The development of these profiles was overseen by Dr Philippa 
Bevan, University of Bath and Dr Alula Pankhurst, Addis Ababa University. (Dercon, 
2004).  In 2007, supplemental data from about 186 households in 2 out of the 15 PAs 
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was collected. These 2 PAs were selected due to information from community level 
surveys and local informants which indicated that there had been recent promotions of 
various new technologies in those villages. A map of Ethiopia depicting the various 
PAs is shown in Figure 1.1. 
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CHAPTER TWO: AN ASSET-BASED APPROACH TO POVERTY 
CLASSIFICATION OF RURAL HOUSEHOLDS IN ETHIOPIA 
Introduction 
Given their limited resources, governments in many African countries must 
make difficult choices when developing policies to combat poverty. For example, 
policy could emphasize alleviating conditions for the poorest of the poor or assisting 
marginally poor households to become consistently non-poor. Policies to reduce the 
proportion of people living in extreme poverty might not reduce the number of people 
living below the poverty line, while interventions that provide safety nets for 
households living close to the poverty line might not support society's poorest (UNDP, 
2006). Whatever the specific objectives of a poverty reduction approach, policy 
makers must distinguish among households in different degrees or forms of poverty in 
order to make informed interventions. Identification of and distinction among  the poor 
can be particularly difficult when a large share of the population is rural and depends 
on highly variable incomes from agricultural production in a highly informal 
economy.  In such a setting it may be difficult to distinguish those households that are 
consistently poor or non-poor from those that are transitionally in one status or the 
other due to passing conditions in the weather or markets.  
Most poverty classification has been based on per capita income or 
consumption expenditures as a gauge of per capita income. With the increasing 
availability of panel data, more nuanced measures of poverty can be derived to enable 
finer distinctions among the poor. Panel data allows the distinction between those 
experiencing transitory income-poverty and those who remain in persistent income-
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poverty (Carter and May 2001; Carter and Barrett, 2006).  More importantly, in 
addition to providing information on the persistence of conditions, panel data allow for 
the estimation and validation of poverty measures based on assets rather than 
consumption expenditures alone. Asset poverty measures inform of the structural 
nature of poverty by focusing on the productive capacity of a household. They make it 
possible to identify households whose incomes are unlikely to rise above the poverty 
level without external assistance, those who are vulnerable with assets that suggest 
their incomes could easily cross the poverty line in either direction and those who are 
non-poor and can be expected to maintain a non-poor status independently. Asset 
measures enable further distinction of households moving into or out of income 
poverty into those whose transitioning is likely to be reversed versus those whose 
transition is based on a loss (or acquisition) of assets, and therefore likely to persist 
(Carter and Barrett, 2006).  The availability of asset-based measures of poverty over 
time can also be used to assess whether there exists a threshold below which 
households are unlikely to be able to accumulate wealth and grow out of poverty. 
Asset-based poverty measures hold considerable value as tools for assessing 
the poverty impacts of policy, but there are difficult methodological issues involved in 
accurately mapping between assets and income.  In particular, efforts to estimate the 
asset-base required to generate income above the poverty line are complicated by the 
multiplicity of assets held by households; many of which have no market price, the 
potential for complementarities among some of these assets, and the likelihood that 
many factors affecting their productivity are unobserved. These issues may be 
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especially pertinent in rural settings where environmental conditions and the 
interactions among assets may be substantial.  
This chapter uses panel data from rural Ethiopia and appropriate econometric 
techniques to estimate the relationship between assets and consumption expenditure 
and consequently generate an asset index. It then computes static and dynamic asset 
poverty-lines that can be used to classify households by both their current expenditures 
and their capacity to independently maintain or raise expenditures, based on their 
assets. This analysis also uses the asset index generated to further test empirically for 
the existence of an asset threshold (Micawber threshold) around which household 
accumulation trajectories split, thus indicating the existence of multiple equilibria of 
asset bundles and possibly a poverty trap(Carter and Barrett, 2006). Based on their 
initial asset base and asset dynamics, the Micawber threshold permits a distinction 
between deep-rooted, persistent structural poverty and transitory poverty that passes 
naturally with time due to systemic growth processes. The threshold makes it possible 
to identify those households who will most likely never get out of poverty(or to a 
higher possible equilibrium) without external assistance (and are thus in a poverty 
trap), those who are vulnerable (these could be poor or non-poor given their current 
asset stock) and headed downwards towards a poverty trap ( or lower level 
equilibrium) and those who are non-poor and can be expected to maintain a non-poor 
status on their own, ceteris paribus. Both parametric and non parametric estimation 
reveal the presence of bifurcated asset index dynamics  and multiple equilibria of asset 
bundles in rural Ethiopia. The lower level equilibrium is slightly above the static asset 
poverty line and the higher equilibrium at about 2 times the asset poverty line.  
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A third contribution of this chapter is to test the validity and usefulness of the 
asset-based poverty classifications relative to the conventional expenditures based 
classifications.  Results indicate that the asset based classifications are more accurate 
at identifying households that are likely to be in expenditures poverty in the future 
than current expenditures. Results also confirm that many households classified as 
non-poor based on current expenditures lack the assets to maintain that level of 
consumption. The findings of this study imply that the asset-based measure could be 
used to more carefully to describe rural poverty, to target government interventions 
and to  more accurately assess the impact of those interventions. 
 
Poverty Measurement and Poverty Status Classification 
Traditional poverty measures are based on individual or household income 
often proxied by consumption expenditures at a particular time. Based on flow 
variables and informant recall, these indicators are more prone to measurement error 
than indicators based on visible assets like land or livestock (Wooldridge, 2002).  
Moreover, expenditures-based measures of wellbeing cannot distinguish between 
consumption supported by erosion of assets and consumption based on production. 
Various studies have shown income-based measures to indicate high levels of 
transitory poverty and underestimate chronic poverty (Baulch and Hoddinott, 2000; 
Hulme and Shepherd, 2003). While transitory poverty measured by expenditures could 
indicate the vulnerability of households to various shocks, it also complicates efforts to 
attribute poverty reduction in specific households to interventions.   
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The literature on poverty once focused narrowly on material deprivation 
measured by some representation of income (Cutler, 1984). Recently, the concept has 
expanded to incorporate more aspects of human wellbeing such as education, 
infrastructure and other public services, property rights, political freedom, and the 
presence of widespread corruption (UN, 2005). Be that as it may, poverty 
measurement is still typically based on some income or expenditures poverty line, 
constituting a threshold below which one is considered to be in poverty.  As Cutler 
(1984) describes, the poverty line represents “a collection of minimum needs 
amounts” and poverty classification using national poverty lines reflect existing prices 
and perceptions of minimum needs in particular countries.4
With reference to a poverty line, income-based measures of poverty classify as 
“poor” those households whose per capita consumption expenditures over a period 
were below the poverty line. One problem with this approach is that expenditures in 
many households will rise above or fall below the poverty line through time regardless 
of policy interventions.  Such movement is especially likely among agricultural 
households in developing countries with poorly functioning or nonexistent formal 
credit and insurance markets and whose income is largely based on weather 
conditions, crop yields, and commodity prices. Changes in consumption expenditures 
could also reflect accumulation or loss of productive assets.  By combining households 
who are likely to be transitorily in poverty with those whose poverty is chronic, 
income-based classification can give an imprecise and potentially misleading 
  
                                                 
4 The United Nations established the International Poverty Line indicating extreme poverty at $1.08 per 
day, in 1993 purchasing power parity terms (referred to as the $1/day measure). In August, 2008, the 
World Bank released its current absolute poverty measure of $1.25 a day measured in 2005 prices 
(Ravallion et al, 2008). Other ideas about a poverty line focus on some income level below which a 
proportion of the poorest people in a population lie. 
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impression of poverty dynamics and policy impacts.  Moreover, in rural areas with 
limited financial services, households may increase consumption expenditures at the 
expense of their productive assets or they may defer consumption to make 
investments.  In either case, current consumption expenditures alone could 
misrepresent more fundamental wellbeing. 
Asset-based approaches use the expected returns on a household's physical and 
human assets to classify households into poverty classes.  The asset poverty line in this 
study is generated using regression analysis to determine the minimum assets required 
to generate and sustain consumption at the expenditure poverty line. Households 
whose assets imply that their income will be below the poverty line are in asset 
poverty, while those whose assets are expected to yield incomes above the poverty line 
are asset non-poor.  In any given year, exogenous factors may give an asset poor 
household the ability to consume above the poverty line.  Due to lack of productive 
assets, such a household is unlikely to sustain this consumption and thus can be 
expected to remain poor.  Likewise, a household with many assets may experience a 
year of low consumption, but the asset-based approach would continue to classify the 
household as asset non-poor, because it has the apparent capacity to increase 
consumption without external assistance. 
An asset-based approach can yield a more nuanced understanding of poverty 
status than a single poor/non-poor dichotomy.  As figure 2.1 shows, households can be 
classified across four poverty categories based on consideration of both expenditures 
and assets.  Chronically poor households are those whose expenditures are below the 
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income poverty line and whose assets suggest low income as well.5
Estimation of the asset poverty line is complicated by the potentially non-linear 
relationship between assets and wellbeing and by asset multiplicity and 
complementarities (i.e. the fact that households have diverse assets whose returns 
depend on the availability of other assets). Most current research using this asset-based 
approach to poverty measurement adopts either a one-dimensional asset measurement 
justified by the predominance of one asset in a region (say livestock), or uses factor 
analysis (or a similar procedure) to generate an asset index. For example, 
Mogues(2006) and Lybbert et al (2004)  use herd dynamics to test for poverty traps 
and or explore poverty dynamics in largely pastoralist populations. Others like Little et 
al, (2006) use a poverty measure based on tropical livestock units (TLU) in their study 
of poverty in Ethiopia claiming that livestock correlate with many other welfare 
markers.  Other studies like Sahn and Stifel (2000), Sahn and Stifel (2003)  and  
Barrett et al (2006) base their asset poverty measure on an index generated using 
  The non-poor 
have adequate assets to generate incomes above the poverty line and actually consume 
above that threshold.  Further distinctions can be made between households whose 
assets lead us to expect that they would be income poor, even if their current income is 
above the poverty line, and households whose asset level indicates a non-poor income 
status despite present incomes below the poverty line. Households in the former group 
are considered to be stochastically non poor, while the later are stochastically poor and 
suffering only transitory income poverty.   
                                                 
5 Generally chronic poverty refers to persistent poverty. Carter and Barrett (2006) use the term “chronic 
poor” to refer to households whose asset base is so low that they are in a poverty trap, unable to 
accumulate assets to grow out of poverty.  We adopt this approach in our description of the chronic poor 
as those trapped at the low level equilibrium. 
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factor analysis. Factor analysis generates an asset index from the variance covariance 
matrix associated with a bundle of assets owned by a household. This approach is 
based on the assumption that there exists some unobserved common factor (c) (e.g. 
household welfare in Sahn and Stifel (2003)) which explains the variation in assets 
owned by a household. With both the common factor (c) and the coefficient explaining 
the relationship between asset ownership and the common factor (β) unavailable, 
identification of the variance in asset ownership ( Ψ+′=Ω 2cσββ )
6
2
cσ
requires a 
normalization of the relevant parameters (either the variance of the common factor        
( ) or the  squared coefficient( ββ ′ ). This normalization makes it difficult to 
interpret the coefficient on the common factor (β).  
Generally, neither of these approaches addresses the possibility of 
nonlinearities and complementarities among assets, which are likely to be significant 
in rural settings where mixed farming is common and the returns to land or tools might 
be affected by the presence of livestock or health.  Imperfect markets in rural areas 
compound this problem by making assets less liquid and thereby leaving some 
households with less productive combinations of assets than others. Similarly, while 
procedures like factor analysis enable identification of some key assets, they do not 
distinguish between the relevance of assets at different levels of endowment, nor do 
they provide an easily interpretable measure of the contribution of various assets to 
household wellbeing.  
Consequently, this study applies a translogarithmic functional form to explore 
possible non-linearities and multidimensionality in the relationship between assets and 
                                                 
6 This is gotten by specifying assets at as at =  βct + ut  with the variance of these assets expressed as ( 
E(ai'ai’) = E[(βct + ut )( βct + ut  ) ],which is Ω. 
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consumption with easily interpretable coefficients that are unbiased and consistent.  
Furthermore, this study adopts an asset based poverty approach focused largely on 
productive assets distinct from wealth indicators such as the type of walls, roofing 
material, number of windows, presence of a latrine etc. The approach is similar to the 
model used by Adato et al in their study on South Africa data.7
A second factor that undermines estimation of the relationship between assets 
and expected expenditure, which is not addressed by factor analysis type studies, is 
omitted variable bias arising from unobserved variables. In rural Ethiopia, critical 
unobserved village characteristics could include cultural practices, specific agricultural 
activities, and environmental particularities, while unobserved household 
characteristics might be savings habits or predispositions as well as managerial ability. 
The use of panel data permits an analysis that accounts for unobserved household and 
village characteristics and better addresses endogeniety concerns while giving more 
accurate estimates of the coefficients associated with the various assets in question.  
Fixed effects (FE) models enable the recovery of consistent estimates of coefficients 
when there are unobserved household characteristics associated with some explanatory 
variables as well as the outcome variable. However, they do not permit the recovery of 
estimates on time invariant characteristics such as the village level fixed effects. 
Consequently, this study exploits panel data to capture village and household effects 
by using a modification of the Hausman-Taylor Instrumental Variable (HTIV). I use a 
Three Stage Least squares instrumental variables (Generalized instrumental variable-
GIV) estimator to produce unbiased and consistent estimates of the various assets and 
  
                                                 
7 Adato et al use a polynomial expansion rather than a translog form to capture non linearities and the 
interactions among different assets.   
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asset interactions  with proper standard errors for inference. This approach which will 
be discussed more fully in the empirical analysis section.  The panel data structure also 
enables us to validate the methods by comparing actual dynamics of asset 
accumulation and expenditures with those implied by the poverty classification 
scheme based on assets.  
 
The Theory of Poverty Dynamics: An Asset Based Approach 
People can be poor because they have few assets or because the return on their 
assets is too low. While time can be an ally to the poor by providing opportunity to 
build up more assets or work around necessary constraints, time also implies 
opportunity for negative shocks  to further deplete the meager assets owned. This 
section uses models of intertemporal choice to develop the concept of poverty 
dynamics that this chapter is based on. This model development here is largely drawn 
from the intertemporal choice literature and from Carter and May (2001) 
At any time period t , each household i  has a bundle of assets itA  which 
includes the physical, human and social resources to which the household has access. 
In every period, we assume that each household chooses some level of consumption, 
cit and investment Iit so as to maximize a discounted stream of expected well being. 
This can be expressed as the solution to the following dynamic optimization problem: 
 





≡ ∑
∞
=
−
→→ ts
it
ts
ttiIicit
cuEAV )(max)(*
),(
δ    (2.1) 
Subject to  
ittititit IPAFc −≤ ),( θ ,  )(i  
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,
−
≥ bait     )(iii  
where  )(* itAV is the true value function for the underlying optimization problem and 
defines the  maximal discounted stream of current and future expected utility that 
household i  can expect given their initial asset endowment itA  and optimal behavior 
over time; δ is the households discount factor,  ), iIic →→ denote the intertemporal 
streams of household consumption and investment decisions and ita  refers to one 
element of the household assets, income. Equations )(i - )(iii reflect the household’s 
periodic constraints. Equation )(i  is the budget constraint stating that household 
consumption in any period is limited by their ability to transform various inputs into 
output (equivalent to their household production function) function which depends on 
of their current assets and a stochastic time and household specific shock to production 
and the value of any investments made in that period. Equation )(ii shows how 
households’ assets accumulate over time as they make investments and face  shocks to 
their asset base (e.g. death or theft of a livestock). Equation )(iii states that a 
household’s money stock (one element of Ait) cannot fall below some borrowing 
constraint. 
 Under normal assumptions of diminishing marginal utility of consumptions, a 
household solving the dynamic optimization problem of (2.1) would choose to smooth 
consumption over time. However this necessitates the ability to borrow on higher 
expected return to future (higher) levels of assets as well as on the presence of 
insurance or borrowing capabilities in the event of asset loss. Only if these conditions 
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are satisfied can a household’s consumption decision depend on its long term 
permanent income stream and thus be separate from its current period asset holdings 
and  expected income. Though possible theoretically, it has been shown that finance 
and insurance markets are often missing or malfunctioning in the rural areas of most 
developing countries (Zimmerman and  Carter, 2003; Sadoulet and deJanvry 1995); 
Conning and Udry (2005 ). 
These market failures can be captured in the model by decomposing itc  as 
follows: 
itc = ititi Acc ε++ )(0     (2.2) 
Perfectly functioning markets and separability implies that the last two terms in (2.2) 
would be equal to zero and realized consumption would be constant over time. Credit 
market failures would lead to a situation in which 0)( ≥itAc  and both credit and 
insurance market failures such that households could not smooth out shocks imply 
that 0≠itε . Consequently a household’s realized consumption level or wellbeing can 
be expressed by modifying 2.2 as follows: 
itc = ititAc ε+)(ˆ    (2.2`) 
Where )(ˆ itAc  refers to household i ’s expected consumption level in time t  when they 
have asset bundle )( itA  and itε refers to a household and time specific shock which 
Carter and May (2001)  explain as an entitlement failure when negative and an 
entitlement windfall, when positive, a la Sen (1981). 
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 Asset vs. Money Metric Poverty Lines 
For any period t , the money metric poverty line, denoted as c ,  represents a 
consumption standard that reflects a level of utility and is  usually empirically 
approximated by scaled per capita income or expenditure. Household i  is classified as 
poor in period t  if ccit ≤ . 
Standard poverty classifications are based on realized levels of consumption 
expenditures itc . However, to explore the structural nature of poverty, the expected 
consumption of a household given their bundle of assets )(ˆ Ac  can be estimated and an 
asset poverty line defined as: 
A  = ( )cAcA =)(ˆ|     (2.3) 
Where A   refers to the bundle of assets that yield an expected level of well-being 
exactly equal to the period specific expenditures poverty line (Carter and May, 1999; 
Carter and May, 2001).  The asset poverty line A can categorize households as is done 
in Figure 2.1, identifying those that are stochastically poor and. those that are 
structurally (or chronically) poor. Similarly, it can further classify the non poor into 
the structurally and stochastically non poor.  
A dynamic poverty line,V , is defined as the present discounted value of a 
sequence of poverty level consumption standards as follows:  






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∞
=
cuV
t
t
pp
0
),( δδ      (2.4) 
Where t is years and δp is a discount factor. A household is dynamically poor 
if: 
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 )(* 0iAV <V .      (2.5) 
meaning that the household’s long term expected stream of well-being conditional on 
optimal accumulation and consumption behavior is lower than the certainty 
equivalence value of a stream of single period poverty living standards (Carter and 
May, 2001). 
 
The Theory of Asset Dynamics and Poverty Traps 
Based on the neoclassical assumption of diminishing returns to factors of 
production, conventional macroeconomic growth theory considers time to be a friend 
to all. Over time the income of poorer nations is expected to converge with those of 
richer nations. However, evidence of divergence in national income growth led to the 
debate on issues of club convergence8 and multiple equilibria.9
The horizontal axis represents initial asset levels of the household represented 
by 
 The theory of 
bifurcated asset dynamics and poverty traps fits into the multiple equilibria divergence 
arguments and the concept can best be illustrated in Figure 2.2.  
tA  and the vertical axis represents household assets at a future period 
xtA + where 0>x . The curves in the diagram represent future assets of households as a 
function of initial asset stocks. In convergent asset dynamics, poorer households build 
assets and consequently their wellbeing and productive capacity improves over time. 
Eventually, their wellbeing converges to the non poor equilibrium. On the other hand 
                                                 
8 This is a case where convergence occurs within certain groups of individuals; households or nations 
who 
share some intrinsic characteristics. However divergence could occur across different groups (Baumol, 
1986; DeLong,1988.  
9 This is where no unique equilibrium exists but given certain intrinsic characteristics, both a low and 
high level equilibria exist for an individual, household or country (Carter and Barrett, 2005). 
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the S shaped curve represents the divergent asset dynamics in which a household is not 
expected to converge to the non poor equilibrium unless its initial asset stock exceeds 
some critical level (the Micawber threshold) which is at an asset index of about 4.5 in 
this figure.10
The idea that there is some initial asset level below which successful 
accumulation of assets and growth is not possible suggests the existence of a dynamic 
asset poverty line analogous to the single period asset poverty line 
  Households with assets below this threshold are expected to converge to 
a low level equilibrium (at about 1.5 in the figure). Households below this critical 
threshold will not be expected to independently build assets over time and move to the 
higher (presumable non-poor) equilibrium because of some sort of exclusion 
restriction. This restriction can be due to locally increasing returns to assets that 
confines the poor with very meager asset levels at such levels or to some market 
failure that excludes the poor from participating in various income enhancing 
activities.  
A  above. This line 
can be expressed as : 
A  = ( )VAVA =)(*|
0
     (2.6) 
Where A  refers to the dynamic asset poverty line or the Micawber threshold which 
divides those asset bundles from which successful accumulation is possible and those 
from which it is not (Carter and May, 2001). Both )(* 0iAV  and )(ˆ Ac are functions of 
household asset and thus defined over the same space of assets. As can be seen from 
equation 2.6, the Micawber threshold is just the asset level for which equation (2.5) is 
satisfied with equality. That is the asset bundle combination for which the discounted 
                                                 
10These numbers are included only to indicate relative positions. 
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present value of the expected streams of living standards is equal to the dynamic 
poverty line. V . 
Asset dynamics are hypothesized to be characterized by non-linear 
relationships. Via flexible estimation techniques that can capture non linearities, future 
asset levels can be explained as functions of initial asset levels. Bifurcated asset 
dynamics and the Micawber threshold shown in Figure 2.2 can be tested for 
empirically and long term predictions of household wellbeing can be made. It should 
be noted that in principal, either convergent or bifurcated dynamics could exist. Thus 
the empirical challenge is to identify whether a particular country or region exhibits 
convergent dynamics or divergent bifurcated asset dynamics which could be explained 
by some sort of exclusion. 
 
Study Area 
The data used are from the Ethiopia Rural Household Surveys (ERHS). This 
dataset contains detailed information on consumption, assets and agricultural activities 
of rural Ethiopian households and is the product of a longstanding data collection 
effort involving the University of Addis Ababa and The International Food Policy 
Research Institute. The ERHS began in 1989, when a survey team visited seven 
peasant associations (similar to villages) in Central and Southern Ethiopia. In 1994, 
the survey was expanded to encompass 15 peasant associations across four regions, 
yielding a sample of 1477 households. An additional round was conducted in late 
1994, with further rounds in 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2004. This chapter focuses on the 
ERHS data for the period 1994 to 2004 supplemented with qualitative information 
35 
 
gathered during interviews with key informants in each of the ERHS PAs in 2007.  
Though the ERHS is not fully representative of rural Ethiopia, the15 peasant 
associations were selected to cover the main farming systems in the country including 
grain-plough areas of the Northern and Central highlands, enset -growing areas and 
sorghum-hoe areas. 
Table 2.1 shows the poverty status classification based on an income poverty 
measure (household stated consumption per capita relative to the minimum per capita 
requirement).  The data show that income poverty was most prevalent during the first 
full round of the survey (1994a) when 51% of households consumed below the 
poverty line.  By the second round of the survey later in 1994, the income poverty rate 
had fallen to 39%; Fifty-seven percent of the households had either previously been in 
poverty but were no longer classified as such, or were currently income poor though 
they had been income non-poor in the first round. These are the transitorily income 
poor. 
By 1997, over 75% of households had moved into or out of income poverty at 
least once since 1994. The finding that a significant amount of the income poverty in 
the sample is transitory is consistent with other studies that have shown transitory 
poverty constitutes a large share of overall poverty in developing countries (Baulch 
and Hoddinott, 2000). However, this information in itself does not explain why 
households move in and out of poverty nor does it adequately inform us which 
households should be expected to be persistently or recurrently poor. Information on 
the asset base of households yields some insight in this regard. 
 
36 
 
Analytical Framework 
The empirical analysis here follows the framework described above. It is 
similar to the model applied by Adato et al (2006) in their study of poverty traps in 
South Africa. Their model estimates the following relationship: 
itijtitjit eAAL += ∑ )(β        
 (2.7) 
Where itL   is the scaled consumption expenditure of household i in period t;  and is 
measured as the ratio of consumption expenditures to an income poverty line 
(
c
cL itit =  ). jβ  is the coefficient of the current asset j owned by household i in time t; 
ijtA  is the amount of asset j owned by household i in time t; itA  is the total amount of 
assets the household owns and ite  is the time and household specific error term. By 
using a polynomial expansion in the estimation of (2.7), Adato et al (2006) estimate 
interaction effects among different asset types as well as non-linearity in the effects of 
specific assets.  The estimates of jβ are then used to calculate the asset index for a 
household as: Λit = ijtitj AA )(ˆ∑β  where itΛ is the asset index and jβˆ ( itA ) is the 
marginal contribution of the j different assets to consumption expenditures.  Thus the 
weight given to each type of asset is derived from the regression of scaled 
consumption expenditures on assets.  
In their formulation, a value of the scaled consumption expenditures variable 
(Lit) of one implies that a household is exactly on the poverty line while a household 
with 1<itL  is poor and one with 1>itL  is non-poor. Adato et al (2006) refer to this 
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value as Poverty Livelihood Units (PLU). This analysis uses logarithmic 
transformations in a translog specification such that the reference point is zero. Thus 
Λit = 0 is the threshold value separating the asset poor from the asset non-poor.   
Extending the previous literature, this model accounts for unobserved village 
characteristics in the study area and incorporates a proxy for social capital to capture 
this non-tangible asset. Accounting for unobserved village characteristics was based 
on both practical and econometric considerations. The geographical dispersion of the 
study villages creates differences in weather, topography, proximity to other markets, 
and quality of infrastructure. that could cause varying returns to the same assets.  
Specification tests conducted on the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) analysis 
revealed the presence of time invariant unobserved characteristics which if not 
accounted for would render the model estimates biased and inconsistent.11
   + D +  +Hlnln
2
1lnln ivttvit0 eAAAL ikvtijvt
j k
jkijtjjivt
Ψ++Σ+= ∑∑βββ
 
Consequently, this study derives an asset index by first estimating: 
 (2.8) 
for all assets j and k in village v,. and then setting the asset index as: 
ivtΛ = ivtLˆ         (2.9) 
where ivtL  jβ   and ivte are as previously defined. jkβ are the coefficients of the 
squared asset and asset interaction terms and vΨ and tD  are dummy variables for 15 
peasant association and six time periods. Hit represents household features like age and 
gender of household head, and household composition that may affect the per capita 
                                                 
11A simple test of the significance of village means added to the original explanatory variables resulted 
in a chi squared value greater than 700 with the probability of the critical value being greater than the 
calculated value equal to zero. Thus we reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of these village 
means are equal to zero indicating the presence of significant unobserved village characteristics. 
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returns to assets and includes controls such as household participation in nonfarm 
activities. 
 
Model Specification 
The data used in estimating equation 2.8 were from six rounds of the ERHS. 
The assets used in this model fall into six categories: land, livestock, implements, 
other physical assets (e.g. jewelry), social capital and education. Measurement of 
physical assets was based on the estimated value in Ethiopian Birr of land, implements 
(tools), livestock and other physical assets. The livestock variables, also expressed in 
Birr value are divided into draught animals (oxen), dairy cattle, pack animals 
(mules/horses/donkeys), and other animals (chicken, goats and rams).  Asset values 
were calculated each year and adjusted yearly by a consumer price index.  Due to the 
presence of missing responses a total of 1190 households of the 1477 were included in 
the estimations. Descriptive statistics on these data are presented in table 2.2.  
Data on the value of livestock and other assets reflect self-reporting by 
respondents. As the reliability of such estimates is questionable, average unit values of 
each asset type (goat, plough etc) were calculated for each village based on the survey 
responses. Land in Ethiopia is not bought and sold but allocated by government, so 
ascertaining land values was difficult. However, land rental has become more common 
since 1991 (when the previous prohibitions on land leasing were lifted). A suggested 
value from Fafchamps and Pender (2001) of 352 Ethiopian Birr per hectare in 1993/94 
is used as a basis for estimating land rental values and this value is adjusted yearly by 
the consumer price index.  
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Human assets were measured through maximum years of education of a 
household member and social assets were proxied through memberships in local 
savings and credit clubs (Equbs). Dummy variables were added for villages and for the 
survey rounds (1994a,1994b, 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2004).  Additional controls for age 
of household head (in years), gender of household head, whether someone in the 
household worked off the household farm, whether a family member participated in a 
food for work program12
With a mean monthly consumption expenditure per capita  of about 87 
Ethiopian Birr(EB) which translates to about a dollar a day in PPP terms
 and variables to capture household composition (number of 
children under 15 years old, number of working adults (15-65 years old), and the 
number of elderly( over 65)) were included in the estimation.  The dependent variable, 
scaled consumption expenditures, was measured as the per capita value of 
consumption expenditures relative to the poverty line. The ERHS dataset includes a 
poverty line that was calculated for 1994 using a cost-of-basic needs approach and 
consisting of a food and non food component. (Dercon and Krishnan, 1998) For later 
years the poverty line is deflated by a yearly adjusted price index (IFPRI, 2006).  
Excluding the dummy variables, data were transformed into log form, adding one to 
the initial values of independent variables due to frequency of zeros in the raw data. 
13
                                                 
12  FFW programs are geared towards providing a safety net for the poorest of the poor in the event of 
adverse shocks while at the same time investing in the production or maintenance of valuable public 
good (road and bridges, schools and natural resource management) that are necessary to stimulate 
productivity and thus increase aggregate income (Clay et al, 1999). For more details, see Quisimbing, E 
(2003), Clay et al, 1999  
  (see table 
2.2)shows that on average, households in the ERHS sample are quite poor. There is 
wide variation in physical assets. Most assets are more negatively skewed but with 
13 One US dollar is equivalent to 9.8 Ethiopian Birr (EB). The PPP conversion factor is approximately 
0.25 
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enough values at extreme ends to guard against outlier problems. About 80% of 
households are male headed with mean household size around 7 members. The 
average number of years for the highest educated household member is about 7 years 
which is just about primary school education. 
Multiple specification tests were applied to identify a consistent and 
asymptotically efficient estimator for this study. Initial results from a Pooled Ordinary 
Least Squares (POLS) model generated reasonable and statistically significant 
coefficient values.  However, POLS estimates are only efficient under the assumption 
that the time varying idiosyncratic errors are serially uncorrelated and the error terms 
are homoskedastic. Furthermore, if there are particular time invariant unobserved 
characteristics that are correlated with the explanatory variables (assets) but are not 
accounted for, the estimates will be inconsistent. In estimates of production functions, 
POLS may yield estimates that are prone to finite sample bias given the existence of 
individual specific effects (Grilliches, 1957; Grilliches and Mairess, 1997; Bond, S., 
2002). A test for serial correlation14
ic
 based on Wooldridge (2002) indicated serial 
correlation, revealing that the POLS estimates are potentially biased and inconsistent. 
We also reject the Breusch and Pagan Lagrange-multiplier test for random effects 
which indicates that the variance of the error term is not zero and the random effects 
model (RE) is superior to the POLS. A  random effects framework puts the 
unobserved characteristic  into the error term. Thus, though potentially more 
                                                 
14 This test is done by adding the lagged value of the error to the rest of the regression and testing for the 
significance of the coefficient of the lagged error term. If the coefficient is significant, reject the null 
H0: No serial correlation). 
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efficient, the RE model is only consistent if 0),( =iit cxE .
15 However, further tests 
indicated endogeneity problems due to unobserved characteristics invalidating the 
Random Effects model in favor of the Fixed Effects model which is consistent in the 
presence of unobserved time invariant characteristics.16
One major drawback of using the fixed effects estimator is the annihilation of 
estimators for time invariant variables.  Furthermore, it ignores variability across 
households, which is important for our research purpose. Thus, this study uses the 
generalized instrumental variables estimator (GIV) which is also the efficient General 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator to estimate the coefficients associated with the 
explanatory variables in equation 2.8.  
 
This approach comprises a three stage least squares instrumental variable 
estimation based on the Hausman-Taylor Instrumental Variable (HTIV) technique. It 
uses means and deviation from means as instruments for time invariant and time 
varying endogenous variables respectively (Hausman and Taylor, 1981). The analysis 
uses the GMM estimator to account for non-spherical errors by incorporating an 
optimal weighting matrix that is a consistent estimator of ( )( )( ) 1]/1[ −′εZnVar   where 
( ) 0=′εZ  is the relevant orthogonality condition. 
Without loss of generality, the equation to be estimated can be written as: 
Y X uβ= +  
                                                 
15 where eivt  in equation  2.8 is a composite error (eivt=ci + uit) due to the unobserved time invariant 
characteristic. 
 
16 This test is equivalent to testing the joint significance of the means of various explanatory variables 
added to the POLS model. The Chi squared statistic was 723 with probability of being less than the 
critical value equal to zero. Thus the null hypothesis of insignificance is rejected indicating the presence 
of unobserved characteristics. 
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where Y is the vector of  household consumption expenditures relative to the poverty 
line, Lit, X is the matrix of time varying ( )1 2,X X  and time-invariant 
( )1 2,Z Z explanatory variables, and u is the vector of composite error terms (i.e. 
it i itu c ε= + ). The X matrix is partitioned into its exogenous ( )1 1,X Z and endogenous 
( )2 2,X Z components. The projection matrix NTT IjP ⊗=  that averages each 
observation over time for each household and   ( )' 'T T T T T TQ j j j j= Ι − , the matrix of 
deviations from the mean are used to compose a matrix of instruments for the time 
invariant and time varying endogenous variables as follows 
( )1 1 2 1, , ,T TM X Z Q X j X= ⊗    
where the exogenous variables  ( )1 1,X Z  act as instruments for themselves, the 
deviations from the household mean (over time) of the various endogenous variables 
( )2TQ X instruments for 2X , and ( )1Tj X⊗  serve as instruments for 2Z .  Low attrition 
in the sample removes concern for endogeneity of village characteristics. Also, since 
land is not bought and sold in Ethiopia, we also consider land to be exogenous. In 
essence, the operationalization of the HTIV approach here is similar to-a fixed effects 
estimation, with the added value of including time-invariant village effects.  
Consequently our  instrumental variables estimator can be expressed as
 YMMXXMMXGMMGIV ′Ω′′Ω′==
−1)(ˆˆ ββ    
( ) YWZZWZZWXXWZZWZZWXGMMGIV 11111111 ˆ)ˆ(ˆˆ)ˆ(ˆˆˆ −−−−−−−− ′′′′′′== ββ  
 
Where 
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 Ω  is the optimal weighting matrix which is a consistent estimator of 
( )( )( ) 1]/1[ −′εZnVar    
To implement the GMM estimation, equation (2.8) was estimated first by the 
pooled two-stage least squares (2SLS).  Using the residuals from the pooled 2SLS, 
scalars; 2ˆuσ  and 
2ˆcσ  were obtained as 
(12) 
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where n is the number of individuals, T is the number of periods, and k is the number 
of estimated parameters. These two estimates were then used to construct 
(14) 
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which is used to adjust the individual means over time. Then the adjusted means are 
taken away from the dependent, explanatory, and instrumental variables (Hausman 
and Taylor(1981). These transformed variables (deviations from the adjusted mean 
over time) were then used in a pooled 2SLS estimation, which provides the efficient 
GMM estimator with standard errors that are asymptotically valid for inference 
(Wooldridge 2002, Hausman and Taylor, 1981, Im et al, 2003). 
The GMM approach yields consistent estimates of all desired coefficients and 
correct standard errors for further inference. In this study, the standard errors are also 
robust to both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. As mentioned earlier, village 
characteristics such as land quality, rainfall, availability of infrastructure like roads, 
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proximity to a market center could affect the return to assets. Given that such 
information is not in these data, village dummies were included in the model to 
capture these unobserved village characteristics while time dummies were added to 
capture variations in years and to the extent possible, seasons.  
For comparison, results on a fixed effects specification (which we know is 
consistent in the presence of unobserved time invariant household characteristics) are 
presented also. These results are very similar to the GIV, but the significance of the 
village and time dummy variables in the GIV suggests that the simple fixed effects 
model could suffer from omitted variable bias.  Hence the GIV is preferred.  
As an alternative to the GIV and FE approaches, an approach that uses the 
difference or system GMM estimators could be employed. Some cases where these 
estimators might be employed include: where it is believed that the data generating 
process might be dynamic, where there may be unobserved characteristics which could 
potentially bias parameter estimates, where some explanatory variables might be 
endogenous or predetermined , hence not strictly exogenous; where, even though 
idiosyncratic shocks across households are uncorrelated, they may have individual-
specific patterns of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation and where the only 
available instruments are internal. 
A general framework for these estimators can be expressed as: 
Yit =α Yit-1 +βXit+ci+uit        
It can be shown that here, the fixed effects model will yield biased and inconsistent 
estimates due to endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable. Anderson and Hsiao 
(1981) proposed a solution to this problem which involved taking the first difference 
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of  equation 2.7 and then instrumenting for ΔYit-1 with the second  lag of  the dependent 
variable(Yit-2) . Arrelano and  Bond(1991) extended this approach further in a 
generalized method of moments (GMM) framework with the possibility of  more 
moment conditions (using further lags of the dependent variable) than using just  E(Yit-
2 , uit)=0  and thus a more efficient GMM estimator called the difference GMM 
estimator for dynamic panels. To further increase efficiency, Arrelano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) extend the analysis further account for 
persistence in explanatory variables and to use the differences of instruments (lags) as 
instruments for the level endogenous variable. This approach assumes that the 
difference in instruments is orthogonal to the fixed effects.  Combining these two 
approaches discussed above yields the systems GMM estimator which enables the 
handling of dynamic panel bias as well as the recovery of coefficients on time 
invariant explanatory variables. Because the survey rounds in this analysis were not 
evenly spaced over time, the results of the dynamic panel model are less credible than 
those of the GIV method.  It was nonetheless estimated and presented together with 
the fixed effects and GIV estimation for comparison. 
 
Model Estimation and Interpretation 
The following model was estimated: 
Livt = ikvtijvt
j k
jkijtjj
AAA lnln
2
1ln0 ∑∑+Σ+ βββ +ln AGEivt + MHHivt 
+lnCHILDRENivt +lnADULTSivt +ln ELDERLYivt + OFF-FARMivt + FFWivt + Ψv  + 
Dt + eivt          (2.8`) 
46 
 
where AGE is the age of the household head in years, MHH takes a value of one for 
male-headed households, OFF-FARM  is one for households with members engaged 
in off-farm activities and zero otherwise, CHILDREN, ADULTS and ELDERLY are the 
number of household members <15years old, 15-65 and >65 years old respectively  in 
residence and all other variables are as previously defined.  Household assets (A) are 
expected to contribute positively to household productive capacity, hence well-being. 
Based on the law of diminishing marginal returns, we expect a positive relationship 
between assets and scaled per capita expenditure but a negative sign on the squared 
term. Based on the general belief in the literature, it is expected that male headed 
households would be better off economically than female headed households. While 
some argue that larger families provide more labor, the expense of maintaining such 
families is also a challenge. Decomposing the household into the various categories 
enables us to explore this. We expect negative signs on the children and the elderly 
variables as these members tend to increase household consumption without being 
able to contribute equivalently to income generation. However, if workers are 
productive, then additional workers should contribute positively to household income 
generating capacity and thus be positively correlated with wellbeing. Table 2.3 
summarizes the study hypothesis. 
Model estimation began with a full translogarithmic specification in assets. As 
is frequently the case, the polynomial expansion model exhibited considerable 
multicollinearity. Thus using a stepwise selection approach and careful consideration 
of reasonable interaction relationships between assets, the model was constructed as 
shown in table 2.4. For the most part, the model results were in line with the study 
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hypothesis and the F-statistic of joint significance of the  explanatory variables was 
30.62 with a Probability>F=0.00 indicating the validity of the model. As can be seen 
in table 2.4, all estimated coefficients that were significantly different from zero were 
either in the expected direction or in a direction for which a plausible explanation can 
be found. Among the physical assets, household land size at higher values has a 
significant impact on scaled consumption expenditures, with a coefficient of about 
0.02.  Contrary to expectation based on production theory, land exhibits increasing 
returns to wellbeing as the squared term was significant and positive.  This result could 
be driven by limited variation in land size at lower levels of land ownership. Mean 
land size for the entire sample is 1.61 ha. Similar findings occurred for physical assets 
like jewelry which are only statistically significantly different from zero and positive 
at higher levels. The coefficients on household tools were significant, positive and 
large in value. The regression results indicate the importance of livestock, consistent 
with other studies in rural areas in sub Saharan Africa. Livestock such as sheep and 
goats, generally perceived as easily disposable assets were found to be positively 
associated with consumption expenditure. They increase consumption expenditure by 
0.05 relative to the poverty line. Unlike land, other physical assets and most livestock 
follow the conventional production theory of diminishing marginal returns with 
significant and negative coefficients on the squared terms. After controlling for 
various household characteristics and removing the time invariant unobserved 
variables, the sex of the household head and education are not significantly different 
from zero.  The education result appears to be driven by the generally low level of 
education attained in the sample; about primary school level (7 years). 
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 Households with more children tend to have lower per capita consumption but 
the presence of elderly members does not have a statistically significant effect on 
wellbeing. The results on the number of working adults (negative and significant) in a 
household indicate that having more working adults does not necessarily translate to 
increased income.  Households with members employed on other farms (or in other 
low wage tend to have higher consumption. This combined with the negative effect of 
the number of working adults might be reflecting high levels of underemployment in 
rural areas. Household membership in local organizations (used to proxy social 
capital) was also found to be a significant asset with membership in such organization 
increasing consumption expenditure by about 15% . Finally, village characteristics 
appear to be very significant drivers of poverty status in rural Ethiopia indicating that 
location specific issues are important for households’ ability to generate income. 
Interpretation of the coefficients on the village dummy variables is relative to village 
number 1(Harresawe) which was dropped from the estimation. 
As with the model used by Adato et al (2006) this study finds a positive 
relationship between the basic assets and wellbeing captured by scaled consumption 
expenditures. The model yielded significant coefficients on most of the village 
dummies confirming that there is significant variation in the return on assets explained 
by the characteristics of the particular village in which a household is located.  The 
GIV estimators are only consistent if independent variables are exogenous in the 
model.  Following Wooldridge (2005, p. 285), we test for exogeneity of the various 
assets by including the leads of the various variables in the fixed effects model. 
49 
 
Livt= ikvtijvt
j k
jkijtjj
AAA lnln
2
1ln0 ∑∑+Σ+ βββ
itiikvtijvt
j k
jkijtjj
ucAAA +++Σ+ +++ ∑∑ 111 lnln2
1ln δδ
 
 
Significance of the delta variables would indicate a violation of the strict exogeneity 
assumption.  The tests for strict exogeneity reveal that all but the dairy livestock 
variable were exogenous after conditioning on the household fixed effect. 17 One 
solution to this problem would be the use of the lagged value as an instrument and this 
is done in the dynamic panel set up of the Arrelano and Bond GMM estimator. This 
approach yielded a statistically significant coefficient (at 1%) with larger magnitude 
than that of the GIV estimation. The fact that the dynamic panel estimates confirm the 
positive relationship between dairy and consumption expenditures, but has its own 
problems, I decided to leave the dairy variable in the GIV estimation and use its more 
conservative estimates. The various conditions necessary to justify the use of the 
Generalized Instrumental Variables approach model are satisfied. The first stage 
results of  the GIV estimation reveal F- statistics associated with all the asset variables 
significantly larger than 10.18
                                                 
17 The lead of the dairy variable was only significant at slightly less than 10% 
 Furthermore we reject the test for weak instruments 
based on the Shea partial R2 statistic. Shea (1997) showed that when you have more 
than one endogenous variable and a set of instruments, it is possible to still have a high 
R squared in the first stage but a poor IV estimator if for example, two instruments are 
highly collinear. Shea’s partial R-squared is thus a measure of instrument relevance 
that takes intercorrelations among instruments into account. We also reject the under 
identification tests based on the Anderson canonical test and the Anderson Rubin test 
18 These are all heteroskesticity and autocorrelation robust F statistic and can be found in the appendix. 
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of insignificance of the endogenous variables in the model. Finally we fail to reject the 
Hansen J test of overidentifying restrictions indicating the validity of our instruments. 
The null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with 
the error term. Under the null, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the 
number of overidentifying restrictions. Based on these tests, I conclude that the model 
estimated is properly specified indicating the positive relationship between assets and 
household wellbeing.  
 
Asset Index Generation and Test for Multiple Equilibria 
As stated in equation 2.9, the asset index, Λivt,  is generated  as the predicted 
value of  scaled consumption expenditure from the estimation of equation 2.8`. If Λivt 
> 0, then a household is ‘asset non-poor’ in period t.  If Λivt < 0, the household is 
considered ‘asset poor’ in time t.  Following the theoretic framework developed 
earlier, we can also identify the dynamic poverty line A (the Micawber threshold) 
which can indicate  long term expected poverty status of a household.   
Asset dynamics are hypothesized to be characterized by non-linear 
relationships. Thus, via flexible estimation techniques that can capture non linearities, 
future asset levels can be explained as functions of initial asset levels.  Moreover one 
can test empirically for the existence of bifurcated asset dynamics and the Micawber 
threshold. I use both non parametric and parametric estimations to test for the 
existence of multiple equilibria in asset index dynamics between 1994 and 2004. The 
null and alternate hypothesis for our test is as follows: 
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Ho: Asset Dynamics in rural Ethiopia exhibits bifurcation indicating multiple 
equilibria and the existence of exclusionary mechanisms that prevent households 
below some asset level from climbing out of poverty. 
Ha: No bifurcation exists in asset dynamics in rural Ethiopia indicating convergence 
of assets over time. 
 
Non Parametric Estimations 
To explore the impact of current assets on future asset ownership, we run a non 
parametric estimation of the asset index in 2004 based on that in 1994. We use a 
running line smoother to estimate the dynamics of the household asset index over the 
10 year period.19
This procedure sorts the data by the x-variable (asset index in 1994) and forms local 
neighborhoods consisting of an (x; y) pair together with the k nearest x-neighbors on 
either side of x. (Sasieni, P. 1995). The default value of k is defined to be N0.67 where 
N is the number of observations. The data are sorted according to the x variable and 
the subscripts refer to the ordered data. The running line smoother estimates the 
corresponding value of y for each ith ordered data point using its nearest neighbors 
from i - k to i + k.  Figures 2.4 and 2.5 below reveal the results of the non parametric 
estimation of the asset index dynamics.  
  
 From Figure 2.4, there is a tangency between the estimated function and the 
45o line at about 0.1 and 0.2.  Based on the conceptual framework described earlier 
and depicted in Figure 2.2, indicates that in our sample, the low level equilibrium is 
                                                 
19 This procedure is almost identical to the LOWESS but unlike the LOWESS it does not permit 
arbitrary weights. 
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equivalent to the Micawber Threshold.  In this case, a household with initial assets of 
less than 0.2 would not be expected to accumulate assets beyond that level. 
However, with non parametric estimations, validity of the results is dependent 
on the confidence interval around the estimated running line. Figure 2.4 depicts this.  
The lower bound of the confidence interval cuts the 45o line from above at about 0 and 
then rises above the 45o line at about 0.2. Either way, by virtue of the tangency of the 
actual curve and the cutting from below of the lower confidence interval, we fail to 
reject our null hypothesis of divergent poverty dynamics.  Asset dynamics in rural 
Ethiopia exhibit bifurcation indicating that households below some asset level are 
unlikely to attain the higher equilibrium. 
Both Figures 2.3 and 2.4 imply a low level equilibrium also equal to the 
Micawber threshold at about 0.2. Households who are below this point are considered 
to be constrained to the low level equilibrium and unable to converge to the high 
equilibrium at about twice the poverty line without some sort of external assistance. 
Comparing this point where Asset Index=0.2 and the high equilibrium where Asset 
Index=0.9, these translate to monthly per capita consumption levels of about 56 
Ethiopian Birr and 114 Ethiopian Birr respectively. In US values, this amounts to 
about $20 (PPP) difference. While it must be noted that on average, households in this 
sample are very poor by US standards, this difference of 60 EB ($20) is very 
significant. It is more than the average per capita consumption level of a household on 
the poverty line which is 46EB. 
The non parametric estimation indicates that asset dynamics in Ethiopia 
exhibits bifurcation and are characterized by the presence of multiple equilibiria. A 
53 
 
lower level equilibrium which is just above the poverty line and a higher equilibrium 
at almost 2 times the asset poverty line.  For households to be able to converge to the 
non-poor equilibrium, they need to have an asset index of at least 0.2. With such low 
levels of consumption, the need to move households beyond the micawber threshold is 
critical for reducing extreme poverty and moving towards reaching the first 
millennium development goal. Understanding the differences between households at 
these levels is a crucial aspect of this challenge as programs/assistance needed by such 
households will be quite different. Furthermore, the success of such programs and the 
ability to reduce poverty will depend on their ability to develop appropriate programs 
and identify the correct target group for the different programs. 
 
Parametric Estimations 
To support the bivariate estimation of the non parametric estimates, the 
relationship between a household’s current asset index and its index in the future is 
estimated. From both Figures 2.4 and 2.5, it can be seen that the relationship between 
the assets in 1994 and those in 2004 is non linear.  Thus a nonlinear specification of asset 
dynamics is estimated as follows: 
Λivt+1 = ΣγkΛivtj + Zitv +eivt      (2.10) 
for  j=1….n, where j refers to the order of the nonlinearity and Zitv  are controls that 
might have an effect on asset accumulation separate from that which determines the 
return on the assets in question.  These controls include the sex of household head, age 
of household head, the squared age of household head (for life cycle effects) and 
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household size.20
 (1- γ1) Λivt - γ1Λivt2 - γ1 Λivt3 - Zitv = 0
As seen in Figure 2.2, the presence of multiple equilibria implies the 
existence of points where  
21
Or 
     (2.10a) 
 (γ1-1) Λivt + γ1Λivt2+ γ1 Λivt3+ Zitv = 0     (2.10b) 
 
If there are multiple equilibria, one would expect to find multiple solutions (values of 
Λivt) to solve 2.10b (Ravallion, 2001; Mogues, 2006).  If there is a low equilibrium and 
a high equilibrium, with an unstable equilibrium in between, then the curves intersect 
at 3 points, two points where   
γ1 + Λ2 γ2 Λ ivt +3 Λ γ3ivt2 ≤ 122
indicating that the curve is falling at that point and one point where 
      
 (2.10c) 
γ1 + Λ2 γ2 Λ ivt +3 Λ γ3ivt2 ≥ 1        (2.10d) 
 
indicating that the curve is upward sloping which would be at the Micawber threshold.  
We first estimate equation 2.10 and then explore if the points described by equations 
2.10c and 2.10d exist. 
                                                 
20 Because the  asset index was generated with a two stage least squares instrumental variable estimation 
which took into account  time and village level effects as well as other controls, most of the necessary 
variables that could be underlying a households asset accumulation and decumulation decisions as well 
as unobservable time or weather related factors have been accounted for. 
21 The minimum polynomial expansion necessary to find multiple equilibria is a cubic polynomial. 
Equating the two equations in figure 2.2  gives  Λivt+i = γ1Λivt + γ2Λivt2 + γ3Λivt3 +Zitv +eivt =  Λivt+i = Λivt  
which can be expressed as Λivt+i – γ1Λivt - γ1Λivt2 - γ1 Λivt3--Zitv -eivt =  Λivt+i -Λivt 
 or Λivt+i – γ1Λivt - γ1Λivt2 - γ1 Λivt3--Zitv -eivt =  Λivt+i -Λivt 
 
22 This is the slope of equation 2.10b 
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I adopt 2 approaches here. First I use a fractional polynomial regression 
equivalent to equation 2.10 without the matrix of household controls (Zivt). Allowing 
the program (STATA) to determine the order that best fits the data, I estimate equation 
2.10 and generate the predicted values which are plotted with the confidence interval 
evaluated at the mean of the data.  The second approach uses a stepwise approach 
guided by the Akaike information criterion and the Bayesian Information criterion 
compared models with n =2-4 and found the best model to be:  
Λivt2004= Λiv1994 + Λiv19942 + Λiv19943 +lnhhsizeitv + Sexheaditv +AGEHEAD 
+AGEHEAD2 +eivt  (2.11) 
From  Table 2.5, we can see that the coefficients on the  base and squared asset 
index value in 1994 are positive indicating that rather than the normal diminishing 
returns to assets we would expect in the presence of convergent asset dynamics, rather 
we have increasing returns to scale in line with the theory of divergence.  The negative 
cubic term indicates that we have an “s” shaped curve. As can be seen from Figure 
2.5b, the parametric estimates indicate that we cannot reject the hypothesis of 
bifurcated asset dynamics. With the confidence intervals, we appear to have 2 stable 
points, one around 0 and the other about two times the static asset poverty line, in line 
with the conclusions from the non parametric estimates. 
Disaggregated by village, results indicate some villages exhibit multiple 
equilibria while others exhibit convergence (see Figure 2.6); however convergence 
varies widely across villages. Villages characterized by relatively better  infrastructure 
and proximity to markets (e.g. Sirba, Shumsheha and Debre Berhan) converge 
sometime more than 2 times higher than the static poverty line while other villages 
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with very poor infrastructure, drought prone, rugged terrain and remotely located (e.g. 
Harresawe, Geblen and Gara Godo) converge at or below the static asset poverty line. 
Villages like Yetmen, Turufe Kechema and Aze Deboa exhibit multiple equilibria. In 
Turufe Ketchema and Aze Deboa, there is a low level equilibrium at around 0 and a 
higher one at about 0.9. In Yetmen, there appears to be a low equilibrium at around 0.2 
and a higher one around 0.5.  As in the general case, the parametric and non 
parametric estimates yield similar results for most villages, with Sirba and Adado the 
only exceptions. 
Similarly, disaggregation by farming system (Figure 2.7a-d) reveals 
convergence at a high equilibrium for teff which is a major food crop in urban centers 
in Ethiopia, but a major cash crop for rural farmers (World Bank, 2006). The chat 
farming system which is also a cash crop exhibits convergence at about 1.5 times the 
poverty line. For cereal and enset farming systems we find evidence (though weak) of 
multiple equilibria. Both systems tend to have a very low equilibrium at around zero 
and a higher one at 0.8 and 0.5 respectively.  The multiple equilibria found in cereal 
farming systems could be driven by the fact that some cereals like maize and barley 
are food crops while others like teff are cash crop, further confirming the low growth 
potential of food crop based systems versus cash crop based systems. For enset, we 
believe that the higher equilibrium might be capturing farmers within such systems 
who grow other cash crops, probably coffee. Since the classification for farming 
systems was based on geographical location, it is possible that we have some mixing 
since coffee is also grown in the southern regions where enset is produced.  
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Asset Index Dynamics, Shocks and Social Capital 
One issue of critical importance in the dynamics of assets and poverty traps is 
the issue of vulnerability and shocks. To explore the effect of vulnerability on 
household asset dynamics, we consider the effect of shocks on asset dynamics and 
how this is cushioned by access to social capital. First we explore the role of social 
capital (indicating less vulnerability) on asset dynamics. We use household’s 
membership in a local savings and credit organization as an indicator of their access to 
social capital. The parametric results indicate that social capital is positively associated 
with future assets23
Next, we check for the effect of shocks on asset dynamics and the persistence 
of such effects. As an indicator of household shock, we considered the distressed sale 
of livestock for purchase of food, repayment of loans or for health expenses in 1999 as 
evidence of a household shock.  We then considered the effect of this shock on the 
household’s asset index in the presence or absence of social capital in 2004.As can be 
seen from figures (2.9a  and 2.9b ) , we see that while there still appears to be  an 
increasing returns to assets over some range of assets, there is only one clear stable 
. The results of a fractional regression indicate that for households 
who participate in local credit and savings organizations, we find more of a 
convergence in the asset index over time to more than twice the poverty line. However 
for those without social capital, we see evidence of bifurcation and multiple equilibria, 
as seen in Figure 2.8b, there appears to be a low level equilibrium just around the 
static asset poverty line and a higher equilibrium at about 1.8 times the static poverty 
line. 
                                                 
23 See Appendix BI. 
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point for those who face shocks but have access to social capital indicating some sort 
of convergence. 
However, for households who face a shock but do not have access to social 
capital, we find more evidence of bifurcation and are unable to reject the presence of 
multiple equilibria, given the predicted values and an acceptable margin of error. 
These results indicate the importance of considering social capital in the measurement 
of asset indices as well as in understanding asset dynamics. The positive effect of 
social capital on asset accumulation (as seen in the parametric estimates) as well as the 
negative effect of shocks on asset dynamics, reveal the importance of vulnerability 
consideration in the development and evaluation of programs to address or prevent the 
persistence of poverty and poverty traps.  
 
A Comparison of the Asset and Income Poverty Measures 
The third main objective of this chapter was to validate the asset based 
measure. This is done by testing the predictive power of the model as well as by 
comparing the asset based poverty measure to a poverty measure based on 
consumption expenditure alone. Two main criteria were used to compare the asset 
poverty measure and the traditional expenditure poverty measure. First transition 
matrices were used to compare the actual and expected poverty status of households. 
Then a statistical measure called the Thiels U statistic was used to see which measure 
is better able to predict household poverty status. 
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Prediction Accuracy Via Transition Matrices 
Transition matrices are a common tool used to evaluate mobility. They are 
square matrices depicting initial and later period classification of individuals or 
households.  The diagonal elements of this matrix reveal the number (or percentage) of 
these individuals or households who did not move between groups during the time 
periods in question.  This lower level of aggregation reveals the dynamics of the 
different households in our sample and enables us to test the robustness of the poverty 
classification under the asset based approach.  
Ideas about the nature of mobility can be varied but usually lie within 2 
extremes of perfect mobility and inertia driven immobility. Perfect mobility 
hypothesizes that a household’s future poverty status is completely independent of 
their current poverty status. On the other hand inertia arguments consider inertial 
forces to make it likely that a household maintains their initial situation and prevent 
movement away from it.  (Carter and May, 2001). While studies such as Carter and 
May (2001) rejected the hypothesis of perfect mobility they found very low levels of 
immobility amongst expenditure based poverty status and concluded it to be evidence 
of some structural forces not captured by the expenditure method.  
In this study, I argue that if indeed I have captured the structural nature of 
poverty with the asset poverty measure and adequately captured the long term 
expected poverty status of our households, then we should see lower levels of mobility 
between our poverty classes and this can be compared to the level of mobility 
associated with classifications based on the traditional expenditure-based poverty line 
in isolation. Also, examination of the change in poverty status of individual 
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households over time based on these classifications can depict more clearly how 
aggregate poverty reduction has occurred and can validate the accuracy of the 
classifications.   
If the asset based poverty classification scheme is working, then households 
identified as structurally and chronically poor should remain in asset poverty and are 
expected to fall into income poverty more frequently than households that are non-
poor based on both assets and expenditures. For the stochastically non poor, transition 
into income poverty is not completely unavoidable since such a household may be able 
to accumulate assets, but households classified into this group should be at greater risk 
for falling into income-poverty than others. We find that about 55%of these 
households actually record being in income poverty in 2004 and about 87% of them 
remain in asset poverty. As for the non poor households, we find that less than 10% of 
these households record being in income poverty in 2004 and over 90% of these 
households’ maintained assets that could sustain a non-poor consumption level in 
2004. 
Similarly, if the classification scheme is functioning then income poor 
households that are asset non-poor will record transition out of income poverty more 
frequently than others. We find that over 80% of households categorized as 
stochastically poor had consumption levels above poverty in 2004 and about 75% 
maintained enough assets to sustain a non poor consumption level. Tables 2.6 through 
2.8 present transition matrices showing the movement of households into and out of 
poverty between 1994 and 2004.  In 1994 there were 730 households classified as non-
poor based on current expenditures.  By 2004, 191 (26%) of these households had 
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fallen into poverty. Furthermore, out of the 460 households categorized as income 
poor in 1994, 249(54%) had moved out of income poverty in 2004.  
While this could be seen as a positive trend in poverty dynamics, it shows that 
the income measure misdiagnosed the poor households expected poverty status for  
54% of such households;  more times than it accurately predicted it.  This is driven by 
the inability of the income measure to distinguish between which households could 
maintain a non poor consumption level and those who couldn’t.  
The asset based classifications from 1994 could be used to identify which of 
these income-non-poor households were at greater risk for falling into poverty. Of the 
149 households classified as structurally poor in 1994 (income non-poor but asset 
poor) 70 (47%)  had fallen into income poverty by 1997. Sixty four  households were 
chronically poor and 6 stochastically poor. Of these 149 households, 103 remained 
asset poor in 2004. Meanwhile of the income non-poor households that were also asset 
non-poor, only about 19% (108 of 581) became income poor (table 2.7) with about 
75% (79 out of 108) of that number being stochastic not chronic poverty. About 90% 
(526 out of 581) of the non-poor households in 1994 maintained assets sufficient to 
support a non poor consumption level in 2004. 
  Finding that the households classified as structurally poor were truly at 
particular risk of falling into income poverty confirms that the classification system is 
valid and suggests that it could be used to identify households in need of assistance.  
Poverty assessment exercises based solely on expenditures would wrongly classify 
such households as non-poor, possibly excluding them from some poverty alleviation 
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program that might be very useful, even necessary for their building up of adequate 
assets to sustain a truly non poor lifestyle.24
Further validation of the asset based poverty classification is seen in the high 
tendency for households classified as stochastically poor in 1994 to have moved to 
their expected non-poor status in 2004.  Seventy eight of the 96 (81%) households that 
were stochastically poor in 1994 had expenditures above the income poverty line in 
2004.  
 
Between 1994 and 2004 there were declines in both the income and the asset-
based rates of poverty. The income based measure suggests that 249 (54%) of the 460 
households that had been in poverty in 1994 had moved into a non-poor status.  This 
improvement could be due to various factors including good rains which raised farm 
incomes for that year. However, for many of these households, one could expect that 
their non-poor status is temporary. Indeed, the asset based measure implies that only 
95 (18%) of 513 households that were structurally asset poor in 1994 had accumulated 
enough assets to maintain consumption above the poverty line by 2004 (table 2.8). The 
difference in measured transitions between the asset and income classifications 
suggests that many of the households that moved out of income poverty in 2004 
remained asset poor and thus in need of assistance. The asset-based measure can 
identify these at-risk households as those that were structurally poor in 2004.  The 175 
households in table 2.6 that moved from being stochastically or chronically poor in 
1994 to being structurally poor in 2004 are one group likely to fall into income poverty 
                                                 
24 Note, this is very important when we want to distinguish between beneficiaries of programs such as 
FFW targeted at the really poor who probably lack access to any external sources of income to even 
record an  income non poor status and these households who might have some access to resources 
which enables them to record non poor consumption levels even with low asset bases). 
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in the future. They represent those who were income poor in 1994 and who have 
moved to income non poor status in 2004 but without adequate assets. Another group 
worthy of note is those who remained in structural poverty between 1994 and 2004. 
These are an interesting group as they represent households who lack the asset base to 
maintain a non poor consumption pattern but appear to have external sources of 
income than enable them to maintain a non-poor consumption status. This could be 
dangerous if they are drawing on some non renewable or unstable income source as its 
depletion or discontinuance would most likely send them into chronic poverty very 
quickly.  
Finally, we test the accuracy of the non parametric estimate results by further 
distinguishing between households based on their location relative to the different 
equilibria and the dynamic asset poverty line and looking at the accuracy of the 
predictions developed therein. We see that 82% of households at or below low 
equilibrium in 1994 were still in that situation in 2004. This compares to about 28% 
found amongst the lowest expenditure group in South Africa in Carter and May’s 
analysis of poverty dynamics using transition matrices. Without external assistance, 
those households below the micawber threshold are expected to naturally decline 
towards the low level equilibrium over time. For those above the micawber threshold 
and below the high equilibrium, we expect them to grow over time towards this 
equilibrium. We find that about 85% of households in this category grew above the 
high equilibrium or remained on this upward trajectory. As for households above the 
high equilibrium, we find that about 99% of households above the high equilibrium in 
1994 remained above the high equilibrium or on the upward growth path towards it in 
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2004. This compares to about 56% found in the highest expenditure group of Carter 
and May’s South Africa sample (Carter and May, 2001). These are all very high 
predictions increasing our confidence in the asset based measure developed in the 
study as well as informing of the usefulness of the long term asset dynamics analysis 
in classifying poor rural households. 
 
Statistical Assessment of the Asset Index Model Using Relative In and Out of 
Sample Prediction 
In addition to the transition matrices, we also subject the asset poverty measure 
to further statistical tests to validate its ability to improve our understanding of poverty 
and poverty dynamics. We evaluate the in-sample and out of sample predictions of the 
asset poverty model and then compare its predictive power to that of the traditional 
income poverty measure. For the in-sample prediction, we compared the predicted 
asset poverty index value gotten from the regression in 2004; Λivt.
25
                                                 
25 Remember that
 to the actual 
household consumption level relative to the poverty line. We used the Thiels U 
statistic (Ui) which measure the prediction accuracy of a forecasting model. This is 
provided in equation 6 where Ai is the actual value and Pi refers to the predicted value 
gotten from our model. A Thiels U-statistic as shown in equation 2.12 lies between 0 
and 1. The closer to 0 the statistic is, the better the prediction of the model. We find 
that the U statistic associated with our model  lies within this range, being 
approximately 0.48 for the in-sample predictions and about 0.47 for the out of sample 
predictions. 
ivtΛ = ivtLˆ  
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To compare the predictive power of the asset poverty measure and the income 
poverty measure, we consider the poverty status in time (t-1) as the prediction (Pi) and 
the actual poverty status in time t as Ai.  We find that the Thiels U statistic (Ui) for the 
income measure prediction is 0.51 while for the asset measure it is 0.29. We also 
tested the predictive accuracy of the asset poverty measure in time (t-1) for the income 
poverty status in time “t” and find that the asset measure predicts income poverty 
status much better than the income measure with a Theils statistic of 0.25 compared to 
0.51. See table 2.10.  
This result further confirms the ability of the asset based measure to capture the 
true poverty status of the structurally poor households (and stochastically poor 
households) who might reveal a non poor poverty (poor) status by their consumption 
in one period, but lack (have) the asset base to sustain such consumption and thus are 
expected to move back to their expected poor (non poor) status. 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
Using a generalized instrumental variables regression (GIV) model, this 
chapter estimated the relationship between household assets and consumption 
expenditures.  Results show that physical and human assets are good predictors of 
household wellbeing in rural Ethiopia, and that village characteristics are significant in 
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explaining household relative consumption expenditures. Results indicate that various 
assets such as land and agricultural implements revealed increasing returns to scale 
rather than the usual diminishing returns of livestock and jewelry. 
In this chapter, regression results were used to estimate an asset index for 
poverty classification and to categorize households based on the structural nature of 
their poverty status. The results of this classification approach reveal that though the 
asset-based approach is not in conflict with the income based poverty measurement, it 
is more informative as it enables a better understanding of the nature, dynamics and 
persistence of households’ poverty status. In addition to these static poverty 
measures26
An important finding of this analysis is that the asset-based poverty 
classifications consistently predict future poverty status more accurately than 
traditional income-based measures. Thus an asset-based measure could be used to 
more carefully describe rural poverty, to target poverty interventions and to more 
accurately assess the impact of those interventions.  In particular, baseline data on 
assets could be used to more accurately identify households to target for specific 
, this chapter also explored the dynamics of the asset index to test for the 
existence of multiple equilibria in the asset growth path in rural Ethiopia. I fail to 
reject the existence of multiple equilbria, identifying a low equilibrium at just above 
the asset poverty line at about 0.2, equivalent to monthly per capita expenditure of 
56EB=$16.8(PPP) and a high equilibria at about 2 times the asset poverty line with 
equivalent per capita expenditure of about 114EB=$41.4(PPP).  
                                                 
26 This refers to the Non-Poor, Stochastically Poor, Structurally Poor, or Chronically Poor 
categorizations 
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programs, while ex post data on assets could indicate the impacts of interventions 
more clearly than expenditures data in isolation. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 2.1 Income Poverty Dynamics in Ethiopia: 1994-1999 
Year In Income  
Poverty 
Not in Income 
Poverty 
Transitorily 
Income 
Poor 
1994 a 51% 49% -- 
1994b 39% 61% 57% 
1995 41% 59% 68% 
1997 41% 59% 76% 
1999 26% 74% 79% 
Source: ERHS data. Sample size: 1019 each year. 
 
 
Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable         Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
     
Scaled consumptiona 0.30 0.59 -2.7 1.83 
Monthly expenditure per capita 
1994(valueb) 
84.51 77.54 1.49 819.39 
Expenditure per capita 
1995(valueb) 
85.69 86.00 1.15 982.34 
Expenditure per capita 
1997(valueb) 
87.49 78.07 2.95 912.51 
Expenditure per capita 
1999(valueb) 
101.02 90.99 2.97 735.35 
Expenditure per capita 
2004(valueb) 
92.79 99.56 2.79 696.72 
Total livestock (valueb) 1186.45 1743.74 0.00 14710.80 
Draught animals (valueb) 333.01       620.99           0.00 5837.03 
Dairy animals (valueb) 628.85 1104.62 0.00 8964.11 
Pack animals (valueb) 
101.96 265.98 0.00 3217.25 
Other livestock (valueb) 
130.60 280.80 0.00 4921.66 
 
Farm tools (valueb) 98.26 200.19 0.00 2214.90 
Other physical assets (valueb)  284.47 630.64 0.00 7575.00 
Number of children (<15) 2.86 2.04 0.00 17.00 
Number of working adults (15-
65) 
3.14 1.84 0.00 15.00 
Number of elderly (>65) 0.76 1.33 0.00 9.00 
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Table 2.2 (contd.) 
     
Variable         Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
     
Household size  6.70 4.08 1.00 30.00 
Highest education of any 
household member (years) 6.89 4.75 1.00 13.00 
Age of household head (years) 47.76 15.66 15.00 105.00 
Land (area) 1.88 2.65 0.00 40.50 
Draught animals (0/1)  0.47 0.50 0 1 
Other livestock (0/) 0.56 0.50 0 1 
Pack animals (0/1) 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Dairy animals (0/1) 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Social capital (membership in 
local organization) 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Male household head (0/1) 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Village 1 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Village 2 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
Village 3 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 
Village 4 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Village 5 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
Village 6 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Village 7 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 
Village 8 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Village 9 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Village 10 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Village 11 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Village 12 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Village 13 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Village 14 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Village 15 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
     
Source: ERHS Data. Sample size is 1190 each year 
a) Relative consumption expenditure is as earlier defined; log of consumption per capita 
relative to the poverty line with reference point being 0. 
b) All values measured in Ethiopian Birr, deflated to 1994.  Official exchange rate in 
1994was 6Birr/US$ 
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Table 2.3 Expected Signs on Estimated Coefficients 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Land + Land Squared - 
Tools + Tools Squared - 
Other physical Assets + 
Other physical 
Assets Squared - 
Livestock-Draught + 
Livestock-Draught 
Squared - 
Livestock-Dairy + 
Livestock-Dairy 
Squared - 
Livestock-Transport + 
Livestock-
Transport Squared - 
Livestock-Other + 
Livestock-Other 
Squared - 
Land*Draught 
Livestock + Land*Tools + 
Male household head + Children - 
Adults + Elderly - 
Education + Education Squared - 
Age of household head ? Age Squared ? 
Social Capital  +     
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Table 2.4 Hausman Taylor IV Model Estimates: Dependent Variable is  
Household Scaled Consumption Expenditures  
  Generalized 
Instrumental 
Variables 
estimation+ 
Fixed Effects 
Panel 
Dynamic 
Panel 
estimation 
Coef. P>Z+
+ 
Coef. P>Z++ Coef. P>Z++ 
Landholdings (hectares) 0.03 0.42 0.02 0.55 -0.06 0.23 
Farm Tools(values) 0.11 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.10 
Draught Animals 
(values) 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.82 
Dairy Animals (values) 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.03 
Pack Animals (values) 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.21 0.01 
Other Livestock 
(values) 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.59 
Education -0.01 0.45 -0.01 0.52 -0.03 0.22 
Other Physical Assets -0.01 0.41 -0.01 0.41 0.06 0.07 
Land*Tools -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.15 -0.01 0.28 
Land*Draught Animals 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.29 
Tools*Livestock 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.33 -0.01 0.14 
Memberships 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.32 0.00 
Off Farm Activities 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.10 0.02 
Land Squared 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.97 0.03 0.05 
Tools squared value 0.01 0.75 0.00 0.96 0.01 0.61 
Other Livestock 
squared value -0.01 0.17 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.76 
Other Physical Assets 
Squared 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.38 
Dairy animals squared 
value -0.01 0.29 -0.01 0.31 -0.02 0.11 
Pack animals squared 
(values) -0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.08 -0.07 0.01 
Draught Animals 
squared value -0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.45 
Male Head 0.04 0.37 -0.05 0.36 0.05 0.70 
Age -0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.10 -0.14 0.01 
Working age household 
members -0.19 0.00 -0.18 0.00 -0.23 0.00 
children less than 15 -0.16 0.00 -0.16 0.00 -0.15 0.00 
elderly above 65 -0.00 0.85 0.00 0.92 -0.03 0.23 
Non Farm Activities 0.04 0.34 0.03 0.43 -0.04 0.51 
Food For Work 
Program -0.08 0.09 -0.08 0.14 - - 
Constant 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.24 0.43 
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Source: STATA Regression Estimations using ERHS data.  
Continuous  variables were transformed into logarithms. 
Coef. refers to coefficient 
Table  2.4 (contd.) 
       
 
Generalized 
Instrumental 
Variables 
estimation+ 
Fixed Effects 
Panel 
Dynamic 
Panel 
estimation 
 
Coef. P>Z+
+ 
Coef. P>Z++ Coef. P>Z++ 
Round 2 0.32 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.32 0.00 
Round3 0.20 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.22 0.00 
Round4 0.15 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.06 0.25 
Round5 0.32 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.27 0.00 
Round6  0.02 0.75 0.04 0.44 -0.10 0.17 
Village 1 - -     -0.27 0.19 
Village 2 -0.02 0.68     0.23 0.31 
Village 3 -0.13 0.01     -0.98 0.00 
Village 4 0.25 0.00     0.06 0.71 
Village 5 0.11 0.03     -0.19 0.51 
Village 6 0.23 0.00     0.22 0.23 
Village 7 0.37 0.00     - - 
Village 8 0.20 0.00     -0.25 0.21 
Village  9 -0.10 0.04     -0.59 0.01 
Village 10 0.15 0.00     -0.18 0.46 
Village 11 -0.14 0.00     -0.83 0.00 
Village 12 0.02 0.72     -0.52 0.03 
Village 13 -0.02 0.71     -0.95 0.00 
Village 14 -0.18 0.00     - - 
Village 15 -0.02 0.66     -0.97 0.00 
Adjusted R2 0.20  0.11   
Number of observations 7161       7042.00 
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Table 2.5 Parametric Estimates of Asset Index Dynamics 
 
Dependent variable = Asset 
Index in 2004 (AI 2004) Coefficient P>|t| 
AI 1994 0.98 0.00 
AI 19942 0.09 0.00 
AI 19943 -0.20 0.00 
Household size -0.14 0.00 
Male Headed Household 0.01 0.68 
Age of Household Head -0.264 0.00 
Squared Age of Household 
Head 0.05 0.00 
Number of observations 1190  - 
F(  7,  1182) 394.25  - 
Prob > F 0  - 
R-squared 0.70  - 
Adjusted R-squared 0.67  - 
Source: STATA Regression Estimations using ERHS data 
 
Table 2.6 Income Poverty Transition Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Calculated using ERHS data. 
  Income Poor 
2004 
Income  
NonPoor 2004 
Total % 
correctly 
predicted 
Income poor 
1994 
211 249 460 0.46 
Income  
NonPoor 1994 
191 539 730 0.74 
Total 402 788 1190  
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Table 2.7 Asset Poverty Transition Matrix 
  Chronically 
Poor, 2004 
Stochastically 
poor 2004 
Structurally  
Poor, 2004 
Non-
Poor, 
2004 
Total  
Chronically 
Poor, 1994 
178 15 137 34 364 
Stochastically 
Poor, 1994 
8 10 17 61 96 
Structurally 
Poor, 1994 
65 18 38 28 149 
Non-Poor,  
1994 
29 79 26 447 581 
Total 280 122 218 570 1190 
Source: Calculated from ERHS data. 
 
Table 2.8 Asset Poverty Transition Matrix: Combined Categories 
  Asset Poor 
2004 
Asset Non 
Poor 2004 
Total % correctly 
predicted 
Asset Poor 
1994 
418 95 513 0.81 
Asset Non Poor 
1994 
80 597 677 0.88 
Total 498 692 1190  
          
Source: Calculated from ERHS data. 
a) Asset poor refers to structurally and chronically poor households. 
b) Asset non-poor refers to stochastically poor and non-poor households 
 
Table 2.9  Highly Disaggregated Asset Poverty Status 
  
Below 
the MT 
2004 
Above MT but  
below high 
equilibrium -
2004 
Above high 
equilibrium 
2004 
% in 
expected 
poverty 
category 
Below the MT- 1994 81.48% 18.52% 0.00% 81.48% 
Above MT but  below 
high equilibrium – 
1994 14.88% 62.15% 22.98% 85.12% 
Above high 
equilibrium – 1994 0.68% 36.99% 62.33% 99.32% 
MT refers to the micawber threshold 
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Table 2.10 Results of Thiels U Statistic Calculations 
Measure 
      No of 
observations      U statistic  
In sample prediction 
 1190 0.475 
Out of sample prediction 
 1190 0.469 
Asset prediction of asset poverty status  
 1190 0.294 
Income prediction of income poverty status 1190 0.505 
Asset prediction of income poverty status  1190 0.246 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Static Asset Based Poverty Classification 
 cit < c   
(Income Poor) 
cit > c  
(Income Non Poor)  
 Ait < A (or A ) 
(Asset Poor) 
 
Chronically  
Poor27
 
  
Stochastically Non 
Poor 
Ait > A (or A ) 
(Asset Non Poor) 
 
Stochastically Poor 
 
Structurally Non 
Poor 
 
                                                 
27 We refer to these households as chronically poor rather than as structurally poor since structurally 
 poor is a term generally used for all asset poor. 
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Figure 2.2 Dynamic Asset Based Poverty Classification 
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Figure 2.3 Rural Ethiopia Asset Income Dynamics 1994 -2004 
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Figure 2.4 Rural Ethiopia Asset Income Dynamics Between 1994 and 2004 With 
Confidence Intervals 
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Figure 2.5a Results From Fractional Polynomial  Parametric Estimations 
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Figure 2.5b Results From Parametric Estimations With  Covariates 
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Figure 2.6 Asset Index Dynamics in a Subset of Villages* 
An example of a village with low level convergence 
 
 An example of a village with convergence at a high asset level  
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Figure 2.6 (contd.) 
An example of a village with multiple equilibria 
 
*Village dynamics for all villages is provided in the appendix 
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Figure 2.7  Farming System Asset Index Dynamics 
A. Enset 
 
B. Teff 
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Figure 2.7 (contd.) 
C. Chat 
 
 
D. Cereal 
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Figure 2.8a Asset Dynamics With Social Capital 
 
 
Figure 2.8b Asset Dynamics Without Social Capital 
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Figure 2.9a Asset Index Dynamics with Shocks and Social Capital  
 
 
Figure 2.9b Asset Index Dynamics with Shocks but without Social Capital  
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CHAPTER THREE: POVERTY STATUS AND THE IMPACT OF 
MICROFINANCE ON TECHNOLOGY USE AND WELLBEING AMONG 
ETHIOPIAN SMALLHOLDERS 
 
Introduction 
Since the 1990’s, the Government of Ethiopia has pursued an Agriculture 
Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) strategy, focused on accelerating 
agricultural growth and achieving food security. This strategy emphasizes extension 
and rural finance to promote intensification of food staple production through the use 
of improved seed, fertilizer and other inputs (Byerlee et al, 2007). In similar vein, 
donors and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have increasingly sought to 
enhance farmers’ productivity by increasing access to improved agricultural 
technology and non-farm enterprises through microfinance and other mechanisms. 
Despite numerous interventions, technology adoption rates remain low (Spielman, 
2007). In an effort to better understand constraints on technology adoption, this 
chapter uses the asset poverty measure generated in chapter two to test for differential 
effects of microfinance and technology on farmer wellbeing.  
Use of improved technology may be inhibited by underdeveloped financial 
markets, limited access to input and output markets and inadequate information on 
market prices or on the practice of the new techniques.  By combining credit with 
training, microfinance institutions (MFIs) might provide households with access to 
new technologies and pathways out of poverty. While they have spread rapidly in 
Ethiopia over the last decade, little has been done to formally explore what types of 
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poor households use the services or how their impacts on technology use and 
wellbeing vary among poor households.  
One might expect expanded access to credit to have the greatest impact on 
households that are otherwise liquidity constrained (Winter-Nelson and Temu, 2005). 
However, the terms and conditions of microfinance contracts are likely to favor 
households that have more assets and greater liquidity initially.  For example, joint 
liability systems common in microfinance are likely to discourage participation by 
households who control very limited resources and whose income streams are more 
variable and therefore pose risk for co-signers. Frequent meetings and training 
sessions might also make MFI arrangements infeasible for time constrained asset poor 
households. In addition to affecting eligibility, a household’s asset base could also 
influence the returns to participation in an MFI. While diminishing returns to capital 
would suggest higher returns to borrowing among households with fewer assets, 
poverty traps28
This chapter examines the effects of farmer participation in microfinance 
programs on the use of new technologies and the impact of these technologies and 
financing on household consumption and assets. The study considers participation in 
 could imply low return among households lacking the asset base 
needed to generate a return to added finance (Johnson and Rogaly, 1997).  
Microfinance and new technologies might allow a broader range of farm and non-farm 
opportunities to households with complementary assets or more capacity to absorb risk 
than to other households. Thus, both access to microfinance and the return from 
investments could differ across households with differing poverty profiles.  
                                                 
28 Poverty traps refer to asset levels below which households are not able to grow out of poverty 
without assistance. Such traps may be associated with locally increasing returns to capital (Carter and 
Barrett, 2006). 
91 
 
non-farm enterprises and three farm technologies (use of chemical fertilizer, 
pesticides, and irrigation), all of which could affect household income and be affected 
by microfinance.  Because MFIs might enhance income by delivering other services, 
we consider both the direct impact of microfinance participation on consumption and 
asset growth as well as its impact through technology adoption. 
Unlike previous studies, this analysis relies on an asset dynamics model to 
distinguish the poverty status of households. Households are stratified based on the 
persistence of their asset-poverty over a 10 year period.  Results reveal a positive 
relationship between microfinance and technology use for the least poor households 
only. The poorest households do not appear to benefit from microfinance institutions 
in terms of technology use or growth in consumption and assets. First we review the 
literature on technology use and poverty. Next we discuss the data used and the 
context of our analysis. Then we present the analytical framework, followed by the 
estimation results and conclusions. 
 
Technology Use and Poverty 
There is a large literature on technology adoption in developing countries and 
it remains a topic of study in Ethiopia. In an extensive review, Feder, Just and 
Zilberman (1985) highlight the roles of risk aversion, credit, and information 
constraints as barriers to technology adoption. Most of the work cited in Feder, Just 
and Zilberman is based on static models, but more recent studies have introduced 
dynamic properties of technology adoption (Besley and Case, 1994; Foster and 
Rosensweig, 1995) and have explored the impact of consumption risk or incorporated 
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the role of savings and insurance (Dercon and Christiansen, 2008; Gine and Klonner, 
2006).  
While a number of studies discuss the impact of liquidity on farm productivity 
(Feder et al, 1990; Winter-Nelson and Temu, 2005) and others consider its impact on 
technology use (Kumar, 1994; Zeller et al, 1997), limited research has considered the 
differential impact of new technologies or microfinance on the wellbeing of farmers 
with different degrees of asset poverty. Bandiera and Rausul (2005) find that when the 
cost of switching to modern technologies is not borne by farmers, asset wealth does 
not impact adoption, but Gine and Klonner (2006) find that farmers with lower wealth 
are slower to adopt technologies. Their analysis measures wealth through home value 
rather than productive assets, and though they show that initial wealth is negatively 
correlated with length of time to adoption, they could not distinguish between effects 
of credit constraint and risk aversion. 
In Ethiopia, Croppenstedt, Demeke and Meschi (2003) identify credit among 
factors limiting fertilizer use.  Other studies have identified risk preferences, credit 
constraints, education, high domestic marketing costs and limited access to inputs, and 
low profitability of fertilizer as factors explaining low use or adoption rates (Asfaw 
and Admassie, 2004; Howard et al, 2003; Dadi, Burton, and Ozanne, 2004; Abrar, 
Morrissey, and Rayner, 2004; Jayne et al, 2003).  While studies like Jayne et al (2003) 
and Byerlee et al, (2007) discuss the key role that state led policies play on the 
diffusion of new technologies, others like Feleke et al (2006) and Gabre-Medhin et al 
(2003) consider the distributional effect of technological advances on food surplus and 
food deficit farmers. Despite this significant discussion of use of fertilizer and other 
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inputs in Ethiopian agriculture, little of the literature addresses the possibility that key 
determinants of technology use may vary across different classes of poor households 
or that the benefits of use or of credit may be uneven over poverty classes.  
 
 Data 
Data for this study are drawn from the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey 
(ERHS). The ERHS dataset contains detailed information on consumption 
expenditure, assets and agricultural activities of rural Ethiopian households and is the 
product of a longstanding data collection effort by Oxford University, the University 
of Addis Ababa, and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). The 
survey covered 15 peasant associations across four regions, with a sample of 1477 
households in 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2004. Though the ERHS is not fully 
representative of rural Ethiopia, the15 peasant associations were selected to cover the 
main farming systems in the country including grain-plough areas of the Northern and 
Central highlands, enset29
                                                 
29 Enset (ensete ventricosum), commonly known as "false banana”, is a traditional staple crop in the 
densely populated south and southwestern parts of Ethiopia. 
-growing areas and sorghum-hoe areas. Dercon and 
Krishnan (1998) provide further details on the EHRS surveys. This analysis uses data 
from the 1994, 1999 and 2004 rounds of the ERHS.  These rounds were selected in 
part because the survey was administered around the same time in each of these years 
and to provide equal spacing between rounds. Supplementary information comes from 
governmental reports, documents provided by NGOs and from interviews with 
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representatives of the communities covered in the ERHS. The supplementary 
interviews were conducted in 2007. 
This analysis begins by using ERHS data to classify households by their asset 
poverty status.  The asset based approach to poverty measurement classifies as asset 
poor those households whose assets are inadequate to generate an income stream 
supporting consumption above the expenditures poverty line (Carter and Barrett, 
2006).  An asset poverty line is defined as the asset value that exactly supports 
consumption at the expenditures poverty line.  In this application an asset index is 
established as a function of the household’s land, livestock, farm implements, other 
physical assets, and education.  The weights on each component of the asset index are 
based on an estimate of the relationship between assets and consumption as described 
in chapter 2.  Households whose asset index was below the asset poverty line in each 
survey year are classified as “always asset poor”. “Never asset poor” households are 
those whose asset index was above the poverty line each year, and households whose 
status changed between years are classified as “Transitory asset poor”. Table 3.1 
presents summary information on the households in each of these poverty classes.  Of 
the 1215 households for which data are complete, 380 were asset poor each year, 483 
were never asset poor, and 352 moved into or out of asset poverty.  The absolute value 
of expenditures is low for all groups.  At 160 Birr per capita, monthly average 
expenditures among the never asset poor group are above the Ethiopian rural income 
poverty line but are still under $2 (PPP) per day.30
                                                 
30 One US dollar is equivalent to 9.09 Ethiopian Birr (EB). The PPP conversion factor is approximately 
0.25. 
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Table 3.2 presents information on use of fertilizer, chemicals and irrigation as 
well as participation in non-farm enterprises and microfinance for households in each 
poverty group.  The data reveal increases in participation in microfinance over the 
decade across all classes, but more rapid expansion among the least poor. In 1994 
participation rates were lowest among the never asset poor, but by 2004 this group had 
twice the participation rate as the other two poverty classes. Microfinance programs 
are quite varied in rural Ethiopia. They provide agricultural and non-agricultural loans 
through NGOs and regional programs coordinated by the government. Loans vary in 
size but are usually less than 1,500 birr (about US$165). The presence of other 
services and the repayment conditions also vary but loans are usually for terms of one 
year or less and sometimes involve regular reporting and training (SIDA, 2003). The 
stated objectives of MFIs are quite similar across the country. They focus on reducing 
poverty and vulnerability by increasing agricultural productivity and incomes, 
diversifying off farm sources of income, and building household assets.  Regional 
governments in Ethiopia have attempted to promote improved seed and fertilizer 
packages through provision of credit since the mid 1990’s. Under this system, large 
volumes of fertilizer are supposedly delivered on credit at below-market interest rates 
as part of packages incorporated with extension programs (Byerlee et al, 2007). In 
some cases MFIs are the conduit for this finance. Despite the linking of fertilizer-seed 
packages with finance, the fungible nature of money prevents direct measurement of 
how formal credit affects additional input use.  Discussions with various farmers and 
microfinance administrators in the study areas revealed a broad spectrum of activities 
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including the purchase of agricultural inputs and the establishment or expansion of 
small scale enterprises such as shoe repair, trading and livestock fattening. 
Of the three farm technologies in table 3.2, chemical pesticides and irrigation 
show consistently increasing use rates across poverty classes. The data show increased 
fertilizer use up to 1999, followed by a decline in 2004. This pattern is consistent with 
national data which show increasing fertilizer rates in the 1990s, then a decline in 2001 
and 2002, with a slight recovery in 2004.31
Irrigation practice in rural Ethiopia is usually based on diversions from streams 
or rivers or the use of pumps to distribute water from streams or wells. While 
irrigation is often community based, private control of associated technology like 
 Higher fertilizer prices and depressed 
cereal prices in 2001 explain the decline in fertilizer use (Thurow, 2003). In contrast to 
fertilizer, chemical use did not fall in 2004. This difference is consistent with the 
different applications of fertilizer and other agro-chemicals. Fertilizer tends to be 
applied to cereals (Dercon and Christiansen, 2008), while chemical pesticides are 
applied to coffee and other cash crops. Among coffee growers in the sample, only 20% 
used fertilizer in 2004, but 56% used other chemicals. By 2004, chemical use was 
more prevalent than fertilizer use, being practiced by 45% of the always asset poor 
households and 64% of the never asset poor. Use rates are consistently higher among 
the never asset poor than the poor.  Higher rates of chemical use among the never asset 
poor is consistent with the greater concentration on coffee and cash crop production 
relative to maize production among the never asset poor compared to the always asset 
poor (table 3.3).  
                                                 
31 Data were provided by the Central Statistical Agency (CSA), Ethiopia, 2007 
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pumps implies significant variable costs to individual users in addition to the initial 
investment costs which might be borne by the community or donor organizations.  
Other private variable costs emerge through crop choice. Irrigation is often associated 
with fruit and vegetable production or other improved crop varieties which are more 
management intensive than cereals.  Irrigation also implies private efforts at repair and 
maintenance (Rahmato, 1999) and increased labor requirements for weeding.  Thus, 
given an irrigation system in a community, individual participation could depend on 
household conditions affected by microfinance.  
The data in table 3.2 reveal growth in irrigation use across the three poverty 
categories. Depending on poverty class, 19 to 25 percent of households practiced some 
irrigation by 2004, up from about 10% in 1999. Non-farm enterprises are less 
frequently reported than any of the farm technologies considered here.  Fewer than 
10% of households in any poverty class report engaging in such activities and rates are 
stable over time.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
 Under the assumption of perfect markets, market prices are exogenous to a 
household and all products (output and inputs) are tradables. Consequently market 
prices reflect the true opportunity cost of products and serve as the prices upon which 
household consumption and production decisions are based. In such settings it does 
not matter if household consumes their own products or sells them and buys its 
necessary consumption items with the resultant income and consequently we can treat 
the household’s production and consumption decisions as solved sequentially. First 
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households determine what to produce given output and input prices as well as 
household specific characteristics, determining the household’s income which then 
serves as part of its budget constraint in the consumption decision. 
Our study area is rural Ethiopia, where rural financial markets are very thin and 
where villages are often isolated with limited access to various input and output 
markets. Consequently, a more appropriate assumption here is one where market 
failures exist such that market prices no longer reflect the full opportunity cost of 
various goods, particularly inputs such as fertilizer, chemical pesticides and irrigation, 
the inputs of particular interest in this study. Consequently we model the technology 
use decision as a constrained utility maximization problem for a household as 
characterized in Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995)  
In this set up we assume that household’s problem is to: 
Max ),( hzcU                     (3.1) 
Subject to the following constraints 
 ( ) SEqpcp ii
Ti
ii
Ti
i ++≤ ∑∑
∈∈
      - cash income constraint    
 (3.2) 
 ( ) KEqpcp ii
TCi
ii
Ti
i ++≤ ∑∑
∈∈
      - credit constraint             
 (3.3) 
0),( =hzqf                           - production technology             
 (3.4) 
,ii pp =    Ti∈ ,                    - exogenous market price for tradables 
 (3.5) 
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iii cEq ≥+ ,   NTi∈ ,             - equilibrium for non tradables.  
 (3.6) 
 
where iq > 0 refers to output commodities and iq < 0 refers to factors of production 
such as labor, fertilizer and chemical pesticides. c refers to the  goods consumed and 
hz is a vector of household characteristics such as farm size, age and gender of family 
members, farm implements, education and household size. ip is the exogenous  
effective market price for tradable goods while ip *  is the endogenous price of 
commodity i , different from the exogenous price when a commodity is not tradable 
and/or when the household is credit constrained.; iE is the household ‘s endowment of 
any commodity i ; S corresponds to net transfers received and K  refers to households 
access to credit. T  refers to all tradables, including goods subject to a credit 
constraint(TC) and those not(TNC) while NT refers to non tradable goods. 
The Lagrangian associated with this constrained maximization problem is: 
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Solving this problem with respect to our inputs of interest yields  
ii
i ppMU *==
λ
  for  inputs i  for which there is no credit constraint 
 (3.8) 
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 ; for inputs j for which there is a credit constraint (3.9) 
iNTMU µ=   for non tradables      (3.10) 
 
From these first order conditions, we can solve for our input and output 
demands as 
iq = )*,(
hq
i zpq  
Where iq <0 since we are dealing with inputs, 
hqz  refers to household characteristics 
associated with the need for input i  and where  the endogenous prices for the relevant 
inputs can be expressed as: 
ii pp =
* ,  TNCi∈                                        (3.11) 
)1(*
λ
η
+= ii pp ,  TCi∈                               (3.12) 
λµ iip =
* , NTi∈                              (3.13) 
 
From equations 3.11 to 3.13 we can see that for tradables, the effective market 
prices (endogenous price) are always a function of the market price, ip . For the non 
constrained tradables, ip  is the effective price and for the constrained tradables, the 
effective prices is a function of the market price ip  as well as  a function of the 
marginal utility of cash (λ ) and the marginal utility of credit; η as can be seen from 
equation 3.12. The credit constraint effectively raises the decision price of credit 
constrained tradable products as well as the factors with a positive marketed surplus. 
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Any strategy or intervention geared at reducing the credit constraint faced by 
farmers is effectively reducing the decision price of the relevant input and expected to 
affect the use of input i . 
K
qi
∂
∂
=
K
p
p
q i
i ∂
∂
∂
∂ *
* *    (3.14) 
The first term on the RHS of equation 3.14 is unambiguously positive. An increase in 
access to credit reduces the decision price and being a normal good, the demand for 
input i  is negatively related to the price of i .  Consequently, this study explores the 
differential impact of access to formal credit (expected to reduce the decision price of 
various inputs) on farmer use of the associated inputs. 
 Under the assumption that the use of modern technologies such as fertilizer, 
chemical pesticides and irrigation increase productivity and hence yield, this study 
assumes that use of the various technologies should increase farmer incomes. 
Following standard utility theory, demand for consumption items is positively 
associated with income and thus with increased income we expect consumption to 
increase. This is the basis for the expected consumption growth associated with 
modern technology used. 
 
 Analytic Framework 
Technology choice by a household can be modeled as a constrained utility 
maximization problem as in Singh, Squire and Strauss (1986). As described above, the 
solution to this problem yields reduced form specifications of demand for inputs and 
technologies and supply of outputs. Based on these reduced form specifications, 
participation in microfinance and its impact on household livelihood can be modeled 
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in a two step procedure. The first step analyzes the impact of microfinance 
participation on technology use and non-farm enterprises for each of the poverty 
classes considered.  The second step estimates the impact of technology use and 
microfinance on consumption and asset growth for households in each poverty class. 
Because of its impact on the credit constraint, taking a loan from an MFI could be 
expected to influence use of technology as in equation 1, below. 
(TUikt)x =  (λAZit)x  + (δA Iit)x + (γAT) x + (E1it) x    i=(1…N);t=(1…T).  (3.15) 
Here (TUikt )x is the use of technology k by household i in time t where 
household i belongs to poverty status class x. Zit refers to a vector of explanatory 
variables capturing household i’s demographic characteristics and other household 
factors that affect the decision to use a particular technology, T refers to time dummies 
included to account for  time specific events that could affect a household’s 
technology use. Iit captures household participation in a microfinance arrangement in 
time t and E1it is the time specific random error.  
While finance has been shown to influence the use of modern technology 
(Kumar, 1994), including participation in a credit program as a regressor could 
introduce bias since participation in a credit scheme is likely to be endogenous with 
farm technology (Zeller et al, 1997).  An estimation problem arises if an unmeasured 
household-level variable affects both microfinance program participation and 
technology use. Given a continuous dependent variable a fixed effects model could be 
applied to eliminate the unobserved time-invariant household characteristics. Given a 
binary dependent variable, Andersen (1973) and Chamberlain (1980) suggest 
estimating a likelihood function conditional on a sufficient statistic for the unobserved 
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parameters, ci. This study uses a conditional fixed effects logit model to produce 
consistent estimators and standard errors.  
This formulation posits TU*ikt as a latent variable capturing household utility 
from use of technology k. Household i’s decision to use k is based on some 
unobservable utility index which depends on a set of explanatory variables Z 
(including household characteristics) access to credit (I), unobserved household 
characteristics (ci), period (T) specific effects and a time and household varying error 
term (uit). Actual use of the technology (TUikt) is observed as either one or zero, 
depending on whether the household uses k in time t or not. Thus  
TUikt = 1 if TU*ikt >0  and 0 otherwise. 
Where  
TU*ikt= βUZit + δU itI  + ic +γUT + uit       
 (3.16) 
 such that 
 P [TUikt= 1] = Pr[TU*ikt >0] = Pr[uit > -( βUZit +δU itI  + ic +γUT)]  = F(βUZit + δU itI  
+ ic +γUT) 
assuming symmetry of the function describing F around zero.  
Unlike conventional probit or logit estimations, the presence of unknown 
parameters βU, δU, γU and the household effect ic  with a fixed number of periods 
(T=3), implies that as ,∞→N  the number of parameters ic  increases. The usual 
solution to this problem is to find a minimum sufficient statistic for ic . As discussed in 
Baltagi (2005), the sum of the years in which a technology is used,∑Tt iktTU , is a 
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minimum sufficient statistic for the logit model such that the distribution of the data 
conditional on this sufficient statistic does not depend on ic . Consequently we 
maximize the following conditional maximum likelihood function: 
∏ ∑
= =






=
N
i
T
t
iktikikikc TUTUTUTUL
1 1
321 /,,Pr
 
     for each k 
to obtain the conditional logit estimates for βU, δU and  γU . We can obtain a N - 
consistent estimators of βU, δU and γU without making assumptions about ic . 
This use of the conditional logit approach requires discarding observations for 
households for which ∑Tt iktTU  = 0 or ∑
T
t ikt
TU = T (i.e., households who never 
change states) because they contribute zero to the likelihood function.  With T=3, this 
application includes households for which ∑Tt iktTU =1 and ∑
T
t ikt
TU =2.  Thus we 
include: 
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==∑ ββ  (3.22) 
where all equations are independent of ci (Maddala, 1987; Baltagi, 2005). 
With the reduced sample, results can be interpreted as explaining the effect of 
taking a loan from a microfinance institution on a household’s decision to use a 
particular technology for all households who adopted or abandoned that technology 
over the three years for which we examine the data.  Removing observations for 
households that did not change states leaves about 40%, 45% and 35% of the always 
asset poor, never asset poor and transitorily asset poor households in the fertilizer use 
estimation. The retention within groups in irrigation estimations is about 25%, 25% 
and 15%, in the same order, while for chemical pesticide and herbicide use about 50% 
60% and 40% of the households are retained for the three groups respectively. The Chi 
squared tests results with P>Chi squared =0.000 indicate that the model has 
explanatory power.  
Fixed effects estimators are only consistent if explanatory variables are 
exogenous in the model. Following Wooldridge (2002, p. 285), we test for exogeneity 
of microfinance participation by estimating a first difference model of technology use:  
ΔTUikt= βUΔZit + δUΔ itI  +η itI + γUΔT +Δ uit    (3.23) 
Significance of η (Iit), would suggest a violation of exogeniety.   This test of strict 
exogeniety was conducted for every two periods, with results confirming strict 
exogeniety conditional on household fixed effects. A more conventional test of 
applying (3.23) to the full sample rather than separate sets of sequential periods 
106 
 
yielded no meaninful results due to insufficient varation in the dependent variable 
when the lead variable was included. 
In the technology use equations (3.15), the control variables included in Z are 
household characteristics as well as other time varying variables expected to affect 
technology use, including: household landholdings (in hectares), access to extension 
services measured as one if households were visited by an extension agent in the last 
year and zero otherwise; size of the household, age in years, sex (male=1), and years 
of education of the household head; whether households had members engaged in off 
farm wage labor (0/1) or engaged in nonfarm enterprises (0/1); household access to 
informal credit from an informal savings and credit association (Equb) and the number 
of support programs available in the peasant association. Support programs include 
nongovernmental organizations as well as other support programs like Food For Work 
and other training related programs in the different peasant associations.  
Table 3.3 presents summary statistics on the variables included in the study.  
The persistently poor households tend to have smaller landholdings, larger household 
sizes and less educated household heads and are as likely as others to have wage 
income from off-farm labor. Other descriptive information is provided in table 3.2.  To 
test for a differential effect of the determinants of technology use, indicator variables 
for poverty status are included and interacted with control variables. These classes are 
the always asset poor, the transitory asset poor, and the never asset poor as defined 
earlier. 
Larger land holdings and access to extension services are expected to be 
positively associated with technology use. Membership in an Equb implies an 
107 
 
alternative source of credit and information for households and should be positively 
related to technology use. The expected effect of participation in wage labor and 
nonfarm enterprises on technology use is ambiguous (Mahmoud and Michuki, 2007). 
Wage labor could provide additional liquidity to finance investment in technology, but 
it could also divert household resources from agriculture. Support programs help 
capture the presence of community level improvements such as infrastructure 
development and trainings. These programs could increase the returns to using 
technology, but they could also increase the profitability of other nonfarm enterprises 
and wage opportunities in nearby towns which might discourage agricultural 
investment. In all estimations, the standard errors are adjusted for possible household 
cluster effects and bootstrapping is used to account for the fact that the poverty status 
categorization was based on a previous parametric estimation.  
After estimating (3.15) to assess the impact of microfinance participation on 
technology use, the relationships between household consumption and asset growth on 
the one hand and technology use or microfinance participation on the other are 
estimated, again testing for a differential effect by poverty status. The following 
equation was estimated 
(ΔYit)x= (αL1) x +( αL2Yit-1) x +(βL2Zit) x +( ΠLTUikt ) x + (γLIi) x +( ELit) x (3.24) 
where ΔYit refers to change in household wellbeing measured alternatively by 
consumption growth and asset index growth respectively. αL1  is a constant term, Yit-1 
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captures lagged wellbeing;32
Consumption and asset index growth are expected to be positively correlated 
with technology use on average. Increased technology use should increase productivity 
either leading to increased marketable surplus or reduced food insecurity. Formal 
credit could relate to consumption directly via increased consumption or reduced 
 Zit represents a vector of control variables as used in 
equation 1 with additional variables for the value of household assets. TUikt captures 
household use of technology k   in time t and Iit measures household participation in a 
microfinance program in time t. ELit is the time and household specific error term and x 
refers to poverty class. Following basic specification tests, this study treats ELit as a 
composite error term composed of a truly random component (uit) and an unobserved, 
time invariant component (ci) associated with each household. Since this unobserved 
characteristic could influence a household’s decision to participate in the various 
technologies and also affect household productivity and welfare, failing to account for 
this in our estimation would lead to biased and inconsistent estimates of our various 
parameters. Under normal circumstances, since the variance of the composite error 
term, (ci +uit) is unknown, a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) method is 
appropriate. However this method is only valid if ci is uncorrelated with other 
covariates. If this is not satisfied, then a fixed effects estimator is appropriate. We 
reject the null hypothesis of the Hausman test of no endogeneity and thus use the fixed 
effects estimator to obtain unbiased and consistent results. 
                                                 
32 To avoid additional endogeneity problems through introducing a lagged dependent variable in a 
growth model, lagged asset variables were used to account for initial consumption levels as they are 
predetermined. 
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consumption variability, through its effect on use of modern technology or through 
other services such as training on effective use of modern technology, small scale 
business development and management, health education or family planning. A 
significant coefficient on the microfinance participation variable would indicate effects 
of participation besides via promoting technology use.  
Equation 3.24 was estimated using lagged asset variables, household livestock 
and land to capture initial conditions. Based on various specification tests for 
exogeneity and correlation between explanatory variables and the dependent variable, 
use of fertilizer, use of chemicals and use of irrigation were applied in lagged form. As 
in the technology use estimation, the differential impact of taking formal credit or 
technology use across poverty classes is distinguished by the use of an indicator 
variable for each poverty class. For all estimations, robust standard errors were 
calculated to account for heteroskedasticity and/or serial correlation in the errors for 
particular households over time and bootstrapping done to account for the estimations 
necessary for poverty classification. 
 
Estimation Results 
Technology Use 
Tables 3.4-3.7 report the results of the technology use regressions (3.15) with 
specifications that distinguish poverty classes and a specification that excludes the 
poverty class terms for comparison.  Results for fertilizer indicate that for the always 
asset poor households who started or stopped using fertilizer between 1994 and 2004, 
a one hectare increase in land holdings would increase the odds of fertilizer use by a 
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factor of 1.43. This effect is not significantly different for the transitory asset poor, but 
for the never asset poor the impact of increasing area on fertilizer use is neutral, with 
an odds ratio of 1.0 (1.425*0.699).  Similarly, receiving extension services in any year 
is associated with an increase in the odds of the always asset poor using fertilizer by a 
factor of 3.4. As in the case of land, this positive effect is not significantly different for 
the transitory poor but reduces for the never asset poor to a factor of 1.0 (3.44*0.29). 
These results support the expectation of decreasing returns to inputs such as land and 
information. Larger households, male headed households, and households with 
younger household heads are more likely to use fertilizer while households with 
members engaged in low skilled off farm wage labor activities are less likely to use 
fertilizer. 
Participation in an MFI has no statistically significant effect on the odds of 
using fertilizer for the always asset poor households or the transitory asset poor 
households who altered their fertilizer use. For the never asset poor households who 
changed their use of fertilizer, taking formal credit reduces the odds of use by a factor 
of 0.21. This suggests that the never asset poor households who take loans from MFI’s 
are either diverting from agricultural activities altogether or diverting away from 
agricultural activities intensive in fertilizer use. Descriptive statistics indicate that the 
asset poor and the asset non-poor households produce similar volumes of maize, which 
responds to fertilizer, but that the asset non-poor on average produce considerably 
more coffee, which demands chemical pesticides (table 3.3).  A loan to a non-poor 
household is unlikely to encourage a shift into fertilizer use, since the household is 
already more likely to be applying the input than others, but may enable a de-emphasis 
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on maize relative to nonfarm activities or to other crops like coffee or chat.33  In 2004 
only 18% of coffee growers and 4% of chat growers used fertilizer, while 50% of them 
used pesticides.  Meanwhile, 30% of maize growers used fertilizer.34
   Results for chemical use (table 3.5) indicate that larger land sizes are less likely 
to increase the odds of using chemicals among the never asset poor than for the always 
asset poor. Both the use of extension services and having more support programs in 
the peasant association increase the odds of chemical use and this does not differ 
across poverty classes.  Like fertilizer, households with members engaged in off farm 
wage activities tend to be less likely to use chemicals. With regard to formal credit, 
taking a loan increases the odds of chemical use for the never asset poor, but not for 
other poverty groups. This finding supports the idea that reducing credit constraints 
increases the odds of engaging in cash crop production for the less poor households 
only.  A specification that does not distinguish among poverty groups would suggest a 
general increase in chemical pesticides use with microfinance engagement. In contrast 
to the effect of MFI, community wide support programs seem to encourage use of 
chemicals among households in all poverty classes. 
  While these 
results provide no evidence that microfinance encourages of use of fertilizer, they do 
reveal a differential impact across poverty classes.  The specification that does not 
include poverty class interaction terms would suggest no effect of MFIs or farm scale 
on fertilizer use.    
                                                 
33 Chat (catha edulis) is marketed throughout East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. 
34 Of all households engaged in cash crop production, over 65% also grew maize. 
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Because there is often a collective investment in irrigation, microfinance is less 
likely to affect use of this technology than fertilizer or chemical pesticides.  Table 3.6 
shoes that on average, households were more likely to use irrigation in 2004 and 1999 
compared to 1994, but taking a loan only significantly increased the odds of irrigation 
use for the transitory asset poor.  For the always asset poor more land and extension 
services increase the odds of irrigation use.  As in the case of fertilizer, these effects 
decline for the never asset poor households.  The insignificance of MFI participation 
on irrigation use among the poor and non-poor households may reflect the 
overwhelming role of community level factors, but the strong impact of MFI 
participation on irrigation use by the transitory asset poor implies that some 
households may be able to apply these services to irrigation.  The results from a model 
excluding poverty class distinctions would suggest that microfinance has a strong 
general impact on irrigation, which is not the case.  Interpretation of the more narrow 
effect is problematic because the transitory asset poor group includes households 
moving out of and into poverty.  Limitations in the data and the intensive data 
requirement of the estimation procedure preclude testing whether MFI participation 
fosters irrigation use among households that transition out of poverty or irrigation use 
by downwardly mobile farms.  
Finally, table 3.7 indicates that assets like land and education do not have a 
significant effect on household’s participation in nonfarm enterprises and households 
who have members engaging in off farm wage labor activities are less likely to engage 
in these nonfarm activities. Formal credit apparently has no effect on the odds of 
households engaging in nonfarm enterprises. However it appears that access to 
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informal credit through a rotating savings and credit institutions (Equb) is highly 
correlated with engaging in nonfarm enterprises, with an odds ratio of 4.2. This effect 
was not statistically different across poverty classes.  The larger the number of support 
programs there are in a peasant association, the higher the odds of household 
participation for the never asset poor category, but these programs have no effect on 
nonfarm enterprises among other poverty groups. Again, an analysis without poverty 
class distinctions would suggest a general effect of the support programs on nonfarm 
enterprise participation, while the disaggregated analysis reveals the effect on the non-
poor only.  
 
Consumption and Asset Growth 
The findings in tables 3.4-3.7 reveal some evidence that microfinance affects 
technology use among the never asset poor households, positively for chemicals and 
negatively for fertilizer but does not play a role in technology use by the poorest 
farmers.  Similarly, community-level support programs seem to facilitate nonfarm 
enterprises for the non-poor, but not the asset poor.  Failure to find a relationship 
between MFI participation and technology adoption among the poorest households is 
particularly meaningful if these technologies stimulate income or asset growth among 
the poor.  The relationship between technology use as well as MFI participation on the 
one hand and growth of consumption expenditure and assets on the other is revealed in 
the fixed effects estimation of equation 3.24.  Results in tables 3.8 and 3.9 show that 
technology and microfinance programs have different effects on wellbeing across the 
different poverty classes. Apart from the never asset poor, participation in 
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microfinance services has no direct effect on consumption growth. However, for the 
never asset poor, MFI has a strong and positive impact.   Meanwhile participation in 
informal financial arrangements (Equb) contributes to consumption growth for 
households in all poverty groups, suggesting a return to financial services across the 
sample, despite the evidence that formal MFI participation directly affects 
consumption for the less poor only. Both nonfarm and off farm activities are positively 
associated with higher consumption growth with larger households tending to have 
slower consumption growth. 
Lagged fertilizer use is positively associated with consumption growth across 
household groups. The positive relationship between fertilizer use and consumption 
among the always asset poor combined with the absence of a relationship between 
microfinance and fertilizer use for this group suggests that either MFI procedures are 
not compatible with finance for their cereal crop production or that asset poor 
households with access to microfinance prefer other uses of the credit.  As in the case 
of technology use, not distinguishing between poverty classes would give impression 
that MFI had a general effect on consumption growth but that fertilizer use had no 
impact.  In fact, fertilizer does affect consumption by the poor and non-poor and MFI 
participation directly affects consumption of the non-poor only.   
Because asset stocks capture the structural nature of poverty and growth in 
assets represents a pathway out of poverty, the impact of MFI participation and 
modern technology use on growth in the asset index is estimated in table 3.9. Results 
reinforce the differential impact of technologies by asset poverty group. While the use 
of fertilizer appears to have a uniformly positive impact on asset accumulation for all 
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groups, chemical pesticides and irrigation contribute to asset accumulation only among 
the non-poor. Meanwhile, microfinance seems to effectively contribute to chemical 
pesticides use among the less poor households who are the ones that seem able to build 
assets through use of this technology.   The result that fertilizer use is important for the 
growth of assets of the always asset poor suggests that there are pathways out of 
poverty for this group.  However, results indicate that formal credit services do not 
serve to assist these households in the use of fertilizer technology.  As with 
consumption growth, microfinance participation appears to directly contribute to asset 
accumulation among the non-poor, but not the always asset poor.  This is in contrast to 
participation in informal financial schemes (Equb) which has a positive impact on 
asset growth among all groups.  The generally positive effect of Equb suggests that all 
poverty groups could benefit from financial services, but only the non-poor seem able 
to capitalize on existing formal microfinance programs.    
 
 Conclusions 
This analysis finds that microfinance programs in Ethiopia have had some 
positive impact on farmer wellbeing. This impact can be seen in the role that 
microfinance programs play in the use of some improved technologies and in their 
measured impact on household consumption and asset growth when controlling for 
technology use. The study finds that this impact is not uniformly distributed and is 
strongest for the never asset poor. Participation in micro-finance programs raises the 
likelihood of technology use for the less poor households only. New technologies are 
also primarily associated with consumption and asset growth for the never asset poor 
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and the transitory asset poor, but not the always asset poor.  The one exception is 
fertilizer use whose impact on consumption and asset growth appears to cut across all 
poverty classes. 
Since even the never asset poor households in this sample have low absolute 
incomes, reaching them is an achievement.  Households classified as always asset 
poor, however, do not appear to benefit from microfinance programs.  Moreover, the 
technology that contributes to asset growth among these households (fertilizer use) 
does not seem to be affected by microfinance in general. Fertilizer use is closely 
associated with food crops and its benefits are widely spread across households. 
Interventions to enable the poor to use fertilizer more widely could contribute to both 
their food security and their ability to grow out of poverty, but current MFI programs 
remain more effective in promoting technologies associated with cash crops (irrigation 
and chemical pesticides). 
 Given the increasing pressure on land, other interventions that could enable 
diversification out of farming could be useful as well as targeted programs for the poor 
that enable the development of private and communal assets.  Nonfarm enterprises 
have a significant and positive effect on consumption and asset growth for all classes 
of households, but formal credit does not appear to play a role in household 
participation in these activities. Generally, expanding the use and effectiveness of 
improved technology practices as well as non-farm enterprises necessitates 
understanding better why poorer households are not apparently benefiting from 
microfinance institutions.   
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 In addition to revealing the differential impact of institutional interventions on 
rural farmer behavior and livelihood, Not only does it inform the development of 
appropriate strategies for different kinds of households but it prevents false assessment 
of government and other development programs. As seen from this study’s results, a 
conclusion about the success or failure of a program evaluated without distinguishing 
between its effects on different kinds of poor households could be misleading.  
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Tables  
Table 3.1  Mean Monthly Consumption Expenditures by Asset-Poverty 
 Status (Constant 1994 Ethiopian Birr per capita) 
        
  
Always  Asset  
Poor 
Never Asset  
Poor 
Transitory Asset 
Poor 
Full 
Sample 
1994 44.49 116.53 68.32 80.008 
(1.994) (3.925) (2.893) (1.893) 
    
    
1999 51.24 133.02 83.35 93.0244 
(2.5944) (4.144) (4.604) (2.585) 
    
    
2004 57.05 159.85 74.04 102.843 
(4.234) (8.242) (3.5814) (3.706) 
    
     
N 380 483 352 1215 
Bootstrapped Standard Errors in parentheses. 
Source: Ethiopian Rural Households Survey data.  
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Table 3.2 Technology Use and Microfinance Participation by Asset-Poverty  
Status  
 
 
Always Asset 
Poor 
Never Asset 
Poor 
Transitory Asset 
Poor 
  Mean 
Standard 
Error(a) Mean 
Standard 
Error(a) Mean 
Standard 
Error(a) 
Fertilizer 1994 
(0/1) 0.421 0.025 0.559 0.022 0.383 0.021 
       
Fertilizer 1999 
(0/1) 0.453 0.027 0.578 0.0214 0.423 0.023 
       
Fertilizer 2004 
(0/1) 0.229 0.021 0.200 0.019 0.227 0.017 
       
Irrigation 1994 
(0/1) 0.034 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.042 0.013 
       
Irrigation 1999 
(0/1) 0.092 0.014 0.115 0.015 0.100 0.013 
       
Irrigation 2004 
(0/1) 0.232 0.020 0.246 0.019 0.188 0.016 
       
Chemical 1994 
(0/1) 0.063 0.012 0.210 0.019 0.100 0.013 
       
Chemical 1999 
(0/1) 0.179 0.020 0.213 0.018 0.236 0.019 
       
Chemical 2004 
(0/1) 0.453 0.025 0.643 0.022 
  
0.503 0.022 
       
Non-Farm 
Enterprise 
1994 (0/1) 
    
0.045 
   0.010 
0.075     0.011 
 
0.044    0.009 
      
Non-Farm 
Enterprise 
1999 (0/1) 
0.055 0 .012 0.043 0 .009 0.045     0 .009 
      
Non-Farm 
Enterprise 
2004 (0/1) 
0.037 0.009 0.068 0.011 0.057     0.009 
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Table 3.2 (cont). 
 
 
Always Asset 
Poor 
Never Asset 
Poor 
Transitory Asset 
Poor 
  Mean 
Standard 
Error(a) Mean 
Standard 
Error(a) Mean 
Standard 
Error(a) 
Microfinance 
1994 (0/1) 0.042 0 .009 0.013 0.005 0.042 0.008 
       
Microfinance 
1999 (0/1) 0.060 0.012 0.052 0.005 0.056 0.009 
       
Microfinance 
2004 (0/1) 0.132 0. 017 0.271 0.021 0.122 0.013 
       
N 380   479   356 1215 
(a) Bootstrapped standard errors. 
Source: Ethiopian Rural Households Survey data.   
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Table  3.3 Summary Statistics   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ethiopian Rural Households Survey data.   
(a) Participation in local rotating and savings credit organizations. 
(b) Bootstrapped  standard errors 
(c) Includes only households that grow the crop in question. 
 
Always Asset Poor 
 
Never Asset Poor 
 
Transitory Asset 
Poor 
Variables Mean  
Standard 
Error (b) Mean  
Standard 
Error (b) Mean  
Standard 
Error (b) 
       
Landholding 
(HA) 1.34 0.040 2.36 0.050 1.37 0.040 
Most 
Education 
(yrs)  6.17 0.125 8.36 0.129 6.45 0.109 
Household 
Size 7.48 0.080 5.55 0.071 5.66 0.080 
Age of Head 
(yrs) 45.64 0.720 47.80 0.780 46.06 0.890 
Male Head 
(0/1) 0.80 0.010 0.75 0.010 0.70 0.010 
Microfinance 
Use (0/1) 0.13 0.008 0.27 0.008 0.12 0.005 
Wage labor 
(0/1) 0.31 0.013 0.27 0.011 0.32 0.010 
Membership 
in Equb (0/1) 
(a) 0.09 0.008 0.14 0.009 0.09 0.005 
Chemical 
Use (0/1) 0.23 0.012 0.35 0.013 0.28 0.011 
Fertilizer use 
(0/1) 
0.36 0.014 0.45 0.013 0.34 0.011 
Irrigation use 
(0/1) 0.12 0.009 
0.13 0.008 0.11 0.007 
Maize 
production 
(per capita)  
(c) 
 
40.6 
 
4.579 
   
   44.8             
 
   4.765          
 
104.8   
 
27.81 
Coffee 
production 
(per capita) 
(c) 
22.3 4.189 79.8 54.05 43.15    15.621 
Chat 
production         
(per capita) 
(c) 
  22.5 
 
8.286 
 
16.43 1.601 18.98 4.397    
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Table 3.4 Determinants of Fertilizer Use: Conditional Fixed Effects Logit 
Estimation 
 
 
Distinguishing 
between poverty 
classes 
Without 
distinguishing 
between poverty 
classes 
Fertilizer Use (1/0) 
Odds 
Ratio 
P>z 
(a) Odds Ratio 
P>z 
(a) 
         
Land size (ha) 1.425*** 0.002 1.070 0.238 
Land size*TransPoor 0.841 0.389 - - 
Land size*NonPoor 0.699*** 0.011 - - 
Extension 3.443** 0.020 2.121*** 0.000 
Extension*TransPoor 0.812 0.759 - - 
Extension*NonPoor 0.286* 0.073 - - 
Household size 1.189*** 0.004 1.178*** 0.000 
Male HH Head 1.922* 0.081 1.720* 0.118 
Age of HH Head 0.983*** 0.005 0.984** 0.047 
Equb membership (informal 
credit) 1.346 0.304 1.370 0.309 
Off Farm Activity 0.704* 0.087 0.763 0.200 
Non-Farm Enterprise 0.649 0.297 0.658 0.185 
Formal Credit (MFI) 1.632 0.501 0.703 0.161 
FormalCredit*TransPoor 0.846 0.869 - - 
FormalCredit*NonPoor 0.216** 0.044 - - 
Support Programs 0.993 0.896 1.052 0.192 
Support Programs*Transitory 
APoor 1.032 0.538 - - 
SupportPrograms*NonPoor  1.090 0.174 - - 
1999 1.085 0.726 1.083 0.644 
2004 0.080*** 0.000 0.068*** 0.000 
N 1458   1507  
Wald (Chi) 322.19   284.19  
P> Chi 0.000   0  
*=significant at 10%  **=significant at 5%  ***significant at1% 
(a) These are  bootstrapped standard errors adjusted for cluster effects 
TransPoor refers to transitory asset poor and Nonpoor refers to non asset poor 
households. 
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Table 3.5 Determinants of Agro-Chemical Use: Conditional FE Logit 
 
 
Distinguishing 
between poverty 
classes 
 
Without 
distinguishing 
between poverty 
classes 
 
Chemical Use (1/0) 
Odds 
ratio P>z 
Odds 
ratio P>z 
Land size (ha) 1.137 0.282 0.959 0.421 
Land size*TransPoor 0.898 0.447 - - 
Land size*Non Poor 0.801* 0.104 - - 
Extension 2.663** 0.031 2.149*** 0.001 
Extension*TransPoor 0.765 0.615 - - 
Extension*NonPoor 0.849 0.792 - - 
Household size 1.033 0.451 1.031 0.451 
Sex of HH Head 1.846 0.105 1.783 0.151 
Age of HH Head 0.996 0.723 0.996 0.756 
Equb membership (informal 
credit) 0.936 0.777 0.943 0.773 
Off Farm Activity 0.753 0.101 0.777 0.208 
Non-Farm Enterprise 0.653 0.300 0.626 0.185 
Formal Credit (MFI) 0.800 0.585 1.552** 0.050 
FormalCredit*TransPoor 1.031 0.964 - - 
FormalCredit*NonPoor 2.835* 0.066 - - 
Support Programs 1.405*** 0.000 1.364*** 0.000  
Support Programs*TransPoor 0.957 0.405 - - 
SupportPrograms*NonPoor 1.005 0.931 - - 
1999 0.805 0.162 0.857 0.354 
2004 0.938 0.830 1.076 0.822 
N 2083  2083  
Wald (Chi) 324.31  309.17  
P> Chi 0  0  
*=significant at 10%  **=significant at 5%  ***significant at1% 
(a) These are  bootstrapped standard errors adjusted for cluster effects 
TransPoor refers to transitory asset poor and Nonpoor refers to non asset poor 
households. 
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Table 3.6 Determinants of Irrigation Use: Conditional FE Logit Estimation 
 
 
Distinguishing 
between poverty 
classes 
 
Not distinguishing 
between poverty 
classes 
 
Irrigation (1/0) 
 
Odds Ratio 
 
P>z 
 
Odds Ratio 
 
P>z 
 
     
Land size (ha) 1.232*** 0.000 1.033 0.632 
Land size 
(ha)*TransPoor 0.917 0.174 - 
- 
Land size(ha) NonPoor 0.783 0.252 - - 
Extension 16.007*** 0.000 1.951* 0.061 
Extension*TransPoor 0.039*** 0.000 - - 
Extension*NonPoor 0.083** 0.000 - - 
Household size 0.997 0.983 1.025 0.771 
Male HH Head 1.310 0.638 1.234 0.75 
Age of HH Head 1.000 0.972 1.005 0.729 
Equb membership 
(informal credit) 0.672 0.172 0.658 0.346 
Off Farm Activity 1.611* 0.077 1.529 0.149 
Non-Farm Enterprise 1.519 0.768 1.693 0.481 
Formal Credit (MFI) 1.518 0.210 3.411** 0.041 
FormalCredit*TransPo
or 7.711** 0.008 - 
- 
FormalCredit*NonPoor 1.953 0.769 - - 
Support Programs 1.035 0.823 1.024 0.628 
Support 
Programs*TransPoor 1.027 0.710 - 
- 
SupportPrograms*Non
Poor 0.997 0.973 - 
- 
1999 12.297*** 0.001 11.809*** 0.000 
2004 36.400*** 0.010 38.571*** 0.000 
N 862  862  
Wald (Chi) 184.78  188.82  
P> Chi 0  0  
*=significant at 10%  **=significant at 5%  ***significant at1% 
(a) These are  bootstrapped standard errors adjusted for cluster effects 
TransPoor refers to transitory asset poor and Nonpoor refers to non asset poor 
households. 
 
 
129 
 
Table 3.7  Determinants of Participation in Nonfarm Enterprises: Conditional FE 
Logit  
 
 
Distinguishing 
between poverty 
classes 
 
Without distinguishing 
between poverty 
classes 
 
Nonfarm Enterprise (1/0) 
Odds 
Ratio P>z Odds Ratio P>z 
Land size (ha) 1.113 0.835 1.057 0.522 
Land size*TransPoor 0.984 0.980 - - 
Land size*NonPoor 0.943 0.917 - - 
Household size 
1.123*
* 0.029 1.136** 0.018 
Male HH Head 0.697 0.749 0.719 0.403 
Age of HH Head 0.984 0.393 0.988 0.519 
Equb membership (informal 
credit) 
4.237*
** 0.000 3.747*** 0.000 
Off Farm Activity 
0.184*
** 0.000 0.208*** 0.000 
Formal Credit (MFI) 0.803 0.821 0.982 0.973 
FormalCredit*TransPoor 1.310 0.959 - - 
FormalCredit*NonPoor 1.345 0.780 - - 
Support Programs 1.030 0.540 1.102*** 0.009 
Support Programs*TransPoor 1.034 0.427 - - 
SupportPrograms*NonPoor 
1.106*
** 0.004 - - 
1999 
0.481*
** 0.007 0.462*** 0.001 
2004 0.347* 0.079 0.305** 0.021 
N 547  547  
Wald (Chi) 63.06  60.33  
P> Chi 0  0  
 *=significant at 10%  **=significant at 5%  ***significant at1% 
(a) These are  bootstrapped standard errors adjusted for cluster effects 
TransPoor refers to transitory asset poor and Nonpoor refers to non asset poor 
households. 
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Table 3.8  Household Per Capita Consumption Growth 
 
 
Distinguishing 
between poverty 
classes 
Without distinguishing 
between poverty classes 
Δ ln Consumption per 
capita (Ebirr) Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t 
Land size (ha) 0.002 0.962 0.009 0.838 
Extension 0.084* 0.097 0.069 0.225 
Fertilizer use 0.143* 0.095 0.056 0.310 
Fertilizer use*TransPoor -0.189 0.142 - - 
Fertilizeruse*NonPoor -0.105 0.453 - - 
Irrigation (1/0) 0.061 0.758 0.055 0.463 
Irrigation*TransPoor 0.164 0.440 - - 
Irrigation*NonPoor -0.088 0.750 - - 
Chemicaluse -0.009 0.841 0.024 0.704 
Chemicaluse*TransPoor -0.016 0.982 - - 
Chemicaluse*NonPoor 0.151 0.245 - - 
Non-Farm Enterprise   0.172* 0.088 0.275*** 0.001 
Non-Farm*TransPoor 0.133 0.576 - - 
Non-Farm*NonPoor 0.110 0.565 - - 
Household livestock -0.004 0.686 -0.005 0.669 
Education -0.110 0.371 -0.097 0.416 
Household size 
     -
0.542*** 0.000 -0.528*** 0.000 
Age of HH Head -0.135 0.267 -0.131 0.228 
Equb membership 
(informal credit) 
      
0.153*** 0.013 0.164*** 0.001 
Off Farm Activity 
      
0.137*** 0.005 0.129*** 0.003 
Formal Credit (MFI) -0.139 0.173     0.122* 0.103 
FormalCredit*TransPoor 0.134 0.405 - - 
FormalCredit*NonPoor 
      
0.424*** 0.002 - - 
Support Programs 
      
0.042*** 0.000 0.048*** 0.000 
1999 
      
0.350*** 0.000 0.362*** 0.000 
2004 - - - - 
Constant 0.920 0.162 0.867* 0.075 
N 1190  1190  
F 6.52  11.08  
Pr>F 0   0.000   
*=significant at 10%  **=significant at 5%  ***significant at1% 
(a) These are  bootstrapped standard errors adjusted for cluster effects  
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Table 3.9 Household Asset Index Growth 
 
 
Distinguishing 
between poverty 
classes 
Without 
distinguishing 
between poverty 
classes 
Δ  in Asset Index  Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t 
          
Land size (ha) 0.03 0.081 0.032 0.126 
Extension 0.10*** 0.000 0.096*** 0.000 
Fertilizer use 0.07** 0.049 0.093*** 0.001 
Fertilizer use*TransPoor -0.03 0.669 - - 
Fertilizeruse*NonPoor 0.08 0.105 - - 
Irrigation (1/0) -0.02 0.812 0.072** 0.054 
Irrigation*TransPoor -0.03 0.828 - - 
Irrigation*NonPoor 0.17** 0.028  - 
Chemical use -0.06 0.140 0.003 0.920 
Chemical use*TransPoor 0.01 0.168  - 
Chemical use*NonPoor 0.13** 0.020 - - 
Non-Farm Enterprise -0.00 0.982 0.045 0.191 
Non-Farm*TransPoor 0.07 0.253 - - 
Non-Farm*NonPoor 0.06 0.469 - - 
Household livestock -0.00 0.425 -0.005 0.331 
Education 0.13*** 0.006 -0.137*** 0.005 
Household size -0.80*** 0.000 -0.796*** 0.000 
Age of HH Head 0.11* 0.093 0.105* 0.098 
Equb membership 
(informal credit) 0.13*** 0.000 0.135*** 0.000 
Off Farm Activity 0.06*** 0.005 0.052*** 0.003 
Formal Credit (MFI) -0.06 0.120 -0.011 0.586 
Formal Credit*TransPoor -0.04 0.563 - - 
Formal Credit*NonPoor 0.09** 0.024 - - 
Support Programs -0.01*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 
1999 0.32*** 0.000 0.316*** 0.000 
2004 - - - - 
Constant 1.18*** 0.000 1.222*** 0.000 
N 1189  1190  
F 63.85  101.780  
P>F 0.000   0.000  
*=significant at 10%  **=significant at 5%  ***significant at1% 
(a) These are  bootstrapped standard errors  adjusted for cluster effects 
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CHAPTER FOUR: POVERTY STATUS AND THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL 
NETWORKS ON SMALLHOLDER TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION IN RURAL 
ETHIOPIA 
Introduction 
The longstanding effort to understand the persistence of poverty has exposed 
the complexity of its underlying structure and dynamics. While there is now a general 
consensus that traditional growth models based on diminishing returns to factors of 
production do not satisfactorily explain persistent poverty, more complete models 
remain in development. Recent efforts have identified the role of various exclusionary 
mechanisms which prevent some households from escaping poverty and explain the 
divergent poverty outcomes obtained by different groups. The struggle to understand 
why and how certain households or groups are excluded from economic growth 
remains an active area of research and the role of social networks in shaping 
consumption, production and exchange behavior an area of current debate (Barrett, 
2005). 
  Relationships are important to the adoption and dissemination of modern 
technologies in agrarian economies and particularly in rural Ethiopia. Despite the 
general view that adoption and use of modern technologies (like  irrigation for 
producing  high value cash crops) could serve as a vehicle out of poverty, adoption 
rates in Ethiopia remain low (Spielman et al, 2007). Farmer adoption of modern 
techniques and innovation may be inhibited by lack of sufficient credit to acquire 
inputs and make necessary investments or due to limited access to input and output 
markets. Yet another potential deterrent to the adoption of new techniques is 
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inadequate information on their practice. A common solution to this constraint has 
been the expansion of extension services, whose form and efficacy can depend on the 
nature of social learning as well as formal instruction.  
While the effect of social networks in reducing the information constraint has 
been shown to exist, it is only recently that researchers have begun to study how this 
effect occurs and to distinguish between effects after adoption and those causing 
adoption. (Munshi, 2004; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006). Furthermore, while the effect of 
wealth (an important indicator of household vulnerability and risk aversion) on 
technology adoption has been shown, very little research has been done to see if and 
how wealth affects the marginal benefit of information received from various sources 
including social networks. Moreover, little work has considered the impact of different 
types of networks. This chapter contributes to fill this gap in two ways: first by 
investigating the roles that different kinds of social networks play in household 
technology adoption in rural Ethiopia, and second by exploring the differential effect 
of networks across households at different levels of poverty and thus their potential to 
help households grow out of poverty.  
This study attempts to answer the following four questions: First, do networks 
in rural Ethiopia contribute to technology adoption? Second, if networks affect 
technology adoption, what kinds of networks matter? Third, can we find evidence of 
social learning in network effects and fourth, are these network effects the same across 
households in different forms of poverty and across different technologies? 
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Social Learning and Technology Adoption 
The theory of social learning in technology adoption looks at how information 
intentionally or unintentionally made available to a farmer as a result of decisions of 
other farmers affects technology use. The fact that social networks affect technology 
diffusion has been studied widely. However only recently have researchers begun to 
study how this effect occurs and to distinguish between effects after adoption and 
those causing adoption. Besley and Case (1994) present an early model of information 
externalities in the adoption and diffusion of improved cotton cultivars in the semi arid 
tropics. Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) further develop this model in a study of high 
yielding varieties (HYVs) of wheat and rice in India during the Green Revolution. 
Munshi (2004) extends the analysis of Foster and Rosenzweig to show how social 
learning differs across heterogeneous populations35
This research follows more recent studies to explore network effects and social 
learning prior to adoption. While several reasons for a positive relationship between an 
individual’s network and their probability of adopting a new technology exist, social 
learning theories indicate that the direction of the relationship between network size 
and adoption is ambiguous.  A larger network might indicate access to more 
information about a technology from the network and thus encourage adoption.  
. These studies distinguish between 
the effects of learning by doing and learning from others. They show how information 
constraints limit technology adoption and how own and neighbor experiences reduce 
this constraint.   
                                                 
35 He shows how social learning effects are stronger where more accurate information is observable .(in 
more homogenous wheat production less affected by farmer specific characteristics) than in rice 
production where production is more dependent on such characteristics. 
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However, information from personal experience may be costly to acquire and the 
experience of others can substitute for it.  Hence, a larger network could encourage 
households to delay adoption and free ride on the experience of members of their 
network. (Bardhan and Udry, 1999; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006). This adoption 
depressing effect occurs because expected profit is increasing in both the information 
received from own trials as well as from trials from others in the network. 
Furthermore, the additional information gained from personal trials declines, the larger 
the network available for the farmer to learn from.  
Aside from varying with network size, the effects of social networks could be 
heterogeneous depending on the kind of network, the technology in question and the 
characteristics of farmers such as their wealth or how informed they are generally and 
with respect to the technology. Most previous studies focus on geographic proximity 
as the causal explanation for correlated adoption choices within social networks.  The 
geographic explanation assumes all farmers have unhindered access to the necessary 
information on the use of the new technology when it is used in their area. Thus, either 
neighbors willingly share information or farmers costlessly observe each other’s input 
use and output.  There are several instances where this might not be the case. For 
example, brief discussions with rural farmers across Ethiopia reveal that this 
assumption is not necessarily true. With land allocated by government and passed on 
from generation to generation, farmers have little choice as to who their neighbors are 
and are not always on the best terms with them. Furthermore various procedures 
associated with a new technology such as quantity and application time of various 
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inputs as well as timing of various management activities may not be easily observable 
but necessitate more purposeful interaction.  
Consequently, social networks based on characteristics other than physical 
proximity might be worth exploring in the bid to understand how information 
constraints could be reduced in rural contexts like Ethiopia. As evidence that adoption 
networks need not be based on physical proximity, studies like Slicher von Bath 
(1963) reveal that during the English agricultural revolution, it was not uncommon to 
see fields being cultivated with very old traditional techniques sharing boundaries with 
lands cultivated by newly introduced crop rotation.  More recently, Bandiera and 
Rasul (2006) find that farmer adoption decisions were correlated to the decisions of 
friends and family as well as those of the same religion but not for those in different 
religions. Similarly, in their study on technology adoption in Ghana, Conley and Udry 
(2001) find that farmers tend to have a limited number of incomplete technology 
information sources not necessarily based on geographic proximity. As far as I am 
aware, no such study has been conducted in rural Ethiopia. Given the importance of 
information in technology adoption and the numerous efforts to restructure and 
improve extension services in Ethiopia, it is important to understand the nature and 
quality of social learning among rural households. 
Beyond the information externality offered by networks, there are other 
possible reasons why adoption choices could be related within various groups. As 
mentioned, but not fully explored, by Besley and Case (1994) and Bandiera and Rasul 
(2006), decisions within groups could be correlated if there are other shared goals for, 
or constraints to the adoption decision, such as economies of scale in 
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commercialization of a commodity.  Furthermore, if there is risk sharing within 
networks or if the technology in question is too expensive for an individual farmer to 
buy and operate, one might expect a high degree of correlation of adoption among 
group members. Similarly, group effects and dynamics could reduce the willingness of 
individual farmers to engage in new activities.  
Thus this chapter studies the effect of a household’s network of neighbors and 
friends on their technology adoption decisions to distinguish between social learning 
and other peer effects. Finding an inverse “u” relationship between the probability of 
adoption and the number of adopters in a households-information network as in 
Bandiera and Rasul (2006) will reveal social learning and thus the potential for using 
certain groups as a vehicle to disseminate information of new technologies. While 
finding a strictly linear or “u” relationship could indicate social learning, such a result 
could also be explained by other network effects. For example, a “u” shape might 
indicate a threshold effect where a smaller network with shared risks reduces incentive 
to adopt but as this risk sharing group gets larger, the high cost of failure is mitigated, 
thus encouraging adoption. A linear relationship could suggest benefits of pooling 
resources to reduce unit costs.  Thus, findings may suggest whether networks have an 
impact and whether that impact is through social learning.  
An important contribution of this analysis is the distinction between network 
effects by poverty status. Even if social networks encourage technology adoption, it is 
important to understand if and how their effects differ across households characterized 
by different poverty forms and dynamics. Chapter three showed that reducing formal 
credit constraints tends to have no effect on the use of modern technology for the 
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persistently asset poor though the use of certain technologies, like fertilizer, assists in 
their ability to accumulate assets over time. Thus exploring whether reducing 
information constraints through social learning has a positive effect on the use of these 
technologies by persistently poor could indicate its role as a potential vehicle out of 
persistent poverty. Furthermore, identification of differential network effects across 
poverty classes will also inform the planning and design of extension as well as other 
poverty reduction strategies in rural Ethiopia.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
Social Learning 
The effect of social learning is often measured using a target input model or a 
profitability model. The target input model lays emphasis on the farmer’s problem of 
deciphering the optimal management of a new technology. This approach contrasts 
with other models of social learning like Besley and Case (1993;1994) and Ellison and 
Fudenberg (1993) which focus on the problem of determining the true profitability of a 
new technology from personal and  network experience. This study adopts the target 
input model to focus on the role that networks play in learning when new crops or 
technologies are introduced and the evidence of learning about the best use of inputs 
from others (Foster and Rosenzweig,1995). Secondly, it can be shown that unlike in 
the case of uncertain but exogenous profits, the profitability of any new technology 
grows over time as knowledge accumulates. Thus, as pointed out by Foster and 
Rosenzweig (1995), we can test for learning externalities directly by looking at 
productivity. Increasing profitability with increased knowledge accumulation implies 
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that technology adoption is an absorbing state; once a households adopts a new 
technology, they are expected to continue using it. The above assumption appears 
more appropriate in this context than the assumption of complete learning about the 
technology needed for identification as made by Besley and Case (1994, page 17). 
Ultimately, the reduced forms that emerge from both theoretical models capture 
farmers learning by doing and learning from others.  
The target input model36
The target input model assumes that farmers output in time t;
 developed here follows that of Bardhan and Udry 
(1999) as well as Bandiera and Rasul (2006). It assumes that farmers use Bayesian 
updating to learn about the parameters of a new technology. While farmers are aware 
of the underlying production technology, they are unaware of one parameter, i.e. the 
target input level.  
itq , declines in 
the square of the distance between the input used itk , and the unknown input target, itχ    
2)(1 ititit kq χ−−=        (4.1) 
Though the target input level itχ  is not known at time t , after selecting an 
input level itk  and seeing the yield, a farmer updates beliefs about the target input 
level. Each time the farmer makes a selection of itk  and gets a particular yield is a 
trial which provides more information about the distribution of itχ . Thus farmers 
learn by doing. Because of farmer and time specific effects, the optimal target for 
farmer i  fluctuates around *χ  is defined as: 
                                                 
36 The target input model is a longstanding model which has been developed by Prescott(1972), Wilson 
(1975), Jovanovic and Nyarko(1994) and applied with regards to learning in agriculture by Foster and 
Rosenzweig(1995). 
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itit εχχ +=
*         (4.2) 
Where itε  refers to these transitory farmer specific shocks to the optimal target 
input *χ .  The error is assumed to be independently and identically distributed normal 
with E( itε ) =0 and V( itε ) = u
2σ .  
At any time t , farmer i believes *χ  ~ N( *itχ , itχσ
2 ). The model assumes that 
u
2σ  is known and also that the input is costless so that farmer’s profit is just price 
(normalized to 1) multiplied by itq .  
Since Et( itε ) =0, to maximize expected profit, farmer i  uses the expected 
optimal target level as the new level of inputs. Thus, itk =E( itχ )=
*
tχ  and expected 
output is 
Et( itq ) = 1 - Et [ itk -Et( itχ )]
2 = 1 - itχσ 2  - u2σ     (4.3) 
showing that output increases with lower levels of uncertainty about target input itχ . 
With regard to learning by doing, in each period, farmer i  engages in a trial 
with a certain level of target input itk , sees the output and then modifies belief about 
the target input level. At time t , the variance of farmer  i  ’s belief about *χ  is 2itχσ .  
After observing the target input for the previous period, 1−itχ , the farmer updates their 
belief about the variance of *χ   applying Bayes’s rule  and as shown by Bardhan and 
Udry (1999), the posterior belief becomes: 
1
2
+tχσ =
uit
22
11
1
σσ χ
+
      (4.4) 
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If we define the precision of information generated by a farmer’s own trial as 
u
2
1
σ
= oρ  and ioρ =
0
2
1
iχσ
 as the precision of farmer i ’s initial belief about the variance 
of *χ , we can show by substitution that  
1
2
+itχσ =
otio I ρρ +
1       (4.5) 
Where tI  is the number of trials farmer  i  has had with the new technology on 
his own farm between periods 0 and t .  Substituting (4.5) into (4.3) we can express 
current expected profits37
Et(
 as: 
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otio I ρρ 1
1
−+
 - u2σ        (4.6) 
From equation (4.6), we can see that output increases with the number of trials, i.e. 
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Now, consider the case where a farmer can improve his estimate of the target 
input by learning from the trials of other farmers.  If we define the network of farmers 
as )(in  and assume that farmers in this network costlessly share  information, then 
after each period, farmer i  updates his belief about the target input with not only 
information from his previous trials, but also from those of other network members 
ij ≠ . This means that at time t  where farmer i  has had 1−tI  trials and the network 
)(in 1−t  trials, his posterior belief about the variance of  
*χ  will be 
                                                 
37 We actually have  Et( 1+itq ) = 1 - 
otio I ρρ +
1
 - u
2σ   which when put in current terms gives us (1.6) 
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 itχσ 2 =
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 (4.8) 
with expected output now being 
Et[ itq , 1)( −tin ] = 1- 
ototio inI ρρρ 11 )(
1
−− ++
 - u2σ      
 (4.9) 
with output also increasing with the number of trials of the network.38
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The Technology Adoption Decision 
Given the existence of some available traditional technology (traditional crop 
or variety), with a known return of qT a farmer is faced with the decision to adopt a 
new technology or not. Let the adoption of new technology by farmer “i” in time “t” 
be a dichotomous variable, ait such that ait =1 if adoption occurs and 0 otherwise. If 
learning takes place as suggested in the previous section, farmer i’s adoption depends 
on the adoption decision of others in his network. The value of future profits to farmer 
i from period “t” to “T” is: 
Vt ])(,[ 11 −− tt inI =  max
}1,0{∈ita
Et ]})(,[)1{ 11 −−
=
− +−∑ sssisTis
T
ts
ts inIqaqaδ ]   
 (4.11) 
                                                 
38 It can be inferred under this assumption that the larger the network size, the larger the number of trials 
available for farmer i from the network. 
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=  max
}1,0{∈ita
 ])(,[])(,[)1( 111 tttttttitTit inIVinIqEaqa +−− ++− δ ]    
 (4.12) 
 
where ∑ =− =
s
t iss
aI
01  is the total number of trials that farmer i has conducted up to and 
including period s.  1)( −sin refers to the number of trials that farmer i’s network has had 
over the same period and δ is the discount rate. 
From equations 4.11 and 4.12, we can see that technology adoption by farmer i 
depends on his expectation of current profits as well as the future expected 
profitability of adoption.  Expected profits are increasing in the number of trials of the 
new technology.  Thus, the number of trials positively affects expected profit which 
determines technology adoption.  Furthermore, the fact that expected profits increase 
with the number of trials indicates that technology adoption is an absorbing state. 
While several studies like Moser and Barret (2006) have revealed examples of 
innovations that are attempted and abandoned once proven less profitable than 
alternative technologies, this would tend to occur in places where new technology has 
not been tested for contextual appropriateness before introduction. Based on 
information in the survey areas, I feel safe to assume that the new crops and varieties 
explored in this study have generally proven to be superior to the traditional crops on 
average once appropriate complementary inputs and practices are also adopted; these 
being the unknown in this process. Issues of relative profitability will be captured by 
controls for possible heterogeneity among farmers. 
144 
 
Equations 4.11 and 4.12 allow the possibility that adoption in time “t” might 
occur even if the technology is less profitable than the traditional practice in that 
particular period, as long as the  benefit in the future from an additional period of 
personal trial and/or the trials of others in time “t” is sufficiently large. If the loss in 
current expected profits is less than the discounted gain in future profitability from the 
additional trial of the new technology, then the technology will be adopted in time “t” 
even if the current profitability is less than the traditional variety. This result obtains if 
the right hand side of the following equation: 
])(),()(),1([))( ,( 11 tttttT intVintVintEqq ++ −+≤− δ           
(4.13) 
is greater than zero i.e. if 
0)(),()(),1([ 11 ≥−+ ++ tttt intVintVδ             
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Where )]()1([ 11 tVtV tt ++ −+  refers to the difference in value functions if 
adoption occurred in  time t+1 when farmer i has had s trials and  value function 
estimated in time t+1 where farmer has had s-1 (one less) trials. 
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The right hand side of equation 4.14 is positive, reflecting the increase in the 
expected profits due to the information gotten by the farmer from experimenting in 
time t. However, while the entire value on the RHS is positive, it is decreasing in n(i). 
If information from personal trials and the trials of others are substitutes, then as more 
other farmers use the new technology, less addition information is gained by the 
individual farmer’s own experimenting. Thus if many of farmer i’s neighbors or 
associates have characteristics that would lead them to adopt a new technology early, 
it might be in i’s best interest to refrain from experimenting until she has seen how 
others have done with the new technology. (Udry and Bardhan, 1999).  These 
opposing effects can be seen by taking the derivative of equation 4.15 below which 
reflects the necessary condition for a farmer to adopt the new technology (crop) in 
time t, based on 4.13. 
i.e. from 4.13 
])(),([]))(,1([])(,[ 11 ttTttttt intVqintVintqE ++ +≥++ δδ    (4.15) 
Taking the derivative with respect to n(it) yields 
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 Given that we are dealing with a discrete scenario,  
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Its derivative with respect to n(it)can be expressed as 
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And substituting this into equation 4.16 we get 
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 The first term in equation 4.17 indicates the positive effect of learning from 
the network though it is decreasing in tin )( . However the marginal value of a personal 
trial is decreasing in the size of the network (i.e. 0
)(
≤
∂∂
∂
tinI
V  . This means that the 
gain in future profitability due to an additional trial is decreasing in the size of the 
network.   Intuitively, given that information from personal trials and one’s network 
are substitutes, the larger a farmers network of adopters, the lower the value of 
additional information from his personal trial creating an incentive for the farmer to 
strategically delay adoption. This means that the net gains from adoption in time “t” 
can be an increasing or decreasing function of the number of adopters in a farmer’s 
network. Bandiera and Rasul explain the sign of this relationship as an indication of 
myopia amongst farmers with the more myopic farmers having higher discount rates 
thus less concerned about the effect of current action on future outcomes being less 
likely to delay strategically (hence positive sign of net gains). The reverse would be 
the case for the less myopic farmers who have a low discount rate, factoring in this 
reduced value of future profitability and thus being more likely to strategically delay 
adoption. 
It is also important to note from equation 4.17 that the net gains to adoption in 
time “t” is also a decreasing function of the accuracy of farmer i’s initial information 
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about the technology. The more accurate his own personal information, the less 
important the additional information from the network will be, and the less sensitive 
he is likely to be to the number of adopters in his network.  Also, given that the effect 
of network size n(i) on adoption  is positive, but decreasing in the size of the network, 
tests for a non-linear relationship between adoption and network size can provide 
evidence of social learning. 
While the direction of the relationship between output and information sources 
shown in equation (4.10) should not be different across various technologies and 
across different poverty classes, the effect of the different sources of information or of 
additional information from various sources might be different. With regard to poverty 
status, in addition to being information constrained, very poor farmers are on average 
more vulnerable, thus more risk averse to technology adoption. For such households, a 
reduced information constraint might have a higher marginal effect on their probability 
of adoption if it significantly reduces their expected output variation (and risk). On the 
other hand, facing a double hurdle (due to risk aversion and lack of information) the 
relaxed information constraint might have a smaller effect on the probability of 
technology adoption  of the very poor if the negative impact of a wealth constraint is 
so great as to overshadow any benefit of additional information.  Thus even though the 
theoretical effect of relaxing the information constraint on the probability of adoption 
for very poor households is also ambiguous, the potential differential effect across 
poverty classes is worthy of exploration. Additionally, if poorer farmers are more 
myopic, one would expect to see a more positive effect between their adoption and 
that of their network versus richer farmers which might be more strategic. 
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 With regard to technology, network effects might differ across technologies 
depending on the amount of new learning necessary as well as the perceived personal 
applicability of the experiences of others. Munshi (2004) found network effects were 
stronger for the technology whose use and needed information was less heterogeneous.  
 
Empirical Technology Adoption Decision Model 
The social learning model shows that farmers can learn from their experience 
as well as the experience of others in their networks.  This information increases the 
profitability of the technology. The more trials (and consequently information) farmer 
i has had access to (from the number of adopters in his network) at time t, the more 
profitable technology i is to him. Adoption of a new technology for any farmer is a 
function of the value of current and future streams of profits (given adoption) for that 
farmer. Because profitability is an increasing function of information and that 
information from one’s own trial and the trials of others are substitutes to personal 
trials, the decision to adopt a technology at any point in time will depend to some 
extent on the size of his network. While the direction of the networks size effect is not 
certain, the relationship can be measured empirically through estimation of: 
 
(TAikv)x = (αA)x  +   (λAZiv)x   +f [n( i )]x + (ψAVi )x  + (E1iv)x     i=(1…N);    
 where (TAikv)x  is the adoption of technology k by household i where household i 
belongs to poverty status class x. Ziv  refers to a vector of exogenous variables 
capturing household i’s demographic characteristics, as well as  other factors that 
affect a household’s decision to adopt a particular technology. This includes, 
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household size, sex of household head, age of household head,  highest years of 
education in the household, distance to the nearest market, size of land cultivated by 
household(in hectares),value of  household implements, number of household 
members engaged in full time agricultural activities. Vi is a dummy to account for 
unobserved variations across villages that could affect a household’s technology use 
decision.  n( ) captures the social network effects and Eivt  is the error term capturing 
unobserved individual and network characteristics which affect household 
participation. In the model, the social network variable is measured as the self reported 
number of adopters among the farmer’s social network, at the time of adoption. The 
networks explored are friends and neighbors. Various specification for f[n( )] are 
explored. The main ones are a quadratic function to test for the direction of the 
relationship between network size and probability of adoption. The other two 
approaches are the use of splines to explore possible threshold effects in the size of 
various networks and non parametric estimations to confirm the results of other 
specifications.  
As in the traditional latent variable analysis, TAivt* represents the household’s 
present value of net gains from participating in agricultural innovation at time t. 
TAivt* = A [Zivt,Vi  f[n( i )] Eivt]  
While one cannot see the net present value ascribed by each household, one can 
observe their dichotomous decision to use a modern technology or not.  
TAikvt  =1 if  TAikvt * >0    and 
TAikvt =0 otherwise 
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I assume that  prob (TAikvt =1) = prob (E1iv>-{f[n(i )] + Ziv,+ Vi}) = F(-{f[n(i )] + 
Ziv,+ Vi})  assuming symmetry of the function describing F() around zero and where I 
explore various specifications for f[ ]. 
The first model specification includes the squared network effects as another variable 
to test for a quadratic polynomial fit and the “u” or “inverse u” shape. 
P [TAikv= 1] x = F[(αA)x +  (λAZiv)x +  θ1[n( i )]x + θ 2[n( i )2]x  +  (ψAVi )x  + (E1iv) x ]    
   To explore possible threshold  effect in network size, I test for the 
differential effect of having a network size of (1-4),(5-8) and 8+ members in the 
network engaged in a particular technology at the time of  adoption relative to having 
no one  in the network using the technology. 
P [TAikv= 1]x = F[ (αA)x +  (λAZiv)x + β0[0]+ β1[1] + β 2[2]  +β3[3]  +  (ψAVi )x  + 
(E1iv) x]       
Where [0], [1], [2] and [3] reflect different splines. 
 
Data 
This study uses a subset of the Ethiopia Rural Household Survey (ERHS) dataset 
and additional data collected from two ERHS villages. The ERHS dataset contains 
detailed information on consumption expenditure, assets and agricultural activities of 
rural Ethiopian households and is the product of a longstanding data collection effort 
by Oxford University, the University of Addis Ababa, and the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). It started in 1989, when a survey team visited seven 
peasant associations in Central and Southern Ethiopia. In 1994, the survey expanded to 
15 peasant associations (PAs) across four regions, yielding a sample of 1477 
152 
 
households. Additional rounds were conducted in late 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999 and 
2004.  
During 2007, supplementary community level surveys were administered in all 15 
PAs to identify recent changes in the villages, particularly between 2004 and 2007.  
Supplemental household surveys were also administered in 2 out of the 15 PAs. These 
2 villages, Haresawe and Korodegaga, were selected based on local information and 
community level surveys that indicated that innovative technologies had been 
introduced in these regions. Data on adoption of improved technologies including 
improved varieties of various cereals and irrigated vegetables were collected from 186 
households in these two PAs. Demographic information as well as information on their 
assets, access to various institutions, social networks and the prevalence of technology 
adoption within these networks was also collected. Other data are based on the 
previously collected data from the 6 rounds of the ERHS conducted between 1994 and 
2004. 
The two main technologies explored here are improved cereals and irrigated 
vegetables and pulses. While these technologies are not brand new, discussions with 
farmers and development agents indicated that there had been a recent emphasis on the 
production of high value crops such as fruits and vegetables as well as other 
marketable crops like pulses and improved cereals. As a control for new technologies, 
I explore the social network effects in a relatively old technology (chemical fertilizer) 
on recent adopters.  Social learning is not expected to affect adoption of this older 
technology. In Harresawe, the farmers and the development agent cited 2004/2005 as 
the period of major shift in the village in terms of increased focus on field pea 
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production and 2004 as a year for increased vegetable production.  For irrigation of 
pulses, fruits and vegetables, the analysis was restricted to households who had 
adopted irrigation since 2004.39
While evidence of social learning is expected to be found in both the improved 
cereals and the irrigated vegetables and pulses, social learning across these 
technologies might be different. For example, given the previous existence of 
irrigation, the new knowledge for farmers in irrigated vegetables and pulses might be 
more about the management of these crops. On one hand, one might think that prior 
knowledge on irrigation might reduce the new amount of information needed 
compared to improved cereals causing households to be less responsive to the choices 
of their networks. However, given that the production of fruits and vegetables often 
requires more planning and effort in terms of weeding, careful application of 
complementary inputs and harvesting activities, the reverse might be the case. The 
complexity of the crop management might cause the network information externality 
to be high. Also, the communal element of irrigation in most villages might create 
more natural opportunities for information exchange amongst farmers and create more 
possible information spillover effects than with improved cereals. If irrigated lands are 
in close proximity, one would expect that the quality of information from the network 
would be higher due to less heterogeneity.  One would expect this higher quality 
information to make farmers more responsive to the actions of their network and a 
smaller network necessary to affect adoption. Ultimately, with higher quality 
 Ninety two percent (92%) of these households were 
engaged in irrigating fruits, vegetables, pulses or oil seed in 2007.  
                                                 
39 Certain aspects of irrigation such as personal digging of wells, setting up water harvesting ponds and 
setting up of small scale drip irrigation have been  recently introduced on a wider scale. 
154 
 
information and a harder technology, one would expect farmers to be more responsive 
to the decision of their network even if very poor households had smaller networks, all 
things being equal; one might expect smaller difference in adoption behavior 
compared to a technology with less precise information where a larger network might 
be necessary. Here I mean that holding other factors constant, I would expect that an 
extremely poor household engaging in a harder technology with a more efficient 
network to be more responsive to the actions of their network even if that network 
were smaller than an extremely poor household engaging in an easier technology or a 
technology for which information from their network was less precise. 
Because risk premia may vary by wealth level and will influence technology 
use, this  study explicitly distinguishes among households by their asset poverty status 
to discern differential effects of social networks on the probability of farmers adopting 
technology. The analysis begins by using the complete ERHS dataset to classify 
households by their asset poverty status.  The asset based approach to poverty 
measurement classifies as asset poor asset those households whose assets are 
inadequate to generate an income stream supporting consumption above the 
expenditures poverty line (Carter and Barrett, 2006).  An asset poverty line is defined 
as the asset value that exactly supports consumption at the expenditures poverty line.  
In this application an asset index is established as a function of the household’s land, 
livestock, farm implements, other physical assets, and education.  The weights on each 
component of the asset index are based on an estimate of the relationship between 
assets and consumption as described in chapter 2.  Households whose asset index was 
below the asset poverty line in each survey year are classified as “always asset poor”. 
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“Never asset poor” households are those whose asset index was above the poverty line 
each year, and households whose status changed between years are classified as 
“Transitory asset poor”.  Because very few households in the two villages were in the 
never asset poor category, the analysis distinguishes only between households who 
were persistently asset poor (considered to be in a poverty trap) and those who were 
not.  
Tables 4.1(a) to 4.1(c) describe network sizes for adopters and non adopters across 
networks and across poverty classes for the technologies considered. The results show 
that on average, adopters of improved seed had more friends who had previously 
adopted than had not adopted. However, the mean number of neighbors who had 
adopted earlier is higher for non adopters than for adopters. With regard to poverty 
status, persistently poor adopters  had fewer adopters in their network than persistently 
poor non adopters. In contrast those adopters who were not persistently poor had more 
adopters among their friends, but fewer among their neighbors than non-poor non-
adopters.  Compared to those in a poverty trap, the less poor have more adopters in 
their self reported network of friends but not in their network of neighbors. For 
neighbors, non adopters have more adopters in their network than do adopters. This 
suggests that learning from networks may not be defined by space but rather by other 
interests.  
With regards to irrigated crop a higher number of adopters is found in both the 
friend and neighbor network among adopters rather than non-adopters though the 
difference in number of adopters is higher within the friend network than in the 
neighbor network. While the number of adopters in the network of non-adopters is 
156 
 
similar across poverty status, adopters of irrigated crops amongst households in a 
poverty trap are significantly higher than those not in a poverty trap; 8 vs. 5. Fertilizer, 
like irrigated crops reveals more adopters in the network of adopters compared to non-
adopters. Thus tables 4.1a – 4.1c appear to indicate the presence of some sort of 
network effects, possibly different across network types and poverty status. 
 The descriptive statistics in table 4.2 reveal the relatively poor nature of our 
sample. Households tend to cultivate about 2 hectares of land, be headed by middle 
aged men of about 50 years old and have on average someone with a maximum of 
about 5 years of education. Their assets tend to comprise of 1 or 2 head of livestock 
valued at about 400EB40
 
 with households in poverty trap tending to have lower assets, 
more people engaged in full time farming and less accessibility to markets. 
Estimation Results 
 
Improved Cereals 
Given the binary nature of the adoption variable, probit, logit and linear 
probability models were explored. In the case of recently adopted improved varieties 
of cereals, results indicate the presence of social learning that varies by network type. 
As can be seen from table 4.3 below, the probability of adopting improved seeds 
exhibits the inverse “u” relationship with respect to the number of friends who had 
previously adopted improved seed use. While the marginal effects on the level term 
are positive and significant, the marginal effects on the squared term are negative and 
significant. On the other hand the neighbor network tends to have an insignificant 
effect on the odds of adoption.  Younger households and households cultivating larger 
                                                 
40 One US dollar is equivalent to about 11 Ethiopian Birr (EB). The PPP conversion factor is 
approximately 0.25. 
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landholdings are more likely to adopt the improved seed.  The closer the household is 
to a paved road, the more likely it is to adopt. A distinction is made between the 
closest market used (usually the local peasant association market) and access to other 
markets which is an indicator of more commercial opportunities. 
Results in table 4.4 indicate that evidence of social learning  varying  across 
both network type and poverty status. While the effect of friends continues to exhibit 
the inverse “u” relationship for the households not in the poverty trap, the effect is not 
statistically different from zero for those households in a poverty trap. This indicates 
that social learning is more valuable for households not in a poverty trap and implies 
that there are differential social learning effects not only across network types but also 
across poverty levels. It appears that while the level variable for the number of 
neighbors who have adopted has no effect on the odds of adoption for all households, 
the squared term is positive for the households in a poverty trap, though only 
significant beyond 10% in the logit estimation. This difference across poverty levels 
may reflect different kinds of networks or efficacy of networks by poverty class. 
Where network members are less knowledgeable or information transfer is less 
efficient, a larger number of informants is needed for adequate information to trigger 
adoption and the promise of gaining information from the network is less likely to 
deter own experimentation. Poor households may be more likely to be in such 
networks. Similarly, if extremely poor households are more risk averse, they may need 
more information to convince themselves that the possible variation in output due to 
limited information is acceptable. Alternatively, the different results by poverty class 
could also indicate other network effects such as economies of scale if indeed these are 
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crops for commercialization. Since the neighbor effect is not statistically significantly 
different across poverty status, such an explanation might be plausible for households 
likely to commercialize. 
 
Irrigated Fruits, Vegetables and Pulses 
Next I explore the same model for irrigation of pulses and vegetables. 
Considering the adoption procedure for recent adopters (from 2004), again I find that 
network effects for friends who had previously adopted exhibits the inverse u 
relationship but this is not evident for neighbors who have already adopted. 
Considering the separate effects of the various networks only the effect of friends is 
significant, still exhibiting the inverse u relationship indicating social learning. 
Coefficient values suggest increasing probability of adoption up to about 10 friends, 
and then reversal in the effect.  To validate these results, I attempt non-parametric 
estimation of the effects of these networks. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show that while the 
friends’ network seems to exhibit the inverse u relationship, the neighbor network 
effect appears to be more of an increasing function of the network size. While there are 
some network effects of neighbors, social learning is more evident in networks where 
there is more intentional interaction. Other factors that appear to affect adoption of 
irrigated crops are access to commercialization opportunities, households wealth 
captured by non productive assets including jewelry and other household items.  
Again a test for differential effects of the friend’s network across poverty class 
is conducted. Table 4.6 shows that households with more non productive assets, better 
access to external markets and larger cultivated land size are more likely to adopt 
irrigated crops. Though a network effect of friends is present, it does not clearly reveal 
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the inverse u relationship and does not appear to be statistically significantly different 
across poverty classes41
Non parametric estimations were conducted and the results shown in figures 
4.3 and 4.4 confirm that there are similar effects of a household’s network of friends 
who had previously adopted irrigated crops on their probability of adoption across 
households in different poverty categories. The results reveal an inverse u relationship 
between network size and probability of adoption, which may have been obscured in 
the parametric estimation due to the small sample size.  
. However, the small sample size may be responsible for low 
levels of statistical significance.  
The presence of social learning across all households irrespective of poverty 
status is encouraging. It might be reflecting the differential information externality for 
different technologies. The fact that irrigated crops are usually more management 
intensive than cereals might cause the marginal value of network information to be 
high, even for the poorest households. The presence of social learning irrespective of 
poverty status might also be indicating information quality differences across 
technologies. It might be that the quality of information from the network of farmers 
engaged in irrigated crops among the poorest is just as high as that for the less poor 
households. Though just  a conjecture, it could be that the higher labor costs associated 
with irrigated crops are less of a constraint for  the poorest neutralizing the extra 
financial burden associated with these crops leading to no differential  marginal effects 
across poverty status. While these possible explanations are presently more 
                                                 
41 Given our small sample size to confirm these results, we explore more parsimonious specifications 
such  as dropping the non productive asset measure given that this might be correlated with poverty 
status. This does not change the results Furthermore the correlation coefficient between various 
variables indicates that we do not have a problem with multicollinearity. 
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speculative, the  result raise the issue that even where social learning is found, its  
value may differ across various technologies and for households with different degrees 
of poverty . 
Given the weakness of the results in table 4.6, I test for a threshold effect on 
the friends’ network by introducing splines. Table 4.7 shows the marginal effects of 
various factors on the adoption of irrigated crops42
 
. The results reveal that compared to 
households who have no friends who have adopted irrigated crops, households with 
between 1 and 4 friends who had adopted have a 40% higher probability of adopting 
irrigated crops. For those with between 5 and 8 friends are  about 67% more likely to 
adopt the technology and while having more than 8 friends using a technology are less 
likely than those with 5 and 8 to adopt, they are 62% more likely than those who have 
no friends using a technology. This further indicates that the relationship between the 
size of the friend network and probability of adoption is shaped as an inverse u. A test 
on the equality of coefficient reveals that the coefficient on 1-4 friend adopters is 
statistically significantly different from having 5-8 members at 1%, and while I fail to 
reject that having 1-4 is statistically significantly different from having more than 8 
members I also fail to reject that having 5-8 is statistically significantly different from 
having more than 8 members. 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 As expected, the logit and probit results are consistently the same across this analysis. However, we 
decided to use the marginal effects here to ease the interpretation of the network effect of the spline 
results. 
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Robustness Checks 
Technology 
Irrigated crops and improved varieties are recent technologies introduced in the 
peasant associations examined. However, to distinguish social learning effects for a 
new technology from the determinants of eventual adoption (common after diffusion 
of information has occurred), I explore a specification which tests for social learning 
effects in the use of an old technology; fertilizer. Since fertilizer is a relatively well 
known technology, one would   not expect to find strong evidence of social learning, 
though  network effects could still exist. Thus the factors likely to determine fertilizer 
adoption among households who have adopted fertilizer since 2004 was explored.   
Table 4.8 shows that households who had recently begun to grow pulses and 
oil seed, improved seeds and vegetables were more likely to be recent adopters of 
fertilizer use. Wealthier households and households with more educated members 
were also more likely to be recent fertilizer adopters. When the size of different 
networks was considered separately, evidence of network effects is found among 
friends only. The results in columns 5-7 in table 4.8 show that there appears to be a 
strictly increasing relationship between number of adopters in a households group of 
friends who had previously been using fertilizer and their likelihood of adopting 
fertilizer use for recent fertilizer adopters. This indicates some network effects exist, 
but not necessarily social learning. Increasing returns to the number of adopters of 
fertilizer use might be indicating economies of scale effects of a household’s network. 
Given that the use of fertilizer is strongly associated with commercial crop production, 
162 
 
it makes sense that scale effects in coordinating input procurement and output sale 
might be present. 
Concerning the differential effect across poverty classes, the main conclusion 
from table 4.9 is that social network effects though weaker still appear to exhibit 
increasing returns to scale, but only for those households who are not in a poverty trap. 
For those in a poverty trap, it appears that social network effects are not statistically 
significantly different from zero. I find evidence of some network effect exclusion for 
the persistently poor households though the mechanism through which this exclusion 
occurs is not known. This is worrisome if those households in a poverty trap are not 
able to take advantage of network effects such as coordination in the procurement of 
inputs or marketing of outputs necessary for their adoption of yield enhancing 
technologies. However, this highlights possible differences between the type of 
networks that households in a poverty trap use compared to those not in poverty trap 
as well as their reasons for the use of fertilizer. If these poor households are using 
fertilizer to increase production to improve productivity and not necessarily for 
commercialization, it might make sense that network effects supporting 
commercialization opportunities might not be necessary. However, if there are input 
procurement benefits to network members, this lack of significance implies that the 
poorest households are excluded from such opportunities with more severe 
consequences.   
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Social Learning vs. Spurious Effects 
As in other studies on network effects, endogeneity due to possible unobserved 
household characteristics driving the association between network size and probability 
of adoption remain an issue for consideration. While Manski (1993) clearly raises 
possible problems in identifying social network effects43
For further justification, Bandiera and Rasul (2006) consider a case in which an 
inverse “u” relationship could be spuriously driven by an unobserved household 
characteristic like ability that is positively and linearly associated with network size 
but non linearly associated with the probability of adoption.  For example, if the really 
low ability and very high ability farmers have lower probabilities of adopting due to 
other financial constraints and  alternative options respectively, these two effects 
together could drive an inverse u relationship. One way to check for this is to drop 
those households considered to be high ability from the sample and check to see if the 
inverse “u” relationship still holds. While the identification of high ability is 
 , Brock and Durlauf (2000) 
show how this identification problem is intrinsically inked to linearity such that non 
linear social effects which are properly specified can still identify endogenous network 
effects.  In addition to the nonlinearity argument proposed by Brock and Durlauf 
(2000) and used by Bandiera and Rasul,  finding that the inverse “u” relationship 
persists after  controlling for persistent poverty status and vulnerability further suggest 
that we are not dealing with cases of mimicry or contextual effects discussed in 
Manski (2003). 
                                                 
43 This is driven by the fact that endogenous network effects (like social learning) cannot be 
separated from exogenous (contextual effects) or correlated unobservable characteristics because these  
endogenous effects are not identified because they are a linear combination of exogenous and correlated 
effects. Manski(193) 
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challenging in our sample,  3 different variables; household membership in local 
rotating savings and credit organizations, household participation in non-farm based 
activities including wage jobs and small scale enterprises and households who have 
had prior interaction with NGO’s were used. As can be seen in tables 4.10 and 4.11, 
running the model without these groups still indicated the presence of the inverse u 
relationship. 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter explored the role of social networks on adoption of new 
technologies in rural Ethiopia. It found evidence of social learning, though this differs 
across network types, technologies and with poverty status. For modern technologies 
most recently introduced into the villages studied (improved cereals), evidence of 
social learning was found. This learning operates through the network of friends 
among households not in a poverty trap. This implies that the marginal value of 
information from social networks differs across households with different levels of 
poverty and should be considered in policies aimed at reducing information constraints 
to technology adoption. The analysis also finds that social learning is stronger among 
networks with more purposeful interaction than spatially determined social networks 
and for technologies expected to have more complicated management procedures. 
Networks of neighbors who have adopted is only significant for households in a 
poverty trap and even there we do not find evidence of social learning as it is only at 
very large network sizes that the neighbor network is positively associated with 
adoption of improved seed.  For recently adopted irrigated vegetables, pulses and oil 
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seeds, there is still find evidence of social learning and that is not statistically 
significantly different across poverty class. However, there is evidence that social 
learning occurs across networks for which there is more purposeful interaction rather 
than that provided by geographical proximity.  For a well known technology, fertilizer, 
evidence of network effects exist, but not necessarily social learning. Again network 
effects are found to differ by poverty status, with networks unfortunately not affecting 
fertilizer adoption for the poorest households.  
Finding that social learning effects are available in rural Ethiopia and that they 
emerge through purposeful interaction rather than proximity is significant for 
extension planning.  Technology diffusion is likely to be enhanced if extension can 
reach more networks of interest.  This implies a need to target intentional groups of 
rural people rather than spatial clusters. Identifying such groups presents a challenge to 
extension services. One mechanism for targeting groups might be local iddirs. Iddirs 
are traditional community based insurance schemes to which households  periodically 
contribute a predetermined amount of money to serve as insurance in the event of 
death of a member of the family or other shock like health related adversities. Though 
Iddir arrangements are informal, they are well coordinated and organized with long 
life spans and relatively high levels of trust amongst members. This organization 
already plays multiple roles in the rural environment, and might be a conduit for social 
learning that extension services could employ. Some preliminary results indicate the 
presence of social learning effects in Iddirs but due to multicollinearity between the 
Iddir network adopters variable and friends network, this chapter focused on network 
of friends. 
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Finding of differential social learning by poverty status implies that the 
marginal value of information from social networks differs across households with 
different levels of poverty and needs to be considered more in social network effects 
studies as well as in the development of both effective poverty reduction strategies and 
extension or other information dissemination strategies in rural areas. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 4.1a Mean Network Size for Recent Adopters of Improved Seed  
 
 Complete Sample Poverty Trap 
Not in a poverty 
trap 
 Total Adopters 
Non 
Adopters 
Adopt
ers 
Non 
Adopters Adopters 
Non 
Adopters 
Friends 4.959 5.662 4.195 4.348 7.467 6.949 2.295 
 (10.3) (11.02) (9.47) (7.25) (13.95) (14.45) (4.74) 
        
Neighbors 5.263 3.135 7.573 3.000 6.929 2.769 5.933 
 (12.6) (4.63) (7.24) (4.99) (14.44) (3.48) (10.64) 
        
Observations 171 89 82 76 
  
 84 
(Standard deviation in parenthesis) 
(Network size refers to number of people in the network who had adopted prior to the 
household in question) 
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Table 4.1b Mean Network Size for Recent Adopters of Irrigated Crops  
 
 (Standard deviation in parenthesis) 
(Network size refers to number of people in the network who had adopted prior to the 
household in question) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Network type Complete Sample Poverty Trap 
Not in a poverty 
trap 
 Total Adopters 
Non 
Adopters Adopters 
Non 
Adopters Adopters 
Non 
Adopters 
Friends 4.706 6.612 2.251 8.136 2.346 5.276 2.409 
 (7.747) (9.505) (3.290) (11.121) (2.629) (7.559) (3.761) 
            
Neighbors 2.997 3.926 1.845 4.459 1.683 3.45 2.115 
 (3.975) (4.455) (2.925) (4.893) (2.262) (4.028) -3.346) 
            
Observations 167 94 73 27 47 36 45 
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Table 4.1c Mean Number of Network Members Already Using Fertilizer by 
Network Type for Recent Adopters of Fertilizer 
 
Network type Complete Sample Poverty Trap 
Not in a poverty 
trap 
  Total Adopters 
Non 
Adopters Adopters 
Non 
Adopters Adopters 
Non 
Adopters 
Friends 6.013 7.846 4.981 7.586 5.091 8.08 4.467 
 (7.182) (9.789) (5.403) (11.364) (4.689) (8.563) (5.344) 
           
Neighbors 5.737 6.286 4.334 7.856 5.544 5.561 4.966 
 (8.177) (9.143) (6.754) (10.877) (6.052) (3.528) (6.059) 
           
Observations 172 58 92 25 34 30 42 
 (Standard deviation in parenthesis) 
(Network size refers to number of people in the network who had adopted prior to the 
household in question) 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  Complete Sample 
Poverty 
Trap 
Not in 
Poverty 
Trap 
        
MaleHead(1/0) 0.581 0.539 0.553 
  (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) 
Household Livestock(Ethiopian Birr) 462.89 403.05 410.36 
  (461.86) (302.17) (491.03) 
Household Non Productive assets 
(Ethiopian birr) 406.65 363.255 411.60 
  (526.07) (419.27) (559.99) 
Age of household head (years) 49.700 50.565 48.09 
  (13.99) (12.45) (17.07) 
Distance to closest market(Km) 4.471 5.090 3.94 
  (3.66) (7.96) (8.04) 
Distance to paved road(km)  13.179 14.88 11.87 
  (8.06) (4.23) (3.05) 
Household Land Cultivated (hectares) 2.053 2.947 2.814 
  (2.74) (2.05) (3.15) 
Fulltime Farm Labor (Number) 2.064 2.237 1.917 
  (1.14) (1.15) (1.10) 
Most Education(years) 5.102 5.123 5.356 
  (3.19) (3.29) (3.09) 
Number of observations 160 76 84 
(Standard deviation in parenthesis) 
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Table 4.3 Social Network Effects on The Adoption of Improved Cereals 
 
  
Logit estimation 
results Probit  estimation results 
Improved cereals 
Odds 
Ratio P>z Coef. 
Margin
al 
Effect P>z 
MaleHead(1/0) 0.956 0.933 -0.034 -0.0113 0.910 
Household Livestock 0.999 0.286 0.000 0.0000 0.293 
Household 
NonProductive assets 0.999 0.902 0.000 0.0000 0.884 
Agehead (years) 0.967* 0.082  -0.019* -0.0062 0.078 
Distance to closest 
market(Km) 0.9858 0.758 -0.009 -0.0030 0.717 
Distance to paved 
road(km)  1.0054 0.737 0.003 0.0009 0.763 
Household Land 
Cultivated  1.099* 0.104   0.059 0.0198 0.110 
Fulltime Farm Labor 
(Number) 0.9709 0.880 -0.019 -0.0064 0.868 
Most Education(years) 1.0172 0.811 0.006 0.0021 0.869 
Friend Network size 1.0984** 0.028 
    
0.051** 0.0170 0.024 
Friend Network size 
Squared 0.9980** 0.030 
   -
0.001** -0.0001 0.031 
Neighbor network size 0.9398 0.576 -0.031 -0.0104 0.648 
      
Neighbor network size 
squared 0.9983 0.673 -0.001 -0.0004 0.671 
Harresawe 0.0411*** 0.000 -1.883*** 0.579 0.000 
Number of Observations 150   150   
Prob > chi2 0.0000   0.0000   
Pseudo R2 0.3598   0.3588     
 *=significant at 10%  **=significant at 5%  ***significant at1%      Coef means coefficient 
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Table 4.4 Social Network Effects on The Adoption of Improved Cereals-
Estimation by Poverty Status 
 
 
Logit estimation  
Results 
   Probit estimation            
results 
Improved cereals 
Odds 
Ratio P>z Coef. 
Margi
nal 
effects P>z 
MaleHead(1/0) 1.0472 0.936 0.0137 0.0011 0.963 
Household Livestock 0.9999 0.486 -0.0001 0.0000 0.512 
Household NonProductive 
assets 0.9998 0.770 -0.0001 0.0000 0.745 
Agehead (years) 0.9628* 0.077 -0.0220* -0.0018 0.049 
Distance to closest market(Km) 0.9906 0.868 -0.0086 -0.0007 0.758 
Distance to paved road(km)  0.9973 0.892 -0.0029 -0.0002 0.794 
Household Land Cultivated  1.1203 0.159 0.0664 0.0055 0.115 
Fulltime Farm Labor (Number) 0.9594 0.845 -0.0271 -0.0022 0.822 
Most Education(years) 0.9974 0.972 -0.0057 -0.0005 0.886 
Not in a poverty trap 0.9433 0.923 -0.0559 -0.0046 0.866 
Friends*PovTrap 0.7172 0.144 -0.1907 -0.0157 0.130 
Friends*PovertyTrapSquared 1.015* 0.082 0.0088* 0.0007 0.083 
Friends*NonPovertyTrap 1.538* 0.102 0.2456* 0.0202 0.078 
Friends*NonPovertyTrap 
Squared 0.985* 0.079 -0.009* -0.0007 0.078 
Neighbors’*PovertyTrap 1.2046 0.197 0.1099 0.0090 0.284 
Neighbors*PovertyTrapSquared 1.000** 0.036 0.1403 0.0004 0.130 
Neighbors*Non PovertyTrap 0.7766  0.337 -0.0046 -0.0115 0.350 
Neighbors*NonPovertyTrap 
Squared 1.0031 0.782 0.0018 0.0002 0.774 
Harresawe 0.050*** 0.001 
-
1.7623**
* -0.1810 0.000 
Number of Observations 138  138   
Prob > chi2 0.0000  0.0000   
Pseudo R2 0.379   0.3793     
*=significant at 10%  **=significant at 5%  ***significant at1%  Coef means coefficient 
 
 
 
 
 
 
175 
 
Table 4. 5 Social Network Effects on The Adoption of Irrigated Crops  
  
Logit estimation  
Results Probit estimation results 
Irrigated crop 
Odds 
Ratio P>z Coef. 
Margi
nal 
effects P>z 
MaleHead(1/0) 0.472 0.418 -0.530 -0.147 0.295 
Household Livestock 1.000 0.163 0.000 0.000 0.202 
Household NonProductive 
assets 
    
1.002*** 0.004 0.001*** 0.000 0.005 
Agehead (years) 1.021 0.417 0.015 0.004 0.309 
Distance to closest 
market(Km) 1.038 0.632 0.026 0.007 0.497 
Distance to paved road(km)  0.929*** 0.006 -0.036*** -0.010 0.001 
Household Land Cultivated  1.461*** 0.000 0.215*** 0.060 0.000 
Fulltime Farm Labor 
(Number) 1.773 0.157 0.259 0.072 0.214 
Most Education(years) 1.124 0.363 0.039 0.011 0.498 
Friend Network size 2.718***. 0.011 0.578*** 0.160 0.002 
Friend Network size Squared 0.924** 0.015 -0.046*** -0.013 0.006 
Neighbor network size 1.289 0.298 0.149 0.041 0.275 
Neighbor network size 
squared 0.990 0.433 -0.006 -0.002 0.466 
Harresawe 55.78*** 0.007 
2.3113**
* 0.466 0.001 
Number of Observations 85  85.000   
Prob > chi2 0.03  0.000   
Pseudo R2 0.3625   0.3548     
*=significant at 10%  **=significant at 5%  ***significant at1%     Coef. Means coefficient 
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Table 4.6 Social Network Effects on The Adoption of Irrigated Crops  
– Estimation by Poverty Status 
 
  
Logit estimation  
Results Probit estimation results 
Irrigated crop Odds Ratio P>z Coef. 
Margin
al 
effects P>z 
MaleHead(1/0) 0.4718 0.418 -0.3970 -0.0907 0.417 
Household Livestock 1.0001 0.163 0.0001 0.0000 0.116 
Household 
NonProductive assets 1.0016*** 0.004 0.0009*** 0.0002 0.004 
Agehead (years) 1.0209 0.417 0.0131 0.0030 0.346 
Distance to closest 
market(Km) 1.0380 0.632 0.0251 0.0057 0.526 
Distance to paved 
road(km)  0.9293*** 0.006 -0.0408*** -0.0093 0.003 
Household Land 
Cultivated  1.4610*** 0.000 0.2229*** 0.0509 0.000 
Fulltime Farm Labor 
(Number) 1.7728 0.157 0.3441 0.0786 0.127 
Most Education(years) 1.1241 0.363 0.0572 0.0131 0.395 
Not in a poverty trap 0.2182 0.153 -0.8171 -0.2075 0.154 
Friends*PovertyTrap 2.6162** 0.039  0.5597*** 0.1279 0.031 
Friends*PovertyTrap 
Squared 0.9445 0.267 -0.0338 0.0442 0.239 
Friends*NonPoverty 
Trap 1.4984 0.530 0.1935 -0.0077 0.596 
Friends*Non 
PovertyTrapSquared 0.9460 0.457 -0.0282 -0.0064 0.498 
Harresawe 103.68*** 0.003 2.618*** 0.446 0.001 
Number of 
Observations 79  79   
Prob > chi2 0.03  0   
Pseudo R2 0.3625   
  
0.3644     
*=significant at 10%  **=significant at 5%  ***significant at1% 
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Table 4.7 Social Network Effects by Splines on The Adoption of Irrigated Crops 
 
Irrigated Crop 
     Marginal     
      effects 
     Robust 
standard error P>z 
    
MaleHead(1/0) -0.139 0.136 0.312 
Household Livestock 0.000 0.000 0.182 
Household NonProductive 
assets 0.0002 0.000 0.004 
Agehead (years) 0.0052 0.004 0.186 
Distance to closest 
market(Km) 0.004 0.010 0.706 
Distance to paved road(km)  -0.010 0.003 0.001 
Household Land Cultivated  0.059 0.014 0.000 
Fulltime Farm Labor 
(Number) 0.088 0.048 0.072 
Most Education(years) 0.016 0.016 0.327 
Having 1-4 adopters  0.404** 0.199 0.033 
Having 5-8 adopters   0.674*** 0.169 0.001 
Having more than 8 
adopters  0.625** 0.248 0.034 
Harresawe   0.454*** 0.137 0.009 
Number of Observations 85   
Prob > chi2 0.03   
Pseudo R2 0.3427     
*=significant at 10%  **=significant at 5%  ***significant at1% 
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Table 4.8  Social Network Effects on The Adoption of Fertilizer Use 
 
  Friends and Neighbors Friends only Neighbors only 
Fertilizer OR 
P>
z 
Coe
f 
P>
z OR P>z 
Coe
f 
P>
z OR 
P>
z 
Coe
f 
P>
z 
Male 
Head 
(1/0) 1.03 0.9 0.03 0.3 1.0993 0.61 0.05 0.8 1.2 0.8 0.08 0.8 
HH 
Livestock 1.00 0.5 0.00 0.5 1.0000 0.00 0.00 0.5 1.0 0.4 0.00 0.4 
New 
Pulse 3.15 0.1 0.71 0.1 3.0132 2.19 0.68 0.1 3.5 0.1 0.78 0.1 
New 
Cereal 7.69 0.0 1.24 0.0 8.4212 5.00 1.29 0.0 9.2 0.0 1.35 0.0 
NewVeg 5.91 0.0 1.04 0.0 6.4155 5.29 1.08 0.0 7.3 0.0 1.16 0.0 
Other 
Assets 1.01 0.1 0.00 0.1 1.0006 0.00 0.00 0.1 1.0 0.2 0.00 0.2 
Agehead 
(years) 1.01 0.7 0.00 0.7 1.0078 0.02 0.01 0.7 1.0 0.8 0.00 0.7 
Distance 
to closest 
market 
(Km) 0.96 0.4 
-
0.02 0.3 0.9632 0.04 
-
0.02 0.4 0.9 0.3 
-
0.02 0.3 
Distance 
to paved 
road(km)  0.99 0.9 
-
0.00
1 0.9 1.0021 0.02 
0.00
1 0.9 0.9 0.9 
-
0.01 0.8 
HH Land 
Cult.  0.96 0.8 
-
0.01 0.7 0.9545 0.10 
-
0.02 0.7 0.9 0.5 
-
0.03 0.5 
Fulltime 
Farm 
Labor 
(Number) 1.18 0.5 0.08 0.4 1.2389 0.28 0.12 0.4 1.1 0.6 0.06 0.6 
Most 
Educ. 
(years) 1.20 0.0 0.11 0.0 1.1925 0.09 0.10 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.11 0.0 
Friend 
Network 
size 1.03 0.5 0.02 0.5 
1.048*
* 0.03 
0.03
+ 0.1 - - - - 
Friend 
Network 
size 
Squared 1.01 0.3 
0.00
4 0.3 
1.002*
* 0.00 
0.00
1** 0.0 - - - - 
Neighbor 
network 
size 1.04 0.5 0.02 0.5 - - - - 0.9 0.2 
-
0.00
84 0.3 
Neighbor 
network 
size 
squared 0.99 0.7 
-
0.00
3 0.7 - - - - 1.0 0.4 
0.00
05 0.4 
Haresawe 1.08 0.9 0.06 0.9 1.1731 1.13 
0.09
0 
0.8
7 1.5 0.7 
0.21
17 0.7 
Number 
of Obs. 131  131   131  131   131  131  
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Table 4.8 (contd.) 
           
  Friends and Neighbors Friends only Neighbors only 
Prob > 
chi2 
0.00
0  
0.00
0   0.000  
0.00
0   
0.0
00  
0.00
0  
Pseudo 
R2 
0.23
65   
0.23
93   0.2322   
0.23
49   
0.2
122   
0.21
44   
*=significant at 10%  **=significant at 5%  ***significant at1% 
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Table 4.9  Differential Social Network Effects on The Adoption of Fertilizer  
by Poverty Status  
  
Logit estimation 
results 
Probit estimation 
results 
Fertilizer Odds Ratio P>z Coefficient P>z 
MaleHead(1/0) 1.8376 0.327 0.3512 0.314 
Household Non productive assets 1.0007* 0.101 0.0001 0.173 
Household Livestock 1.0001 0.220 0.7131 0.122 
NewPulse 2.9235 0.158 1.3912*** 0.000 
NewCereal 10.876*** 0.001 1.4556*** 0.001 
NewVeg 11.189*** 0.003 0.0005* 0.079 
Agehead (years) 0.9994 0.974 0.0005 0.962 
Distance to closest market(Km) 0.9444 0.193 -0.0341 0.169 
Distance to paved road(km)  0.9747 0.234 -0.0136 0.244 
Household Land Cultivated  0.9479 0.667 -0.0239 0.671 
Fulltime Farm Labor (Number) 1.1046 0.699 0.0559 0.689 
Most Education(years) 1.2395*** 0.007 0.1346*** 0.000 
Not in a poverty trap 0.3073 0.177 -0.6437 0.167 
Friend Network size*Poverty Trap 1.1288 0.391 0.0677 0.399 
Friends network size 
squared*Poverty Trap 0.997 0.550 -0.0011 0.582 
Friend Network size*Not in 
Poverty Trap 1.314+ 0.155 0.153+ 0.130 
Friends network size squared*Not 
in Poverty Trap 1.0006* 0.093 0.0002* 0.077 
Harresawe 5.809 0.143 0.9307 0.145 
Number of Observations 121   121  
Prob > chi2      
Pseudo R2 0.2859   0.2884   
*=significant at 10%  **=significant at 5%  ***significant at1% 
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Table 4.10  Social Network Effects for Improved Cereals After Dropping 
Households Considered to be High Ability 
 
 
Dropping high 
ability (a) 
Dropping 
high ability 
(b) 
Dropping high 
ability (c) 
Improved seed Coef. P>z Coef P>z Coef P>z 
MaleHead(1/0) -0.065 0.84 
-
0.113 0.7 -0.076 0.81 
Household Livestock 0.000 0.56 0.000 0.3 0.000 0.32 
Household NonProductive assets 0.000 0.69 0.000 0.7 0.000 0.67 
Agehead (years) -0.017 0.11 
-
0.022 0.0 -0.022 0.03 
Distance to closest market(Km) -0.014 0.57 0.009 0.7 0.014 0.54 
Distance to paved road(km)  -0.001 0.88 0.001 0.9 0.003 0.79 
Household Land Cultivated  0.064 0.10 0.104 0.1 0.079 0.13 
Fulltime Farm Labor (Number) -0.02 0.88 
-
0.003 0.9 0.006 0.96 
Most Education(years) -0.007 0.86 0.002 0.9 -0.003 0.93 
Friends 0.05 0.02 0.040 0.01 0.044 0.04 
Friends Squared -0.001 0.02 
-
0.000
6 0.01 -0.0006 0.05 
Number of Observations 137  136  140  
Prob > chi2 0.00  0.000  0.000  
Pseudo R2 0.352   
0.340
1   0.3521   
(a) Sample of households with no members of local rotating and savings club 
(b) Sample of households with no members engaged in nonfarm enterprises or 
wage labor 
(c) Sample of households without past experience with NGO’s 
(d) Coef means coefficient 
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Table 4.11  Social Network Effects for Irrigated Crops After Dropping 
Households Considered to be High Ability  
 
Dropping high 
ability 
 (a) 
Dropping high 
ability  
(b) 
Dropping 
high ability 
(c) 
Irrigated crops Coef P>z Coef P>z Coef P>z 
MaleHead(1/0) -0.568 0.275 -1.254 0.184 0.775 0.29 
Household Livestock 0.000 0.318 0.000 0.910 0.000 0.21 
Household NonProductive 
assets 0.001 0.004 0.006 0.009 0.003 0.01 
Agehead (years) 0.015 0.304 0.038 0.185 -0.014 0.37 
Distance to closest market(Km) 0.026 0.513 0.064 0.299 0.041 0.42 
Distance to paved road(km)  -0.034 0.002 -0.072 0.034 -0.043 0.04 
Household Land Cultivated  0.212 0.000 0.292 0.001 0.151 0.01 
Fulltime Farm Labor (Number) 0.302 0.171 0.349 0.426 0.167 0.61 
Most Education(years) 0.040 0.514 0.213 0.145 -0.057 0.59 
Friends 0.534 0.003 0.591 0.060 0.609 0.04 
Friends Squared -0.041 0.008 -0.041 0.129 -0.043 0.05 
Number of Observations 78   33   54   
Prob > chi2 0.000  0.027  0.060  
Pseudo R2 0.3424   
0.418
2   
0.392
4   
(a) Sample of households with no members of local rotating and savings club 
(b) Sample of households with no members engaged in nonfarm enterprises or 
wage labor 
(c) Sample of households without past experience with NGO’s 
(d) Coef means coefficient 
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Figure 4.1 Network Effect of Friends on The Probability of Adopting Irrigated  
Crops 
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Figure 4.2 Network Effect of Neighbors on The Probability of Adopting Irrigated  
Crops 
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Figure 4.3 Network Effects of Friends for Households in a Poverty Trap 
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Figure 4.4  Network Effect of Friends for Households not in a Poverty Trap 
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CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
A major cause of food insecurity in the developing world is not just food 
availability but poor access to food due to poverty and limited effective demand. At 
least 80% of humanity lives on less than $10 a day (Ravallion, M and Chen, S, 2008) 
and while poverty rates in various countries, particularly in East Asia are falling, 
poverty continues to grow in Sub Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2008). Though not 
exclusively, the growth in these regions experiencing poverty reduction was partly due 
to increased agricultural productivity. Despite the primary role of agriculture in the 
livelihoods of rural households in Africa, the agricultural sector remains highly 
underdeveloped. It is predominantly rain fed, thus dependent on weather fluctuations 
and characterized by the intense use of low fertility soils with low adoption rates of 
modern technologies and minimal use and external farm inputs on lands suffering 
from environmental degradation.(Kheralla et al, 2002). Poor infrastructure and non 
functioning institutions further limit rural farmers’ access to various markets and 
related opportunities. Thus one key issue becomes pertinent in addressing rural 
poverty; first any approach to poverty reduction in sub Saharan Africa will require 
increased agricultural productivity and an increase in effective demand among rural 
dwellers who constitute the majority of the poor. For this to be done, there must be a 
proper understanding of who the poor are and why they are poor.  Next there must be 
appropriate strategies to assist the poor depending on the nature and reason for their 
poverty. 
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The limitations of monetary measures of poverty based on income or 
consumption expenditures due to measurement error problems and the multifaceted 
nature of poverty is a generally accepted fact in the poverty and development literature 
(Carter and Barret, 2006;World Bank, 2008). This has led to a broader and more 
inclusive approach to the concept of poverty extending beyond monetary measures 
like income to include the political and social dimensions of well being. Similarly, the 
role of household assets as indicators of wealth is also largely recognized in the 
development literature (Sahn and Stifel, 2000; Hulme and Shepherd, 2003; 
Zimmerman and Carter, 2003. However, it is only recently that a clear distinction is 
being made between assets as indicators of wealth vs. assets as determinants of 
production capacity (Carter and Barrett, 2006). This dissertation contributes to the 
research on poverty and development in Sub Saharan Africa in several ways. First the 
dissertation contributes to the global effort to identify the poor by providing a 
theoretically consistent poverty measure based on human and physical assets owned 
by a household and their consequent productive capacity rather than on monetary 
measures. While not in conflict with traditional poverty measures based on 
consumption expenditures (or income) alone, the measure developed and tested in 
chapter 2 provides a more nuanced view of the structural nature of poverty in rural 
Ethiopia, proving to be consistently better able to predict the future expenditure 
poverty status of a household than the expenditure  measure itself.  The findings of 
chapter 2 confirm that asset-based measures could be used to more carefully target 
poverty interventions and to more accurately assess the impact of those interventions.  
If assets are better predictors of household’s income status than income measures like 
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consumption expenditures in rural areas, then assets are more reliable estimates of 
poverty than consumption expenditures and should be used by governments and 
agencies in their documentation of rural poverty.  Though the households in the 
sample were generally poor, the analysis showed that it is still possible to clearly 
distinguish between different kinds of poor farmers. Furthermore, the analysis of asset 
dynamics further reveals that there is a minimum bundle of assets necessary for 
households to be able to sustain a long term non poor status. This helps to clearly 
identify “vulnerable” households requiring risk mitigation strategies from those in 
more dire conditions requiring much deeper assistance to enable them be able to have 
the capacity to independently maintain a non poor status. This is important information 
for development practitioners.  
The second contribution this research makes relates to understanding long term 
chronic poverty and poverty traps. I test for multiple equilibria of asset bundles 
(poverty traps) in rural Ethiopia. Unlike other studies in rural Ethiopia that looked only 
at livestock dynamics and found evidence of convergence, the results of this study 
show that among sedentary farmers, though livestock play an important role in 
production, a complete asset bundle is necessary (including tools, jewelry and social 
capital) and households with too few assets tend to find themselves trapped at a low 
level equilibrium and unable to grow out of poverty. The study finds evidence of 
geographic poverty traps and farming system related poverty traps indicating the 
importance of infrastructure and access to commercialization opportunities on the 
ability of farmers to make meaningful investments and grow out of poverty. 
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This dissertation also shows that contextual setting is important in asset 
poverty measurement. While land is often thought to be a very critical asset, the 
research findings in rural Ethiopia, show that livestock, household tools and social 
networks are more important. It is only at larger land sizes that land becomes very 
important. This is probably partly due to the small land sizes owned by majority of 
farmers (hence limited variation at low levels) as well as the low quality of land (that 
many farmers complained about) such that larger land sizes are needed for satisfactory 
production. Livestock would thus naturally be more important since they are a source 
of manure for soil fertility as well as a means of traction and transportation; and social 
networks would be important to deal with various shocks and to supplement 
productive resources. These results indicate a need for further attention to the 
problems of limited land size and soil fertility in Ethiopia, including strategies for 
replenishing soil fertility as well as expanding nonfarm activities. It also calls for 
increased attention to the rearing of livestock. This includes better understanding of 
the challenges faced by rural sedentary farmers in rearing livestock (e.g. limited 
grazing land and expensive fodder) to  increasing access to improved livestock 
services for cross breeding and animal health. 
One would expect that the assistance needed by rural households would differ 
across households at different levels of poverty. As development programs are 
developed, not only do practitioners and funders  need to know which households are 
in poverty but they need to know which households are more likely to benefit from the 
various programs, depending on the constraints they face. The third contribution of 
this study relates to the findings of chapter 2 and consequent claims. Based on chapter 
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2, this dissertation claims that asset-based measures could be used to more carefully 
target poverty interventions and to more accurately assess the impact of those 
interventions. Chapters three and four of this dissertation explore this. In particular 
these two chapters test whether it is necessary for program evaluation to distinguish 
between different kinds of poor households due to differences in the marginal benefits 
of reducing specific constraints to technology adoption. Chapter three tests for the 
differential effect of a reduced credit constraint on the behavior and wellbeing of rural 
households with different degrees of asset poverty while chapter four tests for a 
differential effect of social networks on farmer behavior.  
Using a constrained utility maximization approach, chapter three shows that 
the effect of reducing credit constraints via formal credit is not uniformly distributed 
among rural households, being strongest for the never asset poor. Participation in 
micro-finance programs raises the likelihood of technology use for the less poor 
households only and new technologies are also primarily associated with consumption 
and asset growth for these households. It confirms that recognizing target group 
differences using asset poverty typologies can be important in program development 
as well as program evaluation. Household model approaches to farmer production 
decisions when faced with constraints have shown that credit for the credit constraint, 
does not necessarily affect production decisions but still has a positive effect on 
welfare ( Sadoulet and De Janvry, 1994).This is usually explained as consistent with 
rational economic behavior where extreme poverty might cause the presence of other 
constraints to render the use of various inputs like fertilizer and chemicals 
economically unprofitable. For example, for vulnerable households with very small 
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plots of land, limited access to markets, labor supply and ability to smooth 
consumption, the additional cost of purchasing various inputs might not be fully 
covered by the expected value of output due to uncertainty about yields and prices. 
The high marginal value of money for such constrained households could lead them to 
use additional funds to smooth consumption or to engage in other activities with less 
uncertainty rather than invest in various inputs.  
The findings of this dissertation reveal otherwise. Not only do we find no 
relationship between participation in formal credit schemes and technology use for the 
poorest households, we also do not find a direct relationship between formal credit and 
growth in consumption expenditure or assets for this group. However, we do find 
evidence of a link between informal credit and technology use as well as a positive 
relationship between the use of fertilizer and consumption as well as asset growth. 
These indicate that reducing the credit constraint faced by the poorest farmers can 
affect production decisions and that it is economically rational for them to engage in 
the use of some technologies like fertilizer. Given that majority of the poorest farmers 
would be subsistence farmers with limited land, credit constrained and probably net 
buyers of food, the various constraints they face due to failed markets would raise the 
shadow prices of food crops actually encouraging the use of fertilizer for increased 
food production to reduce  the need to  purchase from the market at higher prices. 
These findings question  conclusions that credit constraint reductions can plausibly be 
expected to have limited to no effect on the production decision of the poorest 
households. The findings imply a need for careful distinctions between various sources 
of credit as well as exploring why formal mechanisms do not serve this population and 
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how this can be addressed. They also reveal the need for the careful thought about the 
effect of multiple market failures(or constraints) on shadow prices of commodities and 
the impact this could have on the production decisions of household depending on 
whether they are net buyers and sellers. 
Chapter four supports the findings of chapter three, showing how the marginal 
benefit of additional information from social networks differs across households with 
different levels of poverty. Chapter four explores the roles that social networks play in 
the modern technology adoption behavior of rural farmers. Using a target input model 
of social learning, the chapter finds that social networks play a role in the adoption of 
modern technologies and this differs by network type, technology and poverty status. 
It finds evidence of social learning as well as other network effects, believed to be 
more related to marketing of inputs and outputs. Within both of these network effects, 
evidence of exclusion of the poor is evident. While finding some effect of reducing 
credit and information constraints is encouraging, the finding that formal credit and 
social learning effects can be exclusive (emerging through purposeful interaction 
rather than proximity) is significant for planning of credit and extension programs 
respectively. Since informal credit appears to help farmers, even the poorest and some 
modern technologies like fertilizer use positively affect their wellbeing, further study 
of the limited impact of formal credit on this group is necessary to identify why this 
source of credit appears not to be serving the poorest with regards to technology 
adoption. 
The presence of social learning from friends indicates that technology diffusion 
is likely to be enhanced if extension can reach more networks of interest.  This implies 
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a need to target intentional groups of rural people rather than spatial clusters. This 
research also raises the need to explore further the differences between the social 
networks of different kinds of households. There is a need to test if the quality of 
information differs across networks of different kinds of poor farmers or if the 
multiplicity of constraints to adoption faced by the poorest requires approaches 
focused on this group that target these multiple constraints to increase their response to 
reduced information constraints . Since our results reveal that social learning occurs 
only with purposeful interaction rather than geographical proximity, possibilities for 
exclusion become an important issue as development agents and extension workers 
cannot expect that the mere presence of a successful technology in the village would 
have spillover effects within the community.   
Researchers expect that future agricultural productivity will be driven by 
germplasm advancement and improve crop management practices. It is believed that 
crop management practices will take a more prominent seat (with farmers relying on 
multiple channels to supply new technologies and information) as crop management 
technologies will be used to substitute farmer knowledge and skills for inputs. (Gollin 
et al, 2005; Lee,R, 2005). This critical role of information in the future of agriculture 
in developing countries necessitates approaches to information dissemination with a 
broad outreach capacity. Besides the general conception that geographical networks 
were important for social learning, most research highlight the role that networks like 
farmer organizations, cooperatives, usually set up for other reasons (e.g crop 
marketing) could play in the dissemination of information. However, if membership in 
these groups is exclusive, probably by nature (e.g. mostly for  net sellers of a 
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commodity), other mechanisms need to be sought to reach the poorest farmers who by 
virtue of being subsistence farmers might not participate in such groups. In essence, 
chapters three and four highlight the importance of developing appropriate strategies 
for different kinds of households (even within a particular effort like credit or 
extension) for development practitioners and prevent false assessment of government 
and other development programs. The potentially different marginal benefit of 
programs due to poverty status needs to be considered more in credit and social 
network effects studies as well as in the development of both effective poverty 
reduction strategies in rural areas. 
In closing, the combined research in the chapters of this dissertation provides a 
more comprehensive view of structural poverty in rural Ethiopia. It provides a tested 
measure of poverty based on productive capacity that can be used all across rural areas 
in developing countries. The research also contributes to the literature on poverty traps 
and reasons for their existence, particularly focused on the role of infrastructure, 
commercialization opportunities and risk mitigating institutions in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Finally this research contributes to the program evaluation literature  showing the 
importance of considering the differential effect of programs on households depending 
on their poverty level and the key roles such considerations can play in developing 
appropriate strategies to increase rural farmer productivity, increase local effective 
demand and reduce rural poverty.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A.1 Shea Partial R Squared, Traditional R Squared and First Stage F-
Statistic 
Variable 
Shea 
Partial R2 
Partial 
R2 
F 
statistic 
P-
value 
Draught Animals  0.91 0.82 1637.2 0.00 
Dairy Animals  0.89 0.79 1121.9 0.00 
Pack Animals 0.85 0.78 912.2 0.00 
Other Livestock 0.70 0.84 1564.5 0.00 
Education 0.95 0.95 4541.6 0.00 
Non Farm Activities 0.89 0.92 975.8 0.00 
Food For Work Program 0.89 0.91 1239.0 0.00 
Other Physical Assets 0.88 0.84 1241.8 0.00 
Land*Tools 0.54 0.73 316.4 0.00 
Land*Draught Animals 0.73 0.75 561.2 0.00 
Tools*Livestock 0.78 0.78 777.6 0.00 
Memberships 0.93 0.93 2020.4 0.00 
Off Farm Activities 0.84 0.86 2464.1 0.00 
Toos Squared 0.84 0.80 448.3 0.00 
Other Livestock squared 
value 0.67 0.81 735.7 0.00 
Other Physical Assets 
Squared 0.87 0.83 1067.7 0.00 
Dairy animals squared 
value 0.89 0.80 1020.7 0.00 
Pack animals squared 
(values) 0.85 0.80 787.2 0.00 
Draught Animals squared 
value 0.91 0.83 1364.7 0.00 
The traditional R squared is the squared-partial correlation between the excluded 
instruments and the endogenous regressor in question.  Shea's (1997) partial R-squared 
is a measure of instrument relevance that takes intercorrelations among instruments 
into account and the F test is that associated with the excluded instruments in the 
corresponding first-stage regression 
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Table A.2 Under Identification Tests 
Ho: matrix of reduced form coefficients has rank=K-1 (underidentified) 
Ha: matrix has rank>=K (identified) 
 
Tests: 
Anderson canon. corr. likelihood ratio stat.     3800.40         0.0000 
Cragg-Donald N*minEval stat.                     5013.67         0.0000 
 
Conclusion: 
By both tests, reject null hypothesis of underidentification 
 
 
 
 
 
Table  A.3 Specification  Test for Appropriateness of Endogenous Variables 
 
Ho: Endogenous variables xi=0 in main equation 
Ha: Endogenous variables xi ≠0 in main equation 
 
Tests: 
Anderson-Rubin test of joint significance of endogenous variables 
F(24,7113)=    14.51     P-val=0.0000 
Chi-sq(24)=    350.68    P-val=0.0000 
*This statistic is robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust 
Conclusion: 
Reject the null hypothesis that the endogenous variables are inappropriately included 
in the main equation 
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Table  A.4 Instrument Relevance Test 
Ho: Matrix of instruments is underidentified 
Ha: Matrix of instruments is identified 
 
Anderson canonical correlation LR statistic  3800.400    Chi-sq(2) P-val =    
0.0000  
Conclusion: 
Reject null hypothesis that the instruments were not relevant. 
* This rejection has to be considered alongside the weak instrument results  
 
 
Table  A.5 Instrument Validity Test 
Ho: The instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term 
Ha: The instruments are not valid, i.e., not uncorrelated with the error term 
 
Hansen J statistic:    0.490 Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.4837     
 
Conclusion: 
Fail to reject null hypothesis 
In GMM estimation, the J statistic is the minimized value of the GMM criterion 
function. Thus the test is if the statistic is close enough to zero indicating a satisfaction 
of the orthogonality conditions. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Table B.1 Parametric Estimations with Social Capital 
Dependent variable = Asset 
Index in 2004 (AI 2004) Coefficient P>|t| 
AI 1994 0.986 0.000 
AI 19942 0.074 0.120 
AI 19943 -0.190 0.000 
Household size -0.142 0.000 
Male Headed Household -0.001 0.954 
Age of Household Head -0.295 0.000 
Squared Age of Houehold 
Head 0.060 0.000 
Social Capital 0.184 0.000 
Number of obs 1190  - 
F(  7,  1182) 377.28  - 
Prob > F 0  - 
R Squared 0.701  
Adj R-squared 0.6998  - 
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Figure B.1 Village Level Asset Index Dynamics: Parametric and Non Parametric 
Estimations of Village Asset Dynamics 
 
Village Dynamics from Parametric 
Estimation 
Village Dynamics from Non Parametric 
Estimation 
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Figure B.1. (contd.) 
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Figure B.1. (contd.) 
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Figure B.1.(contd.) 
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Figure B.1. (contd.) 
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the Impact of Microfinance on Smallholder Technology Use and Wellbeing in 
Ethiopia – Paper under review for the World Development Journal 
 
L. Saweda Onipede Liverpool (2008). Enhancing the Competitiveness of Commodity 
Value Chains in Nigeria. Presentation given at the International Food and Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) Stakeholder Workshop on “Developing Evidence for 
Agricultural and Rural Development Policies and Strategies in Nigeria”(May 20, 
2008). 
 
L. Saweda Onipede Liverpool and Winter-Nelson, Alex (2008) “An Asset-based 
Approach to Poverty Status Classification of Rural Households in Ethiopia”- Paper 
presented at the Southwestern Economics Association, 2008. Las Vegas, Nevada. 
(Currently under revision for submission for publication) 
 
L. Saweda Onipede Liverpool (2007) “The differential Impact of Institutional 
Interventions on Farmer Behavior and Livelihoods in Rural Ethiopia: Using an Asset 
based Measure of Poverty”  Presented at the Joint AERC/Cornell University 
conference on Bottom-Up Interventions and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa 
31 May – 1 June, 2007, Nairobi 
 
Liverpool, L. Saweda. Onipede and Winter-Nelson, Alex (2008). Poverty Status and 
the Impact of Microfinance on Smallholder Technology Use and Consumption in 
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Ethiopia – Poster Presented at the American Agricultural Economics Association 
meeting, 27 July –July 30, 2008. Orlando, Florida. 
 
Liverpool, L. Saweda. Onipede (2002). A report on information technology use in 
education in the Gambia  
   (Summer, 2002) 
 
Liverpool, L. Saweda. Onipede (2002) A report on Computer Fees in Nigerian 
Universities (2003) 
“Gender and Information Technology” - Paper Presented at the 2003 
Decision Makers Conference, University of Iowa (Summer, 2003) 
 
Professional Work Experience 
 
January 2008 to date:      Collaborator with International Food and Policy Research      
      Institute (IFPRI) 
 
A Commodity Value Chain Analysis: Exploring the 
competitiveness of Rice, Maize and Cassava Production in 
Nigeria using a Policy Analysis Matrix(PAM) Framework. 
 
 
August 2005 to date:  Graduate Teaching Assistant, Department of Agriculture 
and Consumer Economics, University of Illinois, Urbana 
Champaign – 
 
Courses: “The World Food Economy” and “Economic 
development in Tropical Africa” 
These courses are largely about development economic 
development issues across the world. They involve using 
economic concepts to explore changes in  
World demand and supply. They also explore issues of 
policy and international trade and their implications in 
developed and developing countries. 
 
 
August 2006 to July 2007:-  Norman Borlaug Fellow 
 
- Conducting research on “Asset Poverty, 
Technology Adoption and Livelihoods in Rural 
Ethiopia”:  
- Updating data on rural households in Ethiopia 
and re estimation of an asset based poverty 
classification model  
- Developing and administering household and 
208 
 
community level surveys 
- Training enumerators, pretesting and actual 
field Work. This involved coordinating and 
administering surveys in 15 different villages all 
across Ethiopia. This involved meetings with 
different community representatives in each 
village and conducting household surveys in 
two village 
 
August 2004 to May2006:-  Graduate Research Assistant, Department of 
Agriculture and Consumer Economics, University of 
Illinois, Urbana Champaign 
 
- Doing research on 
o Social capital and its role in Economic 
Development 
o Access to credit and welfare of rural 
households 
o Poverty and Poverty measurements in 
developing countries 
 
 
August 2003 to July 2004:-  Graduate Assistant, WiderNet Project, 226 
International Center University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 
52242 
 
- Coordination of partnerships and stakeholders 
for  The “eGranary” digital library project - a 
collaboration between various National and 
International organizations to improve digital 
communication in African Universities 
- Giving presentations to various groups on issues 
relating to information technology and 
development in Africa. 
- Teaching Assistant  for course on  
“Internetworks in International Development” 
 
 
June 2003 – August 2003:-  Intern, The Public Policy Center, University of 
Iowa 
227 South Quadrangle, Iowa City, IA 52242 
 
- Worked with the Center on a project focused on 
developing transportation policies that promote 
the well-being of Iowans for the Iowa 
Department of Transportation.  
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July 2003 – August 2003:-  Graduate Assistant, International Programs,  
University of Iowa, IA 52242 
 
- Organized an awareness camp for children ages 
7-11 called “Africa is not a Country” 
 
August 2001 – May 2003:-  Graduate Assistant, Global Studies Program 
and African Studies Program 226 International 
Center University of Iowa, Iowa City IA 52242 
 
- Organized talks, round table discussions and 
presentations by faculty and students on various 
national and global issues 
- Created and maintained class websites 
- Organized faculty meetings and other 
assignments given by dept. head 
 
August 2001 to May 2003:-   Project Assistant WiderNet Project, 226 
International Center University of Iowa, Iowa 
City, IA 52242 
  
- Researched on various information technology 
applications and their appropriate use in 
developing countries. 
- Participated in the production of reports and 
articles. 
- Organized volunteers for various projects 
 
May 2002 to June 2002 Intern at The Gambia College; Schools of Public 
health and  
agriculture 
 
An eight week internship in The Gambia, West 
Africa- Working with Gambian Researchers and 
students at the School of Agriculture and Public 
Health ( Summer, 2002). Exploring the role of 
ICT in economic development via education and 
human capital development 
 
Languages 
English (Excellent) Creole (Excellent) Hausa (Good)   French (Intermediate)  
 
 
Technical Skills and Software 
Familiar with STATA, R,  and  GAMS  
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Leadership and Activities 
 
Member:  American Association of Agricultural Economists (AAEA) (till date) 
Member:  Association of Christian Economists (ACE) (till date) 
Member: African Students Organization, University of Illinois, Urbana-
Champaign (till date) 
Secretary,  Graduate Student Organization, Department of Agriculture and 
Consumer Economics, University of Illinois, Urbana Champaign, 2005 
Public Relations 
 Officer,  African Students Association, University of Iowa, Iowa City, (2003) 
 
Volunteer,  Habitat for Humanity, Champaign Chapter – Homeworks store (2006) 
Volunteer,   Iowa City Crisis Center (Food Bank) 
Volunteer,       “ Sunday school teacher” at Stone Creek Church, Urbana, Illinois(2006) 
 Volunteer, “Sunday school coordinator”  Trinity Chapel,  Jos, Nigeria (1995- 2001) 
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